

THESE ARE DRAFT MINUTES AS APPROVED BY THE CHAIRPERSON. THEY ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND RESTRICTED TO MEMBERS OF THE DAILY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AND THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE STILL SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY THE DAILY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AT ITS NEXT MEETING.

DRAFT MINUTES OF THE DAILY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT 09H00 ON MONDAY 1 JUNE 1992 AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE

PRESENT:

ZJ de Beer
PJ Gordhan (Chairperson)
P Hendrickse
FT Mdlalose
R Meyer
Z Titus
J Zuma

M Maharaj (Secretariat)
SS van der Merwe (Secretariat)

T Eloff (Secretary)
G Hutchings (Minutes)

APOLOGIES: SS Ripinga

1. Chairperson's opening remarks

The members were welcomed.

2. Apologies

The apology from SS Ripinga was noted.

3. Letter from A Rajbansi to the Secretariat

3.1 The letter was noted.

3.2 After discussion it was agreed to report the following to the MC in this regard:

- * The existing DMC stood disbanded at the MC meeting of 25 May 1992 in an attempt to appoint a new DMC.
- * The MC at their meeting of 25 May 1992 were unable to agree on the appointment of a new DMC.
- * Reference was made to Item 6.2 of the minutes of 25 May 1992 in order to illustrate the implication that the existing DMC continue to function until the MC meeting of 1 June 1992.

- * At its meeting of 25 May 1992, the MC assigned tasks to the DMC which would not have been possible or agreed to by the MC if the DMC had been dissolved. Item 7.4 and 7.7 of the MC minutes of 25 May 1992 refers.
- * Item 10.2 of the MC minutes of 25 May 1992 refers. The MC would not have fixed a DMC meeting if the DMC had been dissolved.
- * Therefore, against this background, the DMC had to attend to the tasks given to it by the MC.

ZJ de Beer would present the report to the MC on behalf of the DMC.

4. Agenda

The agenda was adopted with no amendments.

5. Minutes of the meeting of 25 May 1992

The minutes were ratified with no amendments.

6. Matters arising from the MC meeting of 25 May 1992

6.1 Terms of Reference for the sub-structures.

- 6.1.1 The draft Terms of Reference for sub-structures of Working Group 1, 3 and 4 were distributed to members.
- 6.1.2 The draft Terms of Reference would be finalised at the MC meeting of 1 June 1992.
- 6.1.3 After discussion, it was agreed to recommend the draft Terms of Reference, as amended, to the MC meeting (Addendum A).
- 6.1.4 In respect of Working Groups the following was noted:
 - 6.1.4.1 The point of departure emerges from The Way Forward adopted by Codesa 2 and at the MC meeting of 16 May 1992.
 - 6.1.4.2 Within that point of departure the essential element is that the MC is the wholly representative body and extending the MC has made it more representative in terms of numbers.
 - 6.1.4.3 The MC is to create manageable structures bearing in mind the guidelines as referred to in Item 5.3 of the DMC minutes of 19 May 1992. The structures decided on were the WGSC 1 and 4 and the Technical Committee of WG 3.
 - 6.1.4.4 There is understanding at the DMC and MC level that WG's need to be kept close to this process and in this regard it was decided that (a) as soon as possible after the Sub-Committees have met to convene Working Groups and

inform them about the schedule of work for the Sub-Committees and (b) when higher levels of agreement have been reached, probably towards the end of the work, the Working Groups be convened again and informed of what is happening with a view to receiving any feedback before final recommendations are made to the MC.

6.2 WG 2 issues.

It was agreed to defer this issue to the next DMC meeting.

6.3 Tapping of telephones.

As mandated by the MC, the DMC received a report (Addendum B & C) from the ANC in respect of the allegations of telephone tapping. After discussion it was agreed to report the following to the MC:

6.3.1 The matter shall be investigated.

6.3.2 The investigation should be undertaken by a professional group.

6.3.3 The Secretariat meet with Andy Grudko, Technical Director of the private information agency INEQ and President of the South African Council of Civil Investigators with a view to establish whether there is a South African firm that is technically equipped and sufficiently impartial to conduct this investigation or if it is necessary to engage the services of an International firm. The Secretariat is to submit a report to the DMC in this regard.

