

African National Congress

51 Plein Street
Johannesburg 2001
P O Box 61884
Marshalltown 2107



Tel: (011) 330-7000
Fax: (011) 330-9090
Telex: 421252

30th May, 1992.

**Chairperson
Daily Management Committee
CODESA
World Trade Centre
Kempton Park.**

Dear Sir,

**RE: TAPPING OF THE TELEPHONE LINES OF THE ANC AND SACP AT THE
WORLD TRADE CENTRE.**

I enclose herewith a report by the ANC with regard to the above matter for the attention of the D.M.C.

Yours sincