

MCH91-79-4-2

African National Congress

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DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY

A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

(As adopted by the National Working Committee on 18 November, 1992)

1. Balance of forces

By the end of the eighties, the strategic balance of forces was characterised by:

1.1 The liberation movement enjoyed many advantages over the regime, both internally and internationally. All the pillars of the struggle had grown from strength to strength:

- a very high level of mass mobilisation and mass defiance had rendered apartheid unworkable;

- the building of the underground had laid a basis for exercising political leadership and was laying a basis for an intensification of the armed struggle;

- the world was united against apartheid.

1.2 At the same time the liberation movement faced certain objective weaknesses:

- changes in Southern Africa were making it increasingly difficult for the ANC in the conduct of struggle;

- there was no longer a visible intensification of the armed struggle;

- the international community was making renewed attempts to impose a settlement plan.

1.3 The crisis in Eastern Europe, and the resultant change in the relations between world powers brought the issue of a negotiated resolution of regional conflicts to the fore - in this context, South Africa was not going to be treated as an exception. Importantly, these changes also exerted new pressures on the regime to fall in line with the emerging international "culture" of multi-party democracy.

1.4 The apartheid power bloc was no longer able to rule in the old way. Its policies of repression and reform had failed dismally, and it faced an ever-deepening socio-economic crisis. At the same time the liberation movement did not have the immediate capacity to overthrow the regime.

1.5 All these factors set the stage for a negotiated resolution of the South African conflict. The regime was forced to unban the ANC and other organisations, release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, acknowledge the defeat of the apartheid ideology, and seek negotiations with the liberation movement. This constituted a major strategic retreat for the regime and a victory for the democratic forces.

2. Shifts in the balance of forces :

2.1 The balance of forces is not completely static. In this phase of the negotiations:

- The regime strives to undermine and weaken the liberation movement through its strategy of Low Intensity War;

- The liberation movement seeks to weaken the capacity of the regime to act against the people and broaden the space for free political activity through a combination of mass mobilisation, international pressure and self-defence.

2.2 In the recent period:

- The de Klerk regime has suffered a renewed crisis of legitimacy. It continues to fail to win the allegiance of the majority;

- The regime's camp stands more divided than it ever was since the unbanning of the ANC: its unpatriotic front with some bantustans has collapsed; it is increasingly losing the loyalty of the civil service and important elements in the security forces; in the October special session of the tri-cameral parliament, it failed to secure the support of a single other party outside itself; leading members of the party and government continue to jump ship for reasons of "fatigue", "depression" and "disillusionment".

- the regime has lost all ability to arrest the unprecedented socio-economic decline, growing unemployment among both black and white, the general social disintegration and spiralling crime.

However:

- the regime still commands vast state and other military resources;

- it continues to enjoy the support of powerful economic forces;

- objectively, the counter-revolutionary violence and the growing potential of long-term counter-revolutionary instability acts as a resource for the regime.

2.3 Also in the recent period:

- the ANC has established itself as a legal national political organisation;

- it commands the support of the majority of South Africa;

- the liberation movement enjoys the capacity to mobilise large-scale mass action;

- it is able to influence and mobilise the international community.

the liberation movement suffers many organisational weaknesses;

it does not command significant military and financial resources;

it is unable to militarily defeat the counter-revolutionary movement or adequately defend the people.

2.4 As a result of mass action and negotiations, some progress has been made in the recent period. Some examples of these are: the CODESA Declaration of Intent (which establishes national consensus on the broad direction in which the political process should unfold); the Record of Understanding; and broad consensus on the need for an Interim Government and Constituent Assembly. Though the regime has succeeded in delaying the transition there remains a groundswell of support within society as a whole for a speedy resolution of the political and socio-economic problems.

2.5 In this context, the liberation movement is faced with various options:

- a) resumption of the armed struggle and the perspective of revolutionary seizure of power. (given the objective situation outlined above, and the possibility of a negotiated resolution, the ANC has decided that this option is neither preferable, nor viable at this juncture);
- b) a protracted negotiations process, combined with mass action and international pressure until the balance of forces is shifted to such an extent that we secure a negotiated surrender from the regime;
- c) a swift negotiations process combined with mass action and international pressure which takes into account the need for national unity against counter-revolutionary forces, and at the same time, uses phases in the transition to qualitatively change the balance of forces in order to secure thoroughgoing democratic transformation.