6.3.4 That the DMC be mandated, subject to the final report from the Secretariat, to take the final decision on which professional firm to appoint.

6.3.5 The expert appointed be assigned the following tasks:

- * to evaluate the report and to indicate to the DMC whether the telephones were bugged or not.
- * to advise on the possible location of the bugs.
- * to advise on preventative measures.

6.3.6 When the report is available from the expert, it would be received by the DMC. At this stage Telkom or any other agency that needs to make an input could do so at the meeting.

6.3.7 On the basis of the report from the expert, and only at that stage, would the question of responsibility be discussed.

7. GAC

7.1 Future Terms of Reference.

It was agreed to request that the GAC formulate proposed Terms of Reference and submit to the MC.

7.2 Request to meet MC.

It was agreed to recommend to the MC that the GAC SC meet with the MC during the afternoon session of the MC meeting of 1 June 1992.

8. Correspondence

- 8.1 Letter from the Ambassador of the United States of America to the MC.

The letter was noted. It was further noted that the Secretariat had contacted the American Embassy in this regard with a request to increase the delegation to 19 members. The Secretariat will report back to the MC when a reply is received.

- 8.2 Letter from the Qwa Qwa Interim Joint Working Committee.

The letter was noted and the appropriate reply will be sent.

- 8.3 Letter from Paramount Chief Sombalane Abraham Kekana.

The letter was noted and the appropriate reply will be sent.

- 8.4 Letter from the Institute for Pastoral Education.

The letter was noted and the appropriate reply will be sent.

- 8.5 Letter from the Lawyers for Human Rights re "Creation of a climate for free political activity".

The letter was noted. It was agreed that this issue be handled initially in an informal way by the SA Government. If the issue is unable to be resolved at this level it would be referred back to the MC.

9. Any other business

- 9.1 Slide presentation.

It was noted that the deadline for the comments on the slide presentation had expired and the script and slides would now be sent out.

10. Date of next meeting

This would only be decided upon after the MC meeting of 1 June 1992.

ADDENDUM A

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON MATTERS RELATED TO WORKING GROUP 1

1. The Management Committee (MC) at its meeting of 25/5/92 agreed to reconvene the Steering Committee of Working Group 1 as a Sub-Committee of the MC.
2. The tasks of the Sub-Committee shall be as follows:
 - 2.1 Based on the report tabled by WG1 at CODESA 2, the identification of those agreements which require elaboration or refinement.
 - 2.2 Based on the report tabled by WG1 at CODESA 2, the identification of outstanding matters as well as any other aspects arising from the Terms of Reference from Working Group 1.
 - 2.3 The formulation of a modus operandi with regard to the further handling of outstanding matters and the implementation of final agreements. The MC shall convene a meeting of a WG as soon as possible after the commencement of the work of the Sub-Committee with a view to inform the WG on the modus operandi the SC has decided upon. The MC shall also convene a meeting of the WG upon the completion of the work of the Sub-Committee, with a view to inform the WG on the work of the Sub-Committee.
 - 2.4 The formulation of a priority list and target dates (where possible) in respect of the above.
 - 2.5 Considering the agreements already reached with a view to ensuring that the agreement as a whole or any part thereof has been recorded with adequate definition of the parameters so as to proceed with the work of drafting the agreement in the form of proposed legislation.
 - 2.6 To recommend steps which would facilitate the implementation of the agreements including setting up and supervising a panel of drafts-persons for the above mentioned task. In this regard it should be noted that this task should be carried out under the coordination of the DMC. Further, that if the Sub-Committee considers it necessary, it may call upon the assistance of the DMC to identify and provide suitable drafts-persons with the necessary specialised skills.
 - 2.7 In regard to the agreement on the release of political prisoners, the MC recommends that the Sub-Committee advises on the composition of a sub-committee for purposes of identifying and compiling a list of political prisoners in order to facilitate giving effect to the agreement. The MC suggests that the sub-committee considers composing such a sub-committee to include a representative of the Department of Justice, the Department of Correctional Services, the Human Rights Commission and any other persons whose interests/expertise could facilitate carrying out these tasks.
 - 2.8 In regard to the recommendations on the National Peace accord, the MC would like the advice of the Sub-Committee as to whether this agreement should now be forwarded to the NPC and to advise the MC as to how and when this should be effected.
 - 2.9 Regarding discussions with the SABC: the MC agreed that the Sub-Committee continues its discussions with the SABC Board and report to MC with recommendations as to any course of action it may deem fit.
 - 2.10 The Sub-Committee should report progress on the above-mentioned tasks to every MC meeting and to report agreements to the MC for finalisation.

