

(A) VIOLENCE (SECOND INPUT BY TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT - 19-05-1993):

1. In our previous input to the Technical Subcommittee we dealt with a number of basic principles and the overall approach to be adopted in handling this matter. We add the following input thereto:

(a) the Technical Subcommittee should deal with the draft proposals which the Planning Committee had presented to the Negotiating Council. Further details in this regard, as well as the current views of Planning Committee on this matter, can be obtained from Dr T. Eloff;

(b) We propose that the following points be taken into account when devising solutions to the violence issue:

(i) the need for a speedy settlement at the ongoing national negotiations;

(ii) the need to embark on mass education programmes on the need for peace in our land;

(iii) the need for a scientific analysis to be conducted on the manner in which violence has changed the outlook on life by the young people who have grown up in a violent atmosphere or environment and the

19 MAY 1993

B

27/1

303

Identification of remedial measures;

- (iv) the need to strike a deal which addresses, on a uniform basis, the future of the armed wings of liberation movements and of all the White right-wing armies. Such a deal should not discriminate as between organisations and should give equal treatment to all. The timing of the implementation of suggested solutions should reflect this principle;
- (v) the need to have extra-parliamentary parties participating at the negotiations assuming joint control of the armed forces (armies, police and prisons) controlled by the SATBVC States and the six homelands, immediately after the installation of the Transitional Executive Council;
- (vi) the need to embark on extensive social upliftment projects to rid our society of the suffering and poverty which contributes to violence;
- (vii) the need to identify the defects inherent in the current law enforcement mechanisms;

19 MAY 1993

B

27/2

304

- (viii) the need to identify the reasons why the success of the police in solving politically-motivated crime is so low;
- (ix) the effect which the present secret structures of the State security apparatus have in fanning mistrust amongst the various parties in South Africa and an identification of appropriate remedial measures which would include access to information on decisions taken at State Security Council level;
- (x) the need to remove from office all security personnel involved in all the covert operations - such as those who masterminded Operation Katzen;
- (xi) the need to consider the influence which certain political parties have on the security machinery serving particular States or homelands;
- (xii) the need to ensure that all the TBVC States and the homelands are properly equipped in terms of their machinery, infrastructural and manpower needs, to cope with violence;

19 MAY 1993

B 27/3

305

(xiii) the need to ensure that National Peace Accord structures address meaningfully the threat posed by the White right-wing. At present the emphasis is on so-called Black-on-Black violence; and

(xiv) the need to involve the heads of all the security forces referred to above in the formulation of a solution and the drafting or compilation of an action plan.

2. We have noted with dismay and a sense of shock the Inkatha Freedom Party's handling of its allegations relating to the killing of certain IFP members allegedly by persons known or unknown to that organisation. In Transkei during the years 1990 and 1991 we buried thousands of Transkeians who had been killed by IFP supporters in Transvaal and Natal. The killings still continue albeit on a lower scale. We have files containing all the relevant information and will present them to you when so requested. We also have in our possession affidavits identifying the perpetrators of the crimes as well as information linking them directly to the IFP. We therefore urge the Technical Subcommittee not to finalise the consideration of the IFP document referred to above without giving the Transkei Government the opportunity of placing the information contained in voluminous files, before it.

It is however the Government's view that a mudslinging match will get us

19 MAY 1993

B 27/4

306

nowhere and that the solution to the IFP "problem" lies in the proposals the Transkei Government has presented to the Technical Subcommittee on the issue of violence generally.

19 MAY 1993

^B 27/5 307