2.6 Taking into account:

- the capacity of the liberation movement;

- the capacity of the regime to endlessly delay while consolidating its hold onto power and restructuring in order to undermine future democratic transformation;

- the cost to the people and the country of a protracted negotiations process;

- the need to as urgently as possible address the dire socio-economic needs of the people;

- and the need to prevent a further consolidation of the counter-revolutionary forces;

the third option, (c), is the most viable and preferable.

2.7 The liberation movement, however, should guard against being captive to a given approach. A combination of factors, including the conduct of the regime may dictate a need to revisit our approach.

3. Negotiations : the preferred option of the liberation movement.

- 3.1 A peaceful political settlement has always been the first option of the liberation movement. It was only when the prospect of any peaceful settlement vanished that we adopted the perspective of an armed revolutionary seizure of power. On the other hand, for the regime, it was a failure of arms that imposed the obligation to concede the need for a political settlement.
- 3.2 Negotiations therefore represents a victory for the democratic movement and a defeat for the forces of apartheid.
- 3.3 Consequently, it must remain one of our strategic tasks to continue to draw the regime onto the terrain of free political activity, peaceful democratic action and genuine negotiations.
- 3.4 Delays in the process of peaceful transformation are not in the interests of the masses, who seek liberation now, and do not enhance our possibilities to effect the transformation to genuine democracy as effectively and as speedily as we should.

4. Phases of the Democratic Revolution:

- 4.1 Our strategic perspective should take into account that the Democratic Revolution will proceed in various phases. Our possibilities relevant to each phase should not be pursued in a manner that produces defeats later because of a failure to recognise the dialectical interconnection between various phases.
- 4.2 This strategic perspective should recognise the following phases, each one of which has its regularities and objective and subjective demands:

PHASE 1: The period prior to the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council. (In this phase we should aim to: secure an agreement on free and fair election, Interim Government and Constituent Assembly; stop unilateral restructuring; broaden the space for free political activity; and, address the issue of violence).

PHASE 2: The period from the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council leading up to the election of the Constituent Assembly and the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity. (In this phase we should aim to: consolidate peace through joint control over all armed forces; ensure free and fair elections; and mobilise for a decisive victory in the elections.)

PHASE 3: The period of the drafting and adoption of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly. (In this phase we should aim to: establish an Interim Government in which the ANC would be a major player; adopt a new democratic constitution; and, start addressing the socio-economic problems facing the country).

PHASE 4: The period of the phasing in of the new constitution, which will include the restructuring of the state machinery and the general dismantling of the system of apartheid.

PHASE 5: The period of the consolidation of the process of democratic transformation and reconstruction.

- 4.3 At all stages, we should consider carefully the balance of forces, how to change the balance, and therefore place ourselves in a position in which we can determine the correct path to follow to further the process of democratic change.

In this context, the broad masses should play a decisive role. The process must be mass-driven.

- 4.4 The balance of forces, our specific objectives and our long-term goals would at each stage dictate the need to: enter into specific, and perhaps changing, alliances; and, make certain compromises in order to protect and advance this process.

5. Goals of the National Liberation Struggle and our immediate objectives.

- 5.1 The fundamental goals of the National Liberation Struggle should not be confused with the immediate objectives we set for ourselves in each phase of the transition. At the same time we should ensure that the immediate objectives we pursue do not have the effect of blocking our longer-term goals.
- 5.2 The objectives we set, and can attain in each phase will depend on the balance of forces.
- 5.3 We must ensure that in entering a new phase (eg. the establishment of an Interim Government) the balance of forces is transformed qualitatively in favour of the Democratic Movement. Negotiations can therefore result in the possibility of bringing about a radically transformed political framework (i.e. changing the conjuncture) in which the struggle for the achievement of the strategic perspectives of the National Democratic Revolution will be advanced in more favourable conditions.
- 5.4 In setting objectives for the present round of negotiations we must bear in mind that in the main one would not achieve at the table that which one cannot achieve on the ground. Depending on the balance of forces, we might not gain everything we set out to achieve. However, positions we adopt should be informed by our longer term objectives. Our correct assessment of the balance of forces, the support of the masses and good negotiating tactics should ensure that our gains constitute a decisive leap forward.
- 5.5 In setting objectives today, our strategy should not focus narrowly on only the initial establishment of democracy, but also (and perhaps more importantly), on how to nurture, develop and consolidate that democracy. Our strategy must at once also focus on ensuring that the new democracy is not undermined.
- 5.6 Our broad objectives for the first two phases (as distinct from longer-term goals) should therefore be:
- 5.6.1 The establishment of a democratic constitution-making process.
 - 5.6.2 Ending the National Party's monopoly of political power.
 - 5.6.3 Ensuring a continuing link between democracy and socio-economic empowerment.
 - 5.6.4 Minimising the threat to stability and the democratic process.