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON MATTERS RELATED TO WORKING GROUP 3

1. The Management Committee (MC) at its meeting of 25/5/92 agreed to reconvene the Technical Committee of Working Group 3 as a Sub-Committee of the MC.
2. The tasks of the Sub-Committee shall be as follows:
 - 2.1 Based on the report tabled by WG3 at CODESA 2, the identification of those agreements which require elaboration or refinement.
 - 2.2 Based on the report tabled by WG3 at CODESA 2, the identification of outstanding matters as well as any other aspects arising from the Terms of Reference from Working Group 3.
 - 2.3 The formulation of a modus operandi with regard to the further handling of outstanding matters and the implementation of final agreements. The MC shall convene a meeting of a WG as soon as possible after the commencement of the work of the Sub-Committee with a view to inform the WG on the modus operandi the Sub-Committee has decided upon. The MC shall also convene a meeting of the WG upon the completion of the work of the Sub-Committee, with a view to inform the WG on the work of the Sub-Committee.
 - 2.4 The formulation of a priority list and target dates (where possible) in respect of the above.
 - 2.5 Considering the agreements already reached with a view to ensuring that the agreement as a whole or any part thereof has been recorded with adequate definition of the parameters so as to proceed with the work of drafting the agreement in the form of proposed legislation.
 - 2.6 To recommend steps which would facilitate the implementation of the agreements including setting up and supervising a panel of drafts-persons for the above mentioned task. In this regard it should be noted that this task should be carried out under the coordination of the DMC. Further, that if the Sub-Committee considers it necessary, it may call upon the assistance of the DMC to identify and provide suitable drafts-persons with the necessary specialised skills.
 - 2.7 To report progress on the above-mentioned tasks to every MC meeting and to report agreements to the MC for finalisation.

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

SUB-COMMITTEE ON MATTERS RELATED TO WORKING GROUP 4

1. The Management Committee (MC) at its meeting of 25/5/92 agreed to reconvene the Steering Committee of Working Group 4 (WGSC4) as a sub-committee of the MC.
2. The tasks of the Sub-Committee shall be as follows:
 - 2.1 Based on the report tabled by WG4 at CODESA 2, the identification of those agreements which require elaboration or refinement.
 - 2.2 Based on the report tabled by WG4 at CODESA 2, the identification of outstanding matters as well as any other aspects arising from the Terms of Reference from Working Group 4.
 - 2.3 To examine the implications of a) Ciskei's position tabled at CODESA 2 to the effect that it would not participate in any interim arrangements and b) of Boputhatswana's position with regards to their commitment to the Declaration of Intent; and to make recommendations to the MC especially with regard to the following:
 - 2.3.1 How this would affect the participation of the people in those territories in any elections emanating from agreements reached at CODESA.
 - 2.3.2 How the necessary legislative changes and administrative practices could be effected in these territories and how a climate for free political participation and activity is effected.
 - 2.4 The formulation of a modus operandi with regard to the further handling of outstanding matters and the implementation of final agreements. The MC shall convene a meeting of a WG as soon as possible after the commencement of the work of the Sub-Committee with a view to inform the WG on the modus operandi the Sub-Committee has decided upon. The MC shall also convene a meeting of the WG upon the completion of the work of the Sub-Committee, with a view to inform the WG on the work of the Sub-Committee.
 - 2.5 The formulation of a priority list and target dates (where possible) in respect of the above.
 - 2.6 Considering the agreements already reached with a view to ensuring that the agreement as a whole or any part thereof has been recorded with adequate definition of the parameters so as to proceed with the work of drafting the agreement in the form of proposed legislation.
 - 2.7 To recommend steps which would facilitate the implementation of the agreements including setting up and supervising a panel of drafts-persons for the above mentioned task. In this regard it should be noted that this task should be carried out under the coordination of the DMC. Further, that if the Sub-Committee considers it necessary it may call upon the assistance of the DMC to identify and provide suitable drafts-persons with the necessary specialised skills.
 - 2.8 To report progress on the above-mentioned tasks to every MC meeting and to report agreements to the MC for finalisation.

