

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY - SUBMISSION

SUB GROUP 2 OF GROUP 1

TOPIC 1.2 (h)

" The prevention of violence- related crime and matters giving rise thereto" *Also relevant to Topic 1.2 (e) "The military"*

This sub-clause can be further subdivided into two primary components.

1. The isolation of those violence related crimes emanating from the structures of the SADF.
2. An examination of those measures adopted by the SADF which contribute, indirectly, to the existence of violence related crime (slush funds etc)

1. THE ROLE OF SADF STRUCTURES IN THE EXECUTION OF VIOLENCE.

(A) HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.

SADF structures have historically participated in the execution of violence against the apartheid state's internal and external components. Externally the SADF deployed the following forces in its strategy of destabilisation.

1. Its conventional forces (its divisions, its brigades and its armoured mechanised units)
2. Its Special Forces (its reconnaissance Regiments and 32 Battalion)
3. Its proxy forces (South West African Territorial Force, ethnic battalions)

Internally it deployed its units from the following formations:

1. Its special forces (notably the CCB)
2. Its counter-insurgency forces (particularly its Citizen Force units in the townships)
3. Its proxy forces - ethnic battalions and homeland armies;

(B) THE ROLE OF SADF FORCES IN THE EXECUTION OF VIOLENCE SINCE
2 FEBRUARY 1990.

SADF involvement in violence has emerged as a result of the following information.

1. The involvement of the SADF's Special Forces Division in the elimination of democratic activists. Concrete evidence in this regard has emerged regarding the activities of 5 Recce in Phalaborwa (information provided by an ex - PF sergeant Felix Ndimande)

Circumstantial evidence exists regarding the activities of 1 Recce Regt. (Durban) in the killing fields of Natal and 32 Battalion (Pomfrets) in the killing fields of Natal and Witwatersrand.

2. The involvement of SADF proxy forces can be insolated in the following spheres:
 - 2.1. SADF training of KwaZulu security "guards" - first at an SADF base in Northern Namibia called "Hippo" and then at a temporary base in Northern Natal at Mkhuze.
 - 2.2. SADF and SADF-related training of homeland military personnel, Col. Jan ("Maljan") Breytenbach (former 32 Btn O.C. of 1 Recce Regt.) is presently training the Ciskei Defence Force's parabat complement.
 - 2.3. Appointment of contentious SADF officers to senior post in the HDF eg:
 - i) Brigadier Oelsig (former head of Ops. DISA - UNITA support operation - in M.I.'s Directorate of Spacial Tasks in 1982 and 1983) is now O.C. of the Ciskei Defence Force.
 - ii) Colonel Meiring (former M.I.) is now Chief of Staff Intelligence in the Venda Defence Force.

2. THE ROLE OF SADF STRUCTURES IN FINANCING ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE.

A. Historical overview.

M.I. structures have long, financed dissident and adversarial groupings internally and externally. Externally these support networks were organized by M.I.'s Directorate of Spacial Tasks and included the following four areas of operation :

1. Angola --- UNITA (Ops. DISA).
2. Lesotho --- LLA.
3. Mozambique --- MNR.
4. Zimbabwe --- Super ZAPU.

A variety of other organisations were also fronted.
eg.

1. DTA.
2. Muzorewa.

Internally the following organisations were funded :

1. Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA).
2. United Municipalities of South Africa.
3. S.A. Traditional Healers Council.
4. I.F.P.

Organisations were funded either by DMI's Directorate of Special Task or DMI's Directorate of Communication Operations (Comops)

(B) SADF funding since 1990 (February)

SAD funding of vigilante groups since Feb 2 has emerged in the following areas:

1. Funding of IFP.
2. Funding of AmaAfrica vigilantes in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage.
3. Funding of "Black Cat" vigilantes in Ermelo.
4. Funding of "New Eagles" vigilantes in Bloemfontain.

All the above have been extensively implicated in violence throughout the country.

CONCLUSION

Violence can be attributed to many causes and many actors. The SADF is one of these actors and it remains immensely influential. A termination of SADF violence can be initiated via:

1. SADF Code of Conduct binding both the institution plus all its members;
2. Disbanding and reintegration of Special Forces personnel into conventional units;
3. Public monitoring and /or accountability vis a vis DMI's special funds;
4. Prosecution of SADF personnel involved in violence related crimes since regime's cut off date for indemnity (October 1990) relating to armed operations.