6. The need for Government of National Unity:

- 6.1 The objective reality imposes a central role for the ANC and the NP in the transition. The ANC is the custodian of the peace process - while, the NP is the party in power. Using various forms of struggle we must ensure that the regime accepts movement forward in the process.
- 6.2 This means that the balance of forces has forced onto the South African political

situation a relationship between the ANC and the NP characterised by:

- in the first place conflict, in so far as the regime attempts to block the transition; and,

- secondly, constructive interaction in pursuit of agreements the regime has been forced to enter into.

6.3 How to manage this contradiction is one of our challenges of leadership.

6.4 We have already won the demand for an Interim Government of National Unity.

6.5 However, we also need to accept the fact that even after the adoption of a new constitution, the balance of forces, and the interests of the country as a whole may still require of us to consider the establishment of a government of National Unity - provided that the parties that have lost the elections will not be able to paralyse the functioning of government.

7. Laying the basis to minimise the threat to stability and democracy.

7.1 The new democratic government would need to adopt a wide range of measures in order to minimise the potential threat to the new democracy. However, some of these measures may have to be part and parcel of a negotiated settlement.

7.2 Strategic forces we need to consider right now are the SADF, SAP, all other armed formations and the civil service in general. If the transition to democracy affects the interests of individuals in these institutions wholly and purely negatively, then they would serve as fertile ground from which the destabilisers would recruit.

7.3 Not only do these forces have vast potential to destabilise a fledgling democracy in the future, but as importantly, they have the potential to delay the transition for a lengthy period of time or even make serious attempts to subvert the transition.

7.4 A democratic government will need to restructure the civil service and the security forces in order to ensure that

- they are professional, competent and accountable;
- they are representative of society as a whole (including through the application of the principle of affirmative action);
- they serve the interests of democracy; and
- the size of these institutions is determined by the objective needs of the country.

In this process it may be necessary to address the question of job security, retrenchment packages and a general amnesty at some stage as part of a negotiated settlement. These measures will need to apply to all armed formations and sections of civil service. In this respect, the availability of resources and experiences of other countries need to be taken into account.

8. Reaching the negotiated settlement:

8.1 Some elements of the final negotiated settlement would take the form of ...

lateral (CODESA type) agreements. Other elements of the settlement package would take the form of bilateral agreement between the ANC and the NP - such agreements would bind the two parties.

- 8.2 The thorny question of the powers, functions and boundaries of regions in a new South Africa may be an issue on which we would enter into bilateral discussion with the NP and other parties and seek to reach an understanding which the parties would pursue in the Constituent Assembly.
- 8.3 The question of a Government of National Unity after the adoption of a new constitution, and the future of members of the security forces and the civil service could be dealt with through direct engagement with these forces, as part of a bilateral agreement or in multi-lateral agreements.

END.
18/11/92

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4 April 1993

Dear Friend/Comrade

AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND STRATEGIES MEETING

Let me start by apologising for this late notice. Most of you will already have heard from us by phone but some not. This Friday, 8 April and Saturday, 9 April a large policy meeting will be held in Johannesburg. The purpose of this meeting will be to assess all our work on agriculture and to bring it together in the form of a comprehensive Agricultural Policy Document.

We will also finalise our Land Claims Court policy. A draft Restitution Act has been drawn up by the Land Claims Court working group and will be presented at the commission on Land Claims. We will not be dealing with other land reform measures at this workshop - as you probably know, a major study is being conducted by the LAPC.

The two days will be devoted to combing through our policy papers in smaller commissions and then in plenary form. The commissions will look at the following areas: credit, research, extension, pricing and marketing, cooperatives, drought and food security, farmworkers, natural resource management, forestry, fisheries, veterinary policy, Land Claims Court, the Ministry of Agriculture (structure and budget), the Ministry of Land (structure and budget).

Please call Therese at 330-7265/330-7187/330-7285 to discuss travel arrangements and transport from the airport. If you will be driving, the venue is the Ridge Hotel, 8 Abel Road, Berea (corner Abel Road and Catherine Ave). Hotel parking is freely available.

