

African National Congress

NEGOTIATIONS: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

(As adopted by the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress - 25 November, 1992)



The strategic perspective of the ANC is the transfer of power from the white minority regime to the people as a whole. This will usher in a new era characterised by the complete eradication of the system of apartheid, fundamental socio-economic transformation, peace and stability for all our people. The basic principle underpinning this new order is democratic majority rule.

1. BALANCE OF FORCES

By the end of the eighties, the strategic balance of forces was characterised by:

- 1.1 The liberation movement enjoyed many advantages over the regime, both internally and internationally. All the pillars of the struggle had grown from strength to strength:
 - a very high level of mass mobilisation and mass defiance had rendered apartheid unworkable;
 - the building of the underground had laid a basis for exercising political leadership and was laying a basis for the intensification of the armed struggle;
 - the world was united against apartheid.
- 1.2 At the same time the liberation movement faced certain objective weaknesses:
 - changes in Southern Africa were making it increasingly difficult for the ANC in the conduct of struggle;
 - there was no longer a visible intensification of the armed struggle;
 - the international community was making renewed attempts to impose a settlement plan.
- 1.3 The crisis in Eastern Europe, and the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of regional conflicts to the fore. In this context, South Africa was not going to be treated as an exception. Importantly, these changes also exerted new pressures on the regime to fall in line with the emerging international "culture" of multi-party democracy.
- 1.4 The apartheid power bloc was no longer able to rule in the old way. Its policies of repression and reform had failed dismally; and it faced an ever-deepening socio-economic crisis. At the same time the liberation movement did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime.

- it commands the support of the majority of South Africans;
- the liberation movement enjoys the capacity to mobilise large-scale mass action;
- it is able to influence and mobilise the international community.

However:

- the liberation movement suffers many organisational weaknesses;
- it does not command significant military and financial resources;
- it is unable to militarily defeat the counter-revolutionary movement or adequately defend the people.

2.4 As a result of mass action and negotiations, some progress has been made in the recent period. Some examples of these are: the CODESA Declaration of Intent (which establishes national consensus on the broad direction in which the political process should unfold); the Record of Understanding; and broad consensus on the need for an Interim Government and Constituent Assembly. Though the regime has succeeded in delaying the transition, there remains a groundswell of support within society as a whole for a speedy resolution of the political and socio-economic problems.

2.5 In this context, the liberation movement is faced with various options:

- a) resumption of the armed struggle and the perspective of revolutionary seizure of power;
- b) mass action and international pressure, within the broad context of negotiations, until the balance of forces is shifted to such an extent that we secure a negotiated surrender from regime;
- c) a negotiations process combined with mass action and international pressure which takes into account the need to combat counter-revolutionary forces and at the same time uses phases in the transition to qualitatively change the balance of forces in order to secure a thorough-going democratic transformation.

2.6 These options should be weighed against the following background:

2.6.1 The ANC's National Conference resolved, after weighing various factors - including the possibility of a negotiated resolution of the South African conflict and the objective situation outlined in Section 1 above - that the option of armed seizure of power was neither preferable nor viable at that juncture. The current situation does not warrant a review of this decision of National Conference.

2.6.2 An approach that aims to secure a negotiated surrender from the regime will entail a protracted process with tremendous cost to the people and the country.

- 4.2 This strategic perspective should recognise the following phases, each one of which has its regularities and objective and subjective demands:

PHASE 1: The period prior to the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council. (In this phase we should aim to: secure an agreement on free and fair election, Interim Government and Constituent Assembly; stop unilateral restructuring; broaden the space for free political activity; and address the issue of violence).

PHASE 2: The period from the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council leading up to the election of the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity. (In this phase we should aim to: consolidate peace through joint control over all armed forces; ensure free and fair elections; and mobilise for a decisive victory in the elections).

PHASE 3: The period of the drafting and adoption of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly. (In this phase we should aim to: establish an Interim Government in which the ANC would be a major player; adopt a new democratic constitution; and start addressing the socio-economic problems facing the country).

PHASE 4: The period of the phasing in of the new constitution, which will include the restructuring of the state machinery and the general dismantling of the system of apartheid.

PHASE 5: The period of the consolidation of the process of democratic transformation and reconstruction.

