

ZEBEDIELA CIVIC ASSOCIATION
P.O. BOX 191
GROOTHOEK
0628
11. 02. 92

ATTENTION WORKING GROUP 1
CODESA SECRETARIAT
P.O. BOX 397
ISANDO 1600
Tel: 397-1198
Fax: 397-2211

Sir/Madam

RE: ROLE OF TRIBAL AUTHORITIES, POLICE, AND SADF DURING TRANSITION

During the dark period from which we are now emerging, the magistrate, empowered by the provisions of the Internal Security Act, could deny or grant permission for marches, pickets or the holding of meetings. The security forces could disrupt any of these activities if proof of permission could not be produced on request.

Some insignificant parts of this act have been repealed, but the actions of the security forces leave one with a feeling that they are ignorant of the modifications to this act or else they are operating within a certain covert political agenda. Presently, magistrates refuse to issue permits, saying there's no legal need for us to obtain permits. But a detachment of the SADF that is camping here in ZEBEDIELA disrupts our meeting, saying we must obtain permits from the tribal authority.

Always ready to carry out the SADF's instructions, the authority in turn refuses to grant us the permission, generally adopting a very hostile attitude towards us. Thus our political life effectively under the control of the SADF. Experience has taught us that even if the SADF were to pull out of our village, the Lebowa Police or the SAP would act in no difficult to find out why it is so. All these security structures are there to carry out the political programmes of one and the same government, the government that is in CODESA precisely because it acknowledges the shortcomings of its own political programmes.

There is no doubt that the present government will have the political wisdom to agree to defer the reigns of power to an interim government. But if this should happen while the security forces retain their present format and personnel, then there shall have arisen a situation in which the government shall have relinquished its power and yet its programmes remaining enforceable.

We say this because we don't see the SADF, SAP and the homeland police and military forces in their present format and served by the same personnel ever divorcing themselves from the notion that the "comrades" are the devils while the forces representing the present establishment are the saints. Such a transformation in security personnel thinking will never happen. We are the villains, they are protecting the saints, now and in the future-for ever.

It is an attitude that has been built over many years and it will never change. It is ingrained. While the mechanisms for the control of these security forces are being negotiated by CODESA, we would like to recommend that as a matter of urgency, CODESA urge the present government to effect the following:

1. All the detachments of the SADF that are deployed in the Northern Tvl villages (and elsewhere, if any) be removed;
2. The present government issue a circular to all SADF and police commanders instructing them to refrain from disrupting political meetings;
3. A similar circular be sent all tribal authorities informing them that they have no right to withhold or issue permits for meetings;
4. The present government issue a public multi-media statement indicating that it is committed to the implementation of the above.

We have communicated our feelings on this matter to the State President, Mr F.W. De Klerk, through a fax that we sent to him on 14th January 1992; and to the ANC, through a meeting with the National Leadership on 16th January 1992. We don't want to be forced into a situation where we are seen as taking the law into our own hands.

Delegates at CODESA don't represent themselves. They represent their constituencies. They must report to their constituencies who must in turn meet and discuss the issues and then submit their own views. This is democracy and it must be allowed to happen. Security forces are not politicians, let them not interfere in political matter, whether those political matters are "national" or local.

In our view, when the interim government comes into being the security forces should be structured as follows:

1. The SADF, homeland armies, and all liberation armies must merge in an acceptable proportion. Your working group may work out these proportions.
2. A large army during a transitional period is unnecessary. Large parts of the SADF and homeland armies must be deactivated.

3. The SAP and homeland police forces may remain intact. But they must serve the interests of the communities in which they operate. Each community should appoint a police watchdog committee which can mediate between the police and the community. This committee shall as its main duty, ensure that the police concentrate purely on criminal and civil cases and does not interfere in the political affairs of the community. The police watchdog committee should enjoy legal status.
4. Since the interim government would not be expected to have any interests of its own in the outcomes of the constitutional negotiations, the National Intelligence service would become obsolete and thus should be disbanded.

In conclusion we would like to quote the words that were spoken by an SADF soldier when he disrupted one of our meetings.
 "I assure you, I will not allow meetings that are held every Sunday to discuss our presence in this village. We are here to stay; take it from me, we will never leave this place; never"

That is the New South Africa for the National Party, and that, for us, is repression. May you please oblige us with a well-considered reply of this letter.

Yours in the Re-construction Process

T. J. MAHLOBOCANE
 @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@

FOR SECRETARY