A tentative agenda has been drawn up (see attached). It is important that people be able to participate in all the commissions relating to their work. Consequently, this agenda may well be changed as we hear from people.

In the hope that inspite of this late invitation, you will be able to attend.

Yours sincerely

Derek Hanekom
DEREK HANEKOM
ANC Land and Agriculture Desk

PP

The People Shall Govern!

RUP - Mission

MEETING OF THE ANC NATIONAL TASK FORCE

06 MARCH 1994

41 DE KORTE STREET
21ST FLOOR SABLE STREET
BRAAMFONTEIN
JOHANNESBURG

① Process: Intern
audit Personnel
admin.
② External
Approach

AGENDA

- 10H00 - OPENING
- 10H05 - APOLOGIES AND INTRODUCTION
- 10H15 - READING OF MINUTES
- 10H30 - MATTERS ARISING -REPORT BACK
- 11H00 - TEA BREAK
- 11H15 - ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES
- 13H30 - LUNCH
- 14H00 - ENSURING CONTINUITY
- 14H30 - TRAINING NEEDS
- 15H00 - GENERAL *POSITION OF ST. LUCIA
*IDT/ODA INITIATIVE
*REGIONAL DESKS
- 15H45 - CLOSURE

Data research

Policy

Exist - transform + Regul - officers
 Leadership - who
 Clear - organograms

Commission - not submit

DE con - PL

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

**NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
16 - 18TH FEBRUARY 1993 DECISIONS**

dupl. (?)
RECEIVED

1993 -04- 21

R - TU/WH/NEC MEMBERS

1. COMMISSION ON FORMER DETAINEES

This NEC

Noting

1. that the Motsuenyane Commission on Former Detainees will be completing its work in May 1993;
2. that the Thami Zulu and Stuart Commission reports which the Skweyiya Commission recommended be released to the public had not yet been considered and released by the NEC

Decides

- a) to direct the NWC to consider and release the Thami Zulu and Stuart reports;
- b) to develop a pro-active and appropriate media strategy in dealing with the reports;
- c) to meet with the families of those who died in exile and further explore ways of commemorating their deaths so as to effect reconciliation;
- d) requests the Motsuenyane Commission to hasten the work of the Commission.

2. ANC / IFP BI-LATERALS

This meeting of the NEC

Noting

1. the decision of the Natal Midlands region asking the NEC to reconsider its position on bilateral talks with the IFP;

2. the report of the Peace desk to the NEC titled "NWC REPORT ANNEXURE 1 - ANC/IFP BILATERALS REPORT".

Decides:

- a) to reiterate its decision to engage in bilateral talks with the IFP by way of thorough preparatory discussions through the channel established between the two organisations;
- b) preparatory work for the bilateral should continue and the NWC sub-committee on Natal be empowered to ratify draft agreements to be submitted by the channel;
- c) should the NWC sub-committee on Natal, in its judgement, feel that sufficient basis has been laid for the envisaged bilateral meeting to take place by mid-March 1993, it should recommend to the NWC that the summit should go ahead;
- d) the size of the channel be increased to include two people from the ANCWL and ANCYL.

Further, with regard to the situation in Bophuthatswana, the NEC notes the progress made thus far and endorses the step as outlined in the report from the Peace Desk:

- a. recommending the establishment of a bilateral working party which should be appointed by the NWC and would include representatives of the regions directly affected by this issue;
- b. agreed that the STATEMENT OF INTENT adopted on 20 November 1992 at Kwa Maritane be adopted as a working document to guide our representatives in the bilateral working group.

3. GOLDSTONE INVESTIGATION ON MK

This NEC reaffirms:

The principle that the Goldstone Commission should investigate the involvement of all armed formations in the violence ravaging our country.

Noting:

That no armed formations, including the SADF have come forward to enable the Commission to engage in this investigation.