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30th May, 1992.

Chairperson
Daily Management Committee
CODESA
World Trade Centre
Kempton Park.

Dear Sir,

RE: TAPPING OF THE TELEPHONE LINES OF THE ANC AND SACP AT THE
WORLD TRADE CENTRE.

I enclose herewith a report by the ANC with regard to the above
matter for the attention of the D.M.C.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'M.C. Ramaphosa', is written over the typed name.

M.C. Ramaphosa
SECRETARY GENERAL

encl.

REPORT BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS TO THE DAILY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF CODESA WITH REGARD TO THE TAPPING OF THE TELEPHONE LINES OF THE ANC AND THE SACP AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE.

1. In pursuance of the discussion, held at the Codesa Management Committee meeting 25 May 1992, with regard to the tapping of the ANC and the SACP telephones at the World Trade Centre, we wish to make the following submissions.
2. We enclose herewith a photocopy of computer printouts for five tests carried out on 15 May 1992 on the following telephone lines: 397 2102/3/4. These printouts show that all three lines were tapped during all five tests.
3. The printouts of the test results were submitted by the Sunday Star to Andy Grudko, Technical Director of the Private Information agency INEQ and president of the South African Council of Civil Investigators. He confirmed that the printouts showed that the three lines were tapped at the time that the tests were carried out.
4. After the tests, the technical expert hired by the ANC proceeded to do a physical check on the telephone lines - first at the point where the lines enter the ANC offices at

the WTC. He then followed the lines which go through the ceiling above the NP office and the SA Government office. In the course of this check, the technical expert was asked by a Telkom technician about his credentials, who informed him that Codesa procedure was that if any party or organisation wanted its lines to be checked, it had to be done in the presence of a Codesa security officer. According to the technical expert, who was accompanied by Attorney Peter Harris, the Telkom technician was agitated and looking worried. He proceeded to show the technical expert where the Junction Box is situated in the World Trade Centre. The Junction Box is the point where all the telephone lines at the WTC are connected to the lines that go to the Exchange at the Isando Post Office. He further informed the technical expert hired by the ANC that this was the only Junction Box and that all lines from here went directly to th Isando exchange. As the Junction Box was slightly high up, he offered to bring a stepladder in order to facilitate our technical expert checking the lines at the Junction Box. In fact the Junction Box is not so high up as to need the aid of a stepladder. Nonetheless the Telkom technician immediately left the scene. Our technical expert waited for the Telkom technician to return. When there were no signs that the Telkom technician was likely to return, the technical expert went back to the ANC offices to continue with his checks. After about half an hour the Telkom technician came to the ANC office, accompanied by a Codesa security officer. The Telkom

technician was now relaxed and they together went with the stepladder to check the Junction Box. The check revealed no suspicious devices attached to the lines on the premises.

5. Further tests on the lines after the above incident showed that all lines were clear of any tapping devices.

6. In the opinion of the technical expert, hired, by the ANC, the devices used were unlikely to have been placed on the lines inside the premises of the World Trade Centre because they could have been easily discovered. His conclusion was that the devices were placed on the three phone lines outside the premises and most probably in the exchange at Isando.