4.3 At all stages, we should consider carefully the balance of forces, how to change that balance, and therefore place ourselves in a position in which we can determine the correct path to follow to further the process of democratic change. In this context, the broad masses should play a decisive role. The process must be mass-driven.

4.4 The balance of forces, our specific objectives and our long-term goals would at each stage dictate the need to: enter into specific, and perhaps changing, alliances; and, make certain compromises in order to protect and advance this process.

5. GOALS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE AND OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES

5.1 The fundamental goal of the National Liberation Struggle is the transfer of power to the people as a whole and the establishment of a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society. This should not be confused with the immediate objectives we set for ourselves in each phase of the transition. At the same time, we should ensure that the immediate objectives we pursue do not have the effect of blocking our longer-term goals.

5.2 The objectives we set, and can attain in each phase, will depend on the balance of forces.

7. THE NEED FOR A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

- 7.1 We have already won the demand for an Interim Government of National Unity.
- 7.2 However, we also need to accept the fact that even after the adoption of a new constitution, the balance of forces and the interests of the country as a whole may still require of us to consider the establishment of a Government of National Unity - provided that it does not delay or obstruct the process of orderly transition to majority rule and that the parties that have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government. This is fundamentally different from an approach to power-sharing which entrenches veto powers for minority parties.
- 7.3 Some objectives of a Government of National Unity:
- 7.3.1 Stability during the period of transition to full democracy: the enemies of democracy will try to destabilise the new government and make democracy unworkable.
- 7.3.2 Commitment to and responsibility for the process: we should seek, especially in the early stages, to commit all parties to actively take part in the process of dismantling apartheid, building democracy and promoting development in the interest of all.

8. LAYING THE BASIS TO MINIMISE THE THREAT TO STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY

- 8.1 The new democratic government would need to adopt a wide range of measures in order to minimise the potential threat to the new democracy. However, some of these measures may have to be part and parcel of a negotiated settlement. The new government will also need to take into account the need to employ the talents and capacities of all South Africans, as well as the time it will take to implement an urgent programme of advancing the skills of those who have all along been deprived.
- 8.2 Strategic forces we need to consider right now are the SADF, SAP, all other armed formations and the civil service in general. If the transition to democracy affects all the individuals in these institutions wholly and purely negatively, then they would serve as fertile ground from which the destabilisers would recruit.
- 8.3 Not only do these forces have vast potential to destabilise a fledgling democracy in the future, but as importantly, they have the potential to delay the transition for a lengthy period of time or even make serious attempts to subvert the transition.
- 8.4 A democratic government will need to restructure the civil service and the security forces in order to ensure that:
- they are professional, competent and accountable;
 - they are representative of society as whole (including through the application of the principle of affirmative action);
 - they serve the interests of democracy; and

- the size of these institutions is determined by the objective needs of the country.

In this process it may be necessary to address the question of job security, retrenchment packages and a general amnesty based on disclosure and justice, at some stage, as part of a negotiated settlement. These measures will need to apply to all armed formations and sections of the civil service. However, the availability of resources and experiences of other countries need to be taken into account.

- 8.5 It is also necessary to consider other potential counter-revolutionary forces and find ways of engaging them and their mass base in the national effort to build a democratic society.
- 8.6 One of the basic guarantees to stability will be the implementation of development programmes to meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the majority of South Africans. This places a serious responsibility on the ANC to determine priorities and possibilities for democratic socio-economic transformation.

9. REACHING THE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

- 9.1 Some elements of the final negotiated settlement would take the form of multi-lateral (CODESA-type) agreements. Other elements of the settlement package would take the form of bilateral agreements between the ANC and the NP - such agreements would bind the two parties.
- 9.2 The thorny question of the powers, functions and boundaries of regions in a new South Africa may be an issue on which we would enter into bilateral discussion with the NP and other parties, and seek to reach an understanding which the parties would pursue in the Constituent Assembly.
- 9.3 The question of a Government of National Unity after the adoption of a new constitution, and the future of members of the security forces and the civil service could be dealt with through direct engagement with these forces, as part of a bilateral agreement or in multi-lateral agreements.

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LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS DEPT

FAX COVERSHEET

TO : DULLAH OMAR

FAX NO: (021) 959-2411 PAGE 4 OF 4

ATTENTION OF: Dullah

FROM: Zola Seweyup DATE 25/10/92

OUR FAX NO:

MESSAGE

*Could you be so kind as agreed
as to stand for me - the documents
at this conference at the
Centre for Human Right at Univ of Pretoria.
I plead with you. Could
you use the SACDEF Ticket?*

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR ANC/REGIME BILATERAL AGENDA

1. Status of bilateral decisions.

2. Elections

- 2.1 Date of Elections
- 2.2. Voter Identification and Registration
- 2.3. Voter Eligibility
- 2.4. Independent Electoral Commission including its powers, duties and functions.
- 2.5. The Role of the International Community
- 2.6. Administration of the electoral process.

3. Constitution Making Body

- 3.1 Composition
- 3.2. Constitutional principles
- 3.3. Special Majorities
- 3.4. Time Frames and deadlock breaking mechanisms
- 3.5. Threshold
- 3.6. Constitutional Panel/ arbitration

4. Interim Government

- 4.1 Legislature
 - 4.1.1 Composition and Structure
 - 4.1.2. Decision making procedure
- 4.2 Executive
 - 4.2.1 Composition
 - 4.2.2. Presidency
 - 4.2.3. Decision-making
- 4.3 Regional Administration
 - 4.3.1. Reincooperation of the TBVC states

5. Transitional Executive Council

- 5.1 Confirmation of WG3 proposals
- 5.2. Terms of reference of the Sub-Council for Defence, Law and Order and Foreign Affairs.

6. Independent Media Commission

- 6.1 Composition
- 6.2. Terms of Reference

7. Free Political Activity

- 7.1 Climate for free political activity in the TVBC and self governing areas.
- 7.2. Covert operations
- 7.3. Repressive legislation
- 7.4. State controlled media (including those in the bantustans).

8. Unilateral Restructuring

- 8.1. Economy
- 8.2. Media
- 8.3. Health/ Education/ Social welfare
- 8.4. Local Government
- 8.5. Land

9. Multilateral Negotiations

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE.

OCTOBER 1992

1. Balance of forces

1.1 Strategic balance of forces:

By the end of the eighties, the strategic balance of forces were characterized by

1.1.1 The apartheid power bloc was no longer able to rule in the old way. The balance of forces internally and internationally were such that the regime would be forced, sooner or later, to sue for negotiations.

1.1.2 The crisis in Eastern Europe, and the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of regional conflicts to the fore - in this context, South Africa was not going to be treated as an exception. This was reinforced by the all-round crisis in the South African region itself.

1.1.3 By the mid eighties, the liberation movement enjoyed many advantages over the regime, both internally and internationally. All the pillars of the struggle had grown from strength to strength. But by the late eighties, a number of key factors made it both desirable and imperative that the liberation movement pursues the path of a negotiated resolution of the South African conflict:

1.1.3.1 The possibility of revolutionary seizure of power and of a sustained and generalized peoples' war had become remote.

1.1.3.2 The possibility existed that the international community would itself attempt to impose a settlement plan.

1.1.3.3 The regime had no option but to itself seek negotiations with the liberation movement.

1.2 Shifts in the balance of forces:

1.2.1 The balance of forces are not completely static. However, for the foreseeable future, actions of the liberation movement can result only in "quantitative" or tactical shifts in the balance of


forces. Essentially changes would only take place within the context described in 1.1 and not outside it.

- 1.2.2 Nonetheless, "quantitative" shifts in the balance of forces can play a crucial role in influencing the final outcome of the negotiations. The most dramatic example of this is the impact of rolling mass action and mobilization of the international community over the past few months.

2. Negotiations the preferred option of the liberation movement.

- 2.1 Negotiations has always been the first option of the liberation movement - it is only when the prospect of any peaceful settlement vanished that we resorted to arms, while for the regime, it was the failure of arms that imposed the obligation to concede that need for negotiations.
- 2.2 Consequently, it must remain one of our strategic tasks to deny the regime the possibility of exercising its preferred option of resort to arms by defining the parameters of acceptable political activity as being confined within the field of free political activity, peaceful democratic action and genuine negotiations.
- 2.3 We must therefore contest the notion the negotiations represents a failure for the Democratic Movement and a victory for the forces of apartheid and therefore that the more difficult we make the process of negotiations, the revolutionary we are.
- 2.4 Delays in the process of peaceful transformation are not in the interests of the masses who seek liberation now, and do not enhance our possibilities to effect this transformation as effectively as we should.

3. Phases of the Democratic Revolution:

- 3.1 Our strategic perspective should take into account that the Democratic Revolution will proceed in various phases, our possibilities relevant to each specific phase should not be pursued in a manner that produces defeats later, because of a failure to recognize the dialectical inter-connection between various phases.
- 3.2 This strategic perspective could recognize the following phases, each one of which has its regularities and objective and subjective demands:
- 3.2.1 **PHASE 1:** The period leading up to the election of the
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
Constituent Assembly and the establishment of an elected Interim Government of National Unity;

- 3.2.2 **PHASE 2:** The period of the drafting and the adoption of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly;
 - 3.2.3 **PHASE 3:** The period of the phasing in of the new constitution, which will include the restructuring of the state machinery and the general dismantling of the system of apartheid;
 - 3.2.4 **PHASE 4:** The period of the consolidation this process of democratic transformation and reconstruction.
- 3.3 At all stages, we should determine the goals we seek to achieve, consider carefully the balance of forces in these dynamic situations and therefore place ourselves in the position in which we can determine the correct path to follow to further the process of democratic change, including the compromises that are necessary and the alliances to be formed to protect and advance this process.
- 4. Goals of the National Liberation Struggle and our immediate objectives.**
- 4.1 The long-term goals of the National Liberation Struggle should not be confused the immediate objectives we set for ourselves in each phase of the transition.
 - 4.2 The objectives we set depend on the balance of forces at each stage.
 - 4.3 By entering a new phase (e.g. the establishment of an Interim Government) the balance of forces themselves transform qualitatively in favour of the Democratic Movement. Negotiations therefore can result in the possibility of bringing about a radically transformed political framework in which the struggle for the achievement of the main goals of the National Democratic Revolution will be contested.
 - 4.4 In setting objectives for the present round of negotiations we must bear in mind that in the main one would not achieve at the table that which one could not achieve on the ground. This simply means that neither the ANC nor the regime can enforce a complete surrender of either party at the negotiating table.
 - 4.5 In setting objectives today, our strategy should not focus narrowly on only the initial establishment of democracy, but also, (and perhaps more

importantly) on how to nurture, develop and consolidate that democracy. Our strategy must at once also focus on ensuring that new democracy is not undermined.

- 4.6 Our broad objectives for the current phase (as distinct from longer-term goals) should therefore be:
- 4.6.1 The establishment of a democratic constitution-making process.
 - 4.6.2 Ending the National Party's monopoly of political power.
 - 4.6.3 Ensuring a continuing link between democracy and economic empowerment.
 - 4.6.4 Minimising the threat to stability and democracy.

5. The need for government of National Unity:

- 5.1 The objective reality imposes a central role for the ANC and NP in the transition. Without cooperation between these two forces it will not be possible to move the peace process forward.
 - 5.2 This must mean that the balance of forces has forced onto the South African political situation a relationship between these two leading players characterised by contradictory elements of cooperation in pursuit of common goals and competition in pursuit of divergent objectives.
 - 5.3 How to manage this contradiction, which arises from the fact that neither side has been defeated is one of our challenges of leadership.
 - 5.4 We have already accepted the desirability of an Interim Government of National Unity - in which, of course, the ANC and the NP would be the major components.
 - 5.5 However, we also need to accept the fact that even after the adoption of the new constitution, the balance of forces may still be such that we would seek to establish a government of National Unity in which the ANC and NP are the main players.
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6. Laying the basis to minimise the threat to stability and democracy:

- 6.1 The new democratic government would need to adopt a wide range of measures in order to minimise the threat to the new democracy. However, some of these measures may have to be part and parcel of a negotiated settlement.
- 6.2 Strategic forces we need to consider right now are the SADF, SAP and the Civil Service in general. If the transition to democracy affects the interests of the individual in these institutions wholly and purely negatively, then they would serve as fertile ground from which the destabilisers would recruit.
- 6.3 Not only do these forces have vast potential to destabilise a fledgling democracy in the future, but more importantly, they have the potential to delay the transition for a lengthy period of time or even make serious attempts to subvert the transition.
- 6.4 It may therefore become necessary to address the question of job security, pensions and a general amnesty at some stage as part of a negotiated settlement.

7. Reaching the negotiated settlement.

- 7.1 Some elements of the final negotiated settlement would take the form of a multi lateral (CODESA type) agreements. Other elements of the settlement package would take the form of bilateral agreements between the ANC and the NP - such agreements would bind the two parties.
- 7.2 The thorny question of the powers, functions and boundaries of regions in a new South Africa may be an issue on which we would enter into a bilateral agreement with the NP.
- 7.3 The question of a government of National Unity after adoption of a new constitution, and the future of members of the security forces and the civil service could be dealt with either as part of a bilateral agreement or could be part of multi-lateral agreement.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS

1. Free Political Activity

- 1.1 *Climate for free political activity on KwaZulu, Ciskei and Bophothatswana:* This matter needs to be dealt with mainly at a bilateral level with the regime as the responsibility for ensuring a climate for free political activity in the Bantustans rests with the regime. Gwaqwa
- 1.2 *Covert operations and special forces:* The termination of covert operations and the confinement of the special forces to barracks need to be dealt with prior to the establishment of the TEC.
- 1.3 *Repressive legislation:* ~~max~~ All repressive legislation needs to be repealed prior to the establishment of the TEC.
- 1.4 *State -controlled media:* The independent Media Commission which would be established when the TEC is established would seek to ensure state-owned media plays a neutral role during the run-up to the elections. However, certain important steps need to be taken in the present period, i.e. even before the TEC is established. In this regard we should seek to negotiate a Media Accord with the regime. The Accord would seek to (a) stop all unilateral restructuring of the SABC, and (b) ensure fair coverage in news and current affairs programs, and adequate access to the media for all political parties.

2. Unilateral Restructuring

The regime is hurriedly restructuring in the following fields: Economy, Education, Health, Local governments, Arts and culture, Land, Media, Forestry, etc

It has now become imperative that this matter become a subject of the bilateral negotiations. This would be in addition to the negotiations on these matters in the following forums: The National Economic Forum, National Negotiations Forum on Local Government, and; the Education Forum.

3. Elections Related Issues

- 3.1 We need to fine-tune our position on the composition, powers and functions of the Independent Electoral Commission, This can best be done by producing a draft Electoral Law.

3.1.1. Administration of the Electoral Process

- 3.2 What would be the eligible age for voting in the elections for voting in the elections for a Constituent Assembly? At CODESA we proposed that it should be 18 years of age, However, many of our structures have now suggested 16 years of age.
- 3.3 Should there be registration of voters and the drawing up of a voters' roll? Voter registration has both advantages and disadvantages. We have to adopt a position on this matter.
- 3.4 *Voter Identification:* What method should be used for identifying voters? A number of options present themselves:
- (i) the voters roll exclusively (i.e if there is voters registration);
 - (ii) Book of Life exclusively;
 - (iii) a combination of the above two together with any other form of identification that the voter can produce.
- 3.5 The role of the International Community in the electoral process: We need to develop a detailed proposal on the terms of reference, powers, functions, duties, size and composition of the international mission that would be involved in the electoral process.

4. The Transitional Executive Council (TEC)

- 4.1 We need to determine the detailed terms of reference for the sub-councils on Defence and Law and Order *and all the other Sub Councils*
- 4.2 The powers, functions and composition of the Independent Media Commission need to be agreed to.
- 4.3 Draft legislation for the TEC and its related structures has to be completed.

5. Regional government during the transition:

Draft legislation
The administration of the so-called self-governing territories and the TBVC areas need to be addressed urgently. Draft legislation in this regard needs to be prepared.

6. Interim Government of National Unity:

- 6.1 According to the Transition to Democracy Act:
- 6.1.1 The legislative arm of the IG would be the same body as the CA, but acting as an Interim Parliament.
 - 6.1.2 The executive arm (cabinet) of the IG would be made up of appointees of all parties i the CA who enjoy more than 5% of the total seats on the CA.

6.1.3 The State President would be appointed by the majority party.

6.2 We need to consider whether our proposal should also provide for a vice-president who would be appointed by the second biggest party in the CA.

7. Constituent Assembly

7.1 The CA would have 400 members.

7.2 Decisions would be taken by a two thirds majority.

7.3 The CA shall complete its work within a time frame of nine months.

7.4 *Deadlock-breaking mechanism:* In the event of the CA not completing its work within nine months, are we in favour of the proposal in the Transition to Democracy Act? (i.e fresh elections after nine months)

7.5 Only parties receiving more than three per cent of the total vote would be entitled to representation in the CA.

7.6 // The CA would be bound by General Constitutional Principles. CODESA had arrived at far-reaching agreement on constitutional principles. The regime would seek to add as much detail as possible to the constitutional principles.

7.6.1 We need to agree to a formulation on a clause on property rights.

October 1992

DAC GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS

The ANC has begun the process of Negotiations and shall continue to do with the following guidelines:

1. a. As facilitators of Negotiations the ANC promotes non-sectarianism, takes a broad democratic position, and looks to a way forward through Negotiation.
b. The Draft Policy Document is our guideline for Negotiations. Recommendations for any amendments to be submitted by 22 May 1992.
- 2.. Training for Negotiators should be instituted to empower people.
3. Adequate preparation should take place prior to Negotiations
4. We should empower our own organisations by informing people about the link between the Cultural Negotiations and CODESA.
5. We should establish central resources for consultation, research and development (See Diagram 2).
6. Negotiating teams should have one voice. There should be a binding statement of intent.
7. Negotiations should take place within the context of broader Democratic consultative structures (See Diagram 1and2)
b. The principled Negotiations is to be as inclusive as possible.
8. It is important to make the strategic distinction between Joint Commissions and Working Groups
9. We need to identify short and long term objectives with reference to CODESA and Interim Government implementation. Priority should be given to issues such as women, rural development, special projects, e.g. festivals and the building of structures.
10. In Joint Commissions or Working Groups a statement of intent and commitment to transformation should come out of the Negotiations process.

11. The budget should be developmental to redress the historic imbalances

12. FUNDING

- 12.i. Funding should be re-located to Joint Commissions.
- ii. There should be open accounting and access to budgets.
- iii. In any Negotiating process, finance should be made available in order to fund the Negotiations process.
- iv. There should be a funding body to monitor state and civic funding overseen by the Broad Democratic Consultative Forum at the appropriate level
- v. Moratorium on unilateral appointments of key posts.

13. TRANSFORMATION

13. i. We should look at the imbalances with a view to redressing them.
- ii. Apartheid structures must be transformed. The parastatals should restructure to be democratically representative at all levels of decision-making, artistic management and administration. There should be technical, artistic and administrative training with Affirmative Action as the guiding principle.
- iii. The bias towards Eurocentric high art should be addressed.

14. We should gain access to existing structures to understand how they operate in order to transform them now and in the future.

15. We must ensure that management and staff or their representatives at state institutions are brought into the Negotiations process.

16. There is a need to maintain positive pressure within institutions and be sensitive to issues affecting people within these institutions, and where possible to bring them closer to the ANC position.

17. Negotiations should empower grassroots Cultural Groups.

18. Negotiations should influence future policy-makers.

19. There is a definite need for a Commission on Culture in Education. DAC and Education Department should set up a structure to address this matter.

20. COMMUNICATION

i. Negotiations should not be in secret and should be made public within the ANC through minutes bulletins and newsletters. Regions have a responsibility to disseminate information. At ANC branch level there should be personnel responsible for disseminating Information.

ii. Non-aligned organisations should disseminate information internally.

iii. There should be public debate on Radio, TV, and the Media.

iv. There should be on-going Negotiations workshop around specific issues.

v. At an appropriate stage in the future, there should be a broad democratic cultural consultative conference.

21. In Negotiation with state media emphasis should not only be on control of media but also on cultural content e.g. Language and Drama.

22. To call for immediate moratorium on privatization because all state owned cultural spaces are in fact peoples spaces paid for by peoples tax.

23. Assert the credentials of our Negotiating teams to counteract the regimes' two-pronged strategy ie. - No political involvement
- Organisations not representative.

ADDITIONAL POINTS RAISED

- The above is concerning what must be done as far as the Negotiation process is concerned. There is need to address how to do it.

- DAC to define the process of putting Negotiation teams in play.

- Procedures and time frames to be addressed.

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