Decides:

- a) **Accordingly, the ANC is unable to invite Goldstone at this stage to investigate MK:**
- b) **In the meantime, the ANC is systematically investigating all instances where there are allegations and/or evidence of involvement in the violence by any member of MK;**
- c) **Where such investigations are completed, we shall consider making such information available to the Commission.**

4. SANCTIONS

This NEC noting:

The proposal presented by the Department of International Affairs, resolves:

Having reviewed the process leading to the democratic election of a Constituent Assembly and the formation of an Interim Government of National Unity;

Confirming its resolve to ensure the earliest possible establishment of a Transitional Executive Council, its sub-structures, the Independent Electoral and Media Commissions and the enactment of a Transition to Democracy Act;

Convinced that this is essential to enable free and fair elections to take place;

Reaffirming that international sanctions against apartheid have played a critical role in the struggle for a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa;

Recalling the resolution on sanctions adopted by the National Conference of the ANC in July 1991 for a phased approach to sanctions;

Further recalling the decision of the Tripartite Alliance Seminar on Sanctions of October 4, 1991, which made recommendations about sanctions affecting diplomatic relations, gold coins, trade and trade credits, new investment, loans and other financial matters;

Recommends to all the democratic movement of our country and all our allies internationally that:

- an announcement of an agreed date for elections, and on establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and the Independent Electoral and Media Commissions, as well as the enactment of the Transition to Democracy Act, the sanctions affecting the following areas should be lifted:

- diplomatic relations, gold coins, trade and trade credits, new investment, loans and other financial links.

Further recommends that notwithstanding this decision, no representatives of the white minority regime should be granted accreditation by any international organisation, this being a matter which can only be resolved once an Interim Government of National Unity is established;

Also brings to the attention of the international community that once they are established, the multi-party Transitional Executive Council structures will be the appropriate governmental institution with which to enter into any official agreements;

Calls on the international community to ensure strict observance of the arms and oil embargoes until a democratic government has been installed.

Reaffirms its commitment to do everything in its power to address the burning questions of poverty, unemployment, racial inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income and the social imbalances that are a result of the system of apartheid.

Calls on the investor community, domestic and international, to seek active ways of involving those who were marginalised by apartheid in the projects of investment that they embark upon.

Calls on the investor community, especially the domestic investors, to respond to the positive climate that will be produced by the lifting of these sanctions by initiating an investment programme that will create new jobs and enable the country to address the various and urgent socio-economic needs of our people.

5. BUDGET

This NEC noting:

The proposal presented by the Department of Economic Planning;

Resolves;

The National Party government is being shown to be singularly incompetent in managing public finances. In support of the statement, the following can be noted:

- * an ad hoc approach to expenditure in social services;**
- * repeated revelations of corruption and graft by both senior civil servants and cabinet ministers (without the application of ministerial responsibility);**
- * a totally inadequate delivery system characterised by duplication and a bloated bureaucracy;**

- * the complete absence of controls such as audit trials and performance audits;
- * the "gifts" of golden handshakes to parliamentarians and bureaucrats.

As a consequence of the levels of government incompetence, an enormous budget deficit has accumulated.

Instead of addressing the problem fundamentally through measures such as:

- the establishment of a representative Fiscal Commission to advise on both revenue and expenditure;
- the establishment of transparent departmental and judicial controls over state expenditure, including an audit on the 1992/3 budget;
- a planned approach to expenditure, including the elimination of tricameral and bantustan duplication and improving on the efficiency of public works programmes.

The government is opting to shift the burden of the deficit on to the taxpayers by means of both direct and indirect taxes.

The ANC finds this shift of responsibility on to the taxpayers totally unacceptable. We believe that it is imperative that National Party incompetence be fully exposed and that immediate steps be taken to expose every bit of the corruption so rampant throughout the bureaucracy.

We demand a moratorium on all gratuities outside of what is due to civil servants contractually made to a pension fund.

We call on all ANC regions to be actively involved in mobilisation in order to express opposition to the budget policy of the regime, and to rally support for the ANC's economic policy. In the execution of this tasks, we appeal to regions to be mindful of the responsibilities and constraints which a democratic government will face.

6. **MK COMMISSION**

This NEC noting:

1. The lack of progress in this commission thus far as outlined in the NWC Report;
2. Further proposals from MHQ with regard to a permanent coordinating structure for the military.

Decided:

- a) that the Commission on MK should continue its work;
- b) Comrade Thenjiwe Mthintso be approached to head the commission;
- c) the Commission be instructed to draw up a time frame for the completion of its work;
- d) further, that the Officials urgently attend to the establishment of a permanent NWC Committee to oversee the work of MHQ and NAT.

7. **DEPLOYMENT OF NEC MEMBERS**

This NEC adopted:

The revised deployment for NEC members to regions (see final NEC Documentation)

8. **DOOR TO DOOR CAMPAIGN**

This NEC noted:

1. The proposal from the Campaigns Section for a National "DOOR TO DOOR" campaign;
2. Concerns expressed about the lack of consultation with the Elections Commission in this regard;

Decided:

The Campaigns Section of Organising Department and Elections Commission should meet to streamline their programmes over the coming months and present a consolidated report to the NWC.

9. **RESTRUCTURING OF ORGANISING DEPARTMENT**

This NEC noting:

1. the proposed restructuring of the Organising Department;
2. concerns expressed about the general lack of coordination among departments.

Decided

- a) to endorse the proposed structure of the Organising Department;
- b) that the SGO should convene a meeting of all departments with a view to streamlining coordination at head office level and communication with regions. This meeting should also consider the manner in which departments expect to contribute to the Elections Commission.

10. GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

This NEC, noting:

The joint proposal from the Negotiations Commission and the regime for a Government of National Unity after the adoption of a new constitution:

Resolves that:

Further to our adopted document "Negotiations, a Strategic Perspective", this meeting of the NEC decided as follows:

- a) We reject the National Party's power sharing proposal either for a permanent or fixed period;
- b) In the interest of reconstruction and peace and the need to minimise the potential threat to democratic advance from divisive forces in the period immediately following the adoption of the new constitution, we declare our support for an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) which should exist up to the point of the adoption of a new constitution, the IGNU would continue in the same form as a Government of National Unity and Reconstruction (GNUR) in order to phase in structures provided for in the new constitution.

The GNUR would exist for a specified limited duration, whose term would come to an end by the first election under the new constitution, which would be held no later than five years after the elections for the CA.

- c) Such a GNUR shall be governed by the overriding principle that minority parties shall not have the powers to paralyse the functioning of the executive or to block the process of restructuring, more particularly:
 - i) it shall be made up of an executive in which there will be proportional representation of all the parties elected to the CA subject to a minimum threshold of 5% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly;

- ii) the President shall be elected by a simple majority of the Constituent Assembly;
 - iii) representatives of minority parties in the cabinet shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the leaders of each party in questions. The President shall have the right to insist on an alternative if the person proposed by such leader is, for specified reasons, unacceptable.
 - iv) in general, the President shall exercise his or her executive powers after consultation with the cabinet.
 - v) in the case of certain specified powers, the President shall exercise his or her powers in consultation with the parties represented in the cabinet. In the event of a disagreement, the President's decision shall require support of 2/3 of the members of the cabinet.
 - vi) the specified powers mentioned in (e) are still to be negotiated and before an agreement is reached in this regard, a detailed mandate will have to be obtained from the NWC sitting with either the chairperson or secretary of each region.
- d) The meeting further reaffirms its positions concerning the Constituent Assembly that the Constituent Assembly shall be a sovereign constitution-making body which will be bound only by agreed general constitutional principles. It should be composed of representatives elected on the basis of national and regional lists. It would take decisions by a two thirds majority of the regional representatives sitting as a whole. The Constituent Assembly should complete its work as quickly as possible and not later than nine months after its election.

The NEC will continue to negotiate the issue of an effective deadlock breaking mechanism which would be used in case the Constituent Assembly is unable to conclude its work within the specified time frame.

e) **The meeting of the NEC resolved that work should continue to build a national consensus on the question of future regional government, through discussions with other parties and organisations. All decisions concerning the powers, functions, boundaries and structure of regional government should be decided by the Constituent Assembly. Any Commission on Regions that may be established by a multi-party forum would, apart from delimiting electoral regions for the Constituent Assembly elections, only make recommendations to this Assembly.**

f) **Programme of Reconstruction and Development**

In endorsing the package concerning inter alia a Government of National Unity, the NEC affirmed that such arrangements must, during the transition period itself, be reinforced by an effective programme of reconstruction and democratic transformation.

The ANC immediately needs to embark on a process to consolidate its ranks, supporters and those of the broad democratic forces around a transitional strategy to empower the oppressed majority.

This will entail:

- i) identifying those key sections of the organs of state that require restructuring as a matter of priority;
- ii) evolving an affirmative action programme, with definite time frames, to reconstruct the organs of state in conformity with a democratic society;
- iii) a far-reaching programme of social economic reconstruction to address the pressing needs of the majority of South Africa;

- iv) a process of consultation and mobilisation of mass democratic forces and the convening of a conference on reconstruction and broad strategy. Such a conference to be held within four months.

10.2 NEGOTIATIONS PLANNING CONFERENCE

This NEC noting

The report from the Negotiations Commission for a Negotiations Planning Conference

Decided:

To accept the report presented with the amendment that such conference should be open to all media.

11. ANGOLA

This NEC noting the situation in Angola

Resolve as follows:

We condemn in the strongest terms the criminal war being waged by UNITA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi against the people of Angola and their democratically elected government.

We call on UNITA to end this war against democracy immediately and to respond positively to the initiative of the Government of Angola and the United Nations for peace talks between the Government and UNITA.

We further call on UNITA to honour all the commitments it made when it signed the Bicesse Agreements, which remain the valid framework for the resolution of the problems confronting the people of Angola.

We also demand that UNITA respects the outcome of the democratic elections, which the United Nations and other international observers certified as being free and fair.

We further call on the international community to extend no assistance of any kind to UNITA but take all necessary action to oblige UNITA to desist from its actions which are designed to impose itself on the Angolan people by force of arms, and thus subvert the efforts of the people to achieve democracy, peace and development.

In particular we demand of the South African government that it should extend no assistance whatsoever to UNITA and take resolute action to ensure that South African territory is not used by anybody to provide such support.

The UN Security Council and the guarantors of the Bicesse Agreements are obliged to take all necessary action to end the carnage in Angola and to ensure the success of the process of transformation visualised in these Agreements as well as in Security Council resolutions.

The anti-democratic activities of UNITA should not be allowed either to derail the peace process in Angola nor to compromise the process of change in which the region of Southern Africa, including our own country, is involved.

We further resolve to keep this situation under constant review and will take all action within our power to support the government and people of Angola in their effort to secure democracy and peace for themselves.

12. ELECTION OF NWC MEMBER

This NEC noting:

The vacancy on the NWC following the resignation of Chris Hani

Duly elected:

Raymond Suttner as member of the NWC.

13. REPORT FROM ELECTIONS COMMISSION

This NEC noting the report from the Elections Commission

Decided:

1. With regard with the form in which we participate in the election, that a committee of 6 people: Jaques Modipane, Collins Chabane, Ismail Ebrahim, Trevor Manuel, Willem Steenkamp and Terror Lekota be asked to formulate a proposal on the details about the form in which we participate, spelling out the kind of relationship we want to establish with all other political and mass formations for the purposes of the campaign. They should formulate the proposal after consultation with the relevant regions.
2. With regard to the list of candidates for the for the CA and the proposal for the considerations, criteria and process contained in said report, this matter should be urgently considered in all its complexities by the NWC at the earliest possible sitting. Regions needed to discuss the matter and report to the NWC.
3. With regard to Election Platform, endorsed the process described on page 5 of the report but added that this matter required discussion at the proposed National Conference on Reconstruction and Transformation.
(see Resolution on Negotiations)

4. With regard to Voter Identification, endorsed the procedure outlined that one or two types of documents can be used by voters to identify themselves; the identity books (Books of Life) issued by the South African government, TBVC Territories or South African passports being the first, and voter cards issued by the Independent Elections Commission being second. Those without the first category of document can use amongst others, birth certificates, baptismal certificates or affidavits signed by two citizens to get their voters card.
5. To embark on a major drive to encourage all those without valid identity documents to apply for the SA Identity Document. The ANC should liaise with Home Affairs to speed up the process.
6. That at least three international people should be included in the Independent Elections Commission.
7. That the ballot paper for the elections should have a single column of parties listed in alphabetical order with spaces for the name of the party, its symbol, the picture of the party and a space to mark the ballot. The ballot should be produced by an internationally based commercial company with a reputation for producing security documents. However, the matter of which symbol the ANC would use on the ballot paper needed further processing and was referred to the NWC.
8. That the broadest definition for what is considered a valid ballot should be used; any mark which indicates unambiguously the intention of the voter should be valid, although as the ANC we will popularise the cross in our own material.
9. That the DIA should produce a motivated proposal for the NWC on which international bodies could facilitate the monitoring of elections and act as the body which coordinates all international monitoring of the elections.

10. With regard to the proposed structures for the Election, this matter be referred to the NWC for decision. All departments should meet before hand to iron out any remaining problems with regard to the proposed structure. When the NWC considers the final structure, regions should be represented at said NWC by either the Chairperson or Secretary.
11. With regard to the core slogan for the campaign, this should be "NOW IS THE TIME". It was agreed to accept *in principle* to have approximately ten leaders who represent the high profile, public face of the campaign.
12. With regard to the local level programme of work for the election campaign between now and end of April, to adopt the programme outlined on pages 53 and 54 of the report.
13. With regard to finances and fundraising, that the Elections Campaign Coordinating Team will have responsibility for using the criteria described on page 44 of the report for developing an allocations policy which will describe the ratio of money to be allocated to each region for elections. They will make recommendations to the NWC for decision. This will allow for a strategic allocation based on the criteria and is a shift away from the equal allocation policy. This will apply to all amounts other than a common amount allocated to all regions. The Coordinating Team will use the policy to negotiate and finalise budgets from regions for the elections. The Finance Department will continue to be responsible for financial accountability.
14. Finally, with regard to the proposed directive to all structures of the ANC, it was agreed this matter would be finalised by the Officials who would see to it that the said directive is signed by the President and circulated to all structures of the organisation.

14. **CODE OF CONDUCT**

This NEC noting:

That this matter was long overdue and required urgent attention;

Decided:

The proposed Code should be urgently discussed by regions and finalised by the NWC within one month.

**ANC PRESS STATEMENT FROM THE MEETING OF THE
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING AT
IPELEGENG CENTRE, SOWETO, 16TH TO 18TH
FEBRUARY 1993**

The National Executive Committee of the ANC met in full plenary session from 16 - 18 February 1993 in Soweto, Johannesburg. During its first meeting for 1993, the NEC reviewed the work of its National Working Committee, and received reports from the Organising Department, the Negotiations Commission and the Elections Commission.

The NEC adopted a recommendation to restructure the Organising Department with a view of streamlining the ANC at national, regional and branch level in preparation for the general election campaign we shall embark on in the course of 1993.

The meeting discussed at length, a report and recommendations from the Negotiations Commission. In a resolution on Negotiations, the NEC committed the ANC to a comprehensive programme of reconstruction and development, which will proceed in tandem with the transition to democracy.

The NEC recognised that in the interests of peace, stability and reconstruction there will be a need for a government of national unity of limited duration, that draws on the talents of a representative range of South Africans.

The meeting underscored its rejection of the National Party's proposal of power sharing, whether permanent or for a fixed period. While affirming the need for inclusiveness, the NEC emphasised that it should not impair the capacity of such a Government of National Unity to function effectively in the process of restructuring.

The NEC affirmed that the composition and mandate of a Government of National Unity is not a deal struck between political parties in smoke-filled rooms. It will be the outcome of the preferences of the South African electorate as expressed in the first democratic elections. The ANC declared its commitment to a government composed of all parties elected to the Constituent Assembly, subject to a minimum threshold of 5% of the seats in that assembly.

The NEC endorsed the multi-party Negotiations Planning Conference to be held on 25 February 1993 with a view to a speedy resumption of CODESA. The ANC will enter into discussions with a range of political parties in pursuance of this objective.

The NEC emphasised the important inter-connection between the negotiations package and a far-reaching process to restructure the organs of government, the judiciary and the civil service, in the transition period to bring these into conformity with a non-racial democratic political order.

In pursuance of this goal, the ANC will convene a major conference of reconstruction and strategy before the end of June 1993.

The NEC noted with grave concern the present situation in Angola. It is clear that the renewal of the war is a direct consequence of Dr Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept the electoral verdict of the Angolan people. South African government's involvement in ongoing supplies and other logistical support to UNITA have also fuelled the conflict.

The NEC recorded our indebtedness to the Angolan people and their government for years of solidarity with the South African struggle at great cost to their country and themselves. Accordingly, the meeting resolved to launch a national campaign of solidarity and support for Angola, including demonstrations and other manifestations.

The forthcoming general elections will be the first occasion in the history of our country in which all South Africans will participate as equals. These elections will mark an historic turning point as the culmination of decades of struggle for a democratic franchise.

The election campaign will be most important mass action the ANC and other democratic forces will wage in the course of the coming months.

The NEC discussed and endorsed an extensive report from Elections Commission and has instructed all levels of our organisation to gear themselves for that campaign which we will wage under the slogan "Now is the Time" - "Ke nako" - "Sekunjalo" - "Nou is die Tyd".

An election, by secret ballot, was conducted to fill one vacant seat on the National Working Committee. Comrade Raymond Suttner has been duly elected to serve on the National Working Committee.