7. With regard to the likely points at which the taps could have been connected, the report of the Sunday Star sets out in diagrammatic form all the possible critical points of the telephone lines from the World Trade Centre to the Isando Post Office. In this regard we should also note that Mr Andy Grudko agreed with the view of the company hired by the ANC that the location of the bug of the fax line could have been inside the Isando Exchange. However in the case of the other two bugs, he is of the view that these could have been connected anywhere on the underground cable between the box outside the World Trade Centre and the Isando Exchange. In this connection it should be noted that there are five manholes over this distance leading to the

underground cables.

8. On the basis of the check made by the private company hired by the ANC and taking into account the expert opinion of Mr Grudko with regard to the printouts of the five test results, we submit that it is incontrovertible that the three telephone lines were being monitored.
9. The question arises: who could have been responsible for placing the taps on these three lines?
10. It is our view that this question can only be answered in the context of the very nature of the Codesa process; who could have at their disposal the necessary technical equipment and resources to effect such tapping; and who could have such unimpeded access to the Isando Post Office Exchange. Furthermore, the issue must be placed in the context of accumulating evidence as to how the different agencies of the South African State have been, and are still, operating.
11. In the first place the findings of the court in the Trust Feed Massacre case show that highly placed officers in the South African Police masterminded and were directly involved in the massacre. And that after the massacre, even more highly placed officers in the SAP were involved in efforts to block investigations about this massacre.

12. In the case of the murder of Matthews Goniwe and three others in the Eastern Cape it has recently come to light that their "death warrant" was signed by General van der Westhuizen who is currently the head of the Department of Military Intelligence in the SADF.

13. In case there are parties who are prone to argue that the above two instances belong to the pre-February 2 1990 period, we wish to draw attention to the fact that in May this year the South African Police sought to obtain a court order in the Pretoria Supreme Court in an effort to block the Weekly Mail publishing a disclosure of a covert network of SAP bases in the Southern Transvaal. In this they were not entirely successful. What emerged was incontrovertible evidence that the South African Police have established since 1988 a clandestine network of bases in eleven regions across the country under the Criminal Investigation Services, into which the Security Police were absorbed last year. In the case of the Southern Transvaal network, this secretive police operation has been working from four undercover houses and that it operates with registered vehicles, non-existent companies and falsely registered telephone and page numbers. Furthermore the Weekly Mail uncovered this secret network through leads obtained from two informants. Both informants were approached by this secret police network. In the case of one informant, he was quizzed about information relating to Umkhonto weSizwe cadres, and was promised training to wreak revenge on the

ANC. In the case of the other informant, he was approached to participate in petrol bomb attacks on the homes of ANC leaders in Sebokeng, including a church fieldworker Saul Tsotetsi. Eight days after this approach was made, Tsotetsi was attacked by a group of five men. In the course of the struggle, a hand grenade exploded killing Tsotetsi and injuring two of his attackers.

14. The reports of the Weekly Mail clearly indicate that this Southern Transvaal secret police network is engaged in activities directed at eliminating local leaders of the ANC and that these activities are currently taking place.
15. Without labouring the point it is our considered view that one or other agency of the South African government is involved with the use of state funds and resources in activities aimed at destroying and undermining the ANC.
16. In this context we are of the view that in a similar manner, one or other agency of the South African government has been responsible for the telephone taps place on the ANC and the SACP telephone lines at the World Trade Centre, and that information derived from such taps was sought for the purpose of disadvantaging the ANC and the SACP at the expense of the South African Government.
17. We attach hereto a copy of the test results of the printouts showing that these three lines were tapped on the

15 May 1992 with the express proviso that we are not prepared to disclose the identity of the private company which carried out the tests and the equipment they used for the tests. We further enclose a photocopy of the report which appeared in the Sunday Star on 24 May 1992 for your information.

30th May, 1992. Johannesburg.

15 MAY 92 09-30

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-31

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

INACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.51	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.40
3 S	52.45	44.65
RDG	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.10

ACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.45	0.05
2 T	52.40	0.10
3 T	52.45	0.10
RDG	52.45	0.05
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
SUSPECT 3
AIRPAGE 4 ST DU 17

R	1R	VALUE 103
R	1R	VALUE 141
R	1R	VALUE 63

These are the Bugged line combinations at the EXCHANGE

15 MAY 92 09-24

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-24

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

INACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.35
3 T	52.45	52.40
RDG	52.45	52.40
S.D.	0.05	0.10

ACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.45	0.05
2 T	52.45	0.15
3 T	52.45	0.10
RDG	52.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
SUSPECT 3
AIRPAGE 4 ST DU 4

R	1R	VALUE 101
R	1R	VALUE 159
R	1R	VALUE 15

15 MAY 92 09-19

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-19

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

INACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.45
3 S	52.45	37.40
RDG	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.05

ACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.45	0.05
2 T	52.45	0.15
3 T	52.45	0.10
RDG	52.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
SUSPECT 3
AIRPAGE 4 ST DU 9

R	1R	VALUE 32
R	1R	VALUE 104
R	1R	VALUE 151

15 MAY 92 09-14

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	4

15 MAY 92 09-15

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

INACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 S	52.50	23.05
2 T	52.45	52.45
3 T	52.50	52.50
RDG	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.05

ACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.45	0.05
2 T	52.45	0.15
3 T	52.45	0.10
RDG	52.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
SUSPECT 4
AIRPAGE 4 ST DU 2

R	1R	VALUE 3
R	1R	VALUE 7
R	1R	VALUE 218
R	1R	VALUE 1

15 MAY 92 09-09

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-10

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

INACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.55
2 T	52.45	52.45
3 T	52.50	52.50
RDG	52.45	52.50
S.D.	0.05	0.05

ACTIVE MODE (line Voltages)		
PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.45	0.05
2 T	52.45	0.15
3 T	52.50	0.10
RDG	52.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
SUSPECT 3
AIRPAGE 5 ST DU 3

R	1R	VALUE 126
R	1R	VALUE 224
R	2R	VALUE 15

SURVEY LOCATION: ANC OFFICE, WORLD TRADE CENTRE, CODESA.

DATE: 15-05-1992

SHOCK DISCOVERY could destroy trust between parties at vital negotiations

Mystery of ANC phone taps at Codesa grows

Crossed wires: Mysterious telephone tappers have been bugging the ANC at Codesa. While they may have picked up a few secrets the real damage has been the destruction of trust at the vital talks.

By PETA THORNYCROFT

SOMEbody, somewhere in South Africa desperately wanted to hear what the ANC was saying on its telephones just before Codesa 2. So they tapped them, all three lines, and those of the South African Communist Party. It wasn't us, said the Ministry of Defence. It wasn't us, said the Ministry of Telecommunications didn't say anything at all. But INSIGHT has independent documentary evidence that the ANC's telephones were almost certainly tapped for at least two days just before Codesa 2. The SACT's lines were also tapped, but for a shorter time. And, miraculously, the day after interference was discovered, the lines showed up clean.

Trust

Tapping telephones is part of South Africa's culture of the very recent past. Trade unionists, activists, liberal churchmen, journalists and a host of other people deemed to be potential "enemies of the state" all have telephone tapping stories to tell.

But what shocks politicians such as Democratic Party leader Zac de Beer, is that anyone could be under any kind of surveillance at Codesa, where building trust is of the essence. INSIGHT has established that the ANC suspected it had company on its telephone and fax lines in the run up to Codesa 2. So it called one of a handful of companies in Johannesburg with the expertise and equipment to detect taps.

The company ran some tests and the computer printouts of the results showed someone, somewhere had put something on the lines either inside or outside the World Trade Centre at Kempton Park where the ANC and the Government were locked in negotiations.

When the security company technician discovered what he believed was proof that the lines were being interfered with, he checked them inside the World Trade Centre and also the single junction box in the complex, situated fairly high up in the centre of the building.

Agitated


"A Telkom engineer was nearby and offered to get us a ladder. He seemed agitated and then disappeared for about half an hour," said ANC official Joe Cotton.

The next day the lines were all clear. INSIGHT obtained the printouts from the ANC. But the organisation would not say which company had undertaken the tests for "ethical" reasons. "We undertook not to identify them," said Joe Nhlanihla, head of security. So INSIGHT sent the printouts to Andy Grudko, technical director of the private information agency INEQ and president of the South

Codesa talks at World Trade Centre, Isando. Fax and 2 direct lines tapped.

Placement of taps

1. Lines in building technically easy to tap if security is poor.
2. Impossible to tap.
3. PO technician with circuit diagram could tap here. Tape recorder placed down manhole, connected to network.
4. Clever PO technician might put on a jumper connection to an unused PO cable and connect phone box A to B and tap underground at B.
5. Any PO engineer would have access to the underground tunnel network down a manhole. Illegal tap could be placed here.
6. Most likely tapping point inside exchange. May be detected and would be done by a corrupt PO man. Fax tap was here.



African Council of Civil Investigators.

He confirmed that the equipment used to test the lines was sophisticated and that tests had been carried out to check voltage and current as well as more subtle measurements.

He disagreed with some of the technical conclusions — for instance, where the taps could have been connected for two of the ANC's lines — but agreed that the results of the tests indicated something was wrong.

He also agreed with the company hired by the ANC that the location of the bug of the fax machine could have been in the Isando exchange, but that the other two could have been anywhere on the underground cable between the box outside the World Trade Centre and the Isando exchange.

Grudko said he was always cautious about being categorical, but given the results of the tests, and the fact that the readings changed from day to day on three different lines when no faults had been reported, he would have told the ANC, had they been his clients, that he suspected their lines were being tapped.

INSIGHT's investigations established that the taps were not officially sanctioned by the authorities. A legal tap is permissible only when state security is at stake and cannot be detected.

A permissible tap would be placed at a point which is electronically isolated from the

subscriber's circuit between the exchange and the telephone. There is no known equipment that can pick up a tap which has been placed where there is sound but no electrical impulses.

However it is widely accepted in the security industry that some companies have acted for Government agencies when it was anticipated that official sanction for a tap would be refused.

In addition, well-placed sources in the industry said there have been, and almost certainly still are, Telkom technicians who will put taps in place both in the exchange or under the street box to supplement salaries as low as R2 000 a month.

Sanction to tap the ANC at Codesa would never have been official or sanctioned, and the analysis of the tests on the fax machine was that as at least the tap on the fax machine was in the Isando exchange, and maybe the other two lines as well, evidence points to the endeavours of a Telkom technician.

Shocking

Only a Telkom engineer would have had circuit diagrams to show him which of the underground cables to tap into, and Grudko said it was unlikely that a security company would have been foolish enough to put a tape recorder inside a street box where it might have been discovered by any number of people.

"It is difficult to deduce from the evidence exactly what happened," said Zac de Beer. "But if it is true that any agency connected with government caused the ANC lines to be tapped, then it would be a shocking breach of the sort of mutual trust which is absolutely essential to good faith in negotiations."

"I hope this matter can be fully resolved in a very short time because otherwise it may well have an adverse effect on the vital negotiations which we are now entering."

The SAP, which usually motivated taps in the bad old days, says it has had nothing to do with the ANC's lines. Police Minister Herms Kriel said shortly before Codesa 2 that the ANC requested permission to sweep its offices for bugging devices, and nothing was found. He did not mention telephones.

However Andy Grudko had some advice for the ANC. "Use those lines for information to throw the other side off balance. See who reacts and then you'll know for certain who ordered the tap." Or, he said, the ANC could buy a scrambler, a la John de Carro or the CIA, for a cool R50 000, and then no-one would be able to listen in.

An Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) delegate to Codesa, Bruce Anderson, said he thought tapping the ANC at Codesa was shocking. "But we all know it goes on here." The IFP had routinely had its lines checked at Codesa but gave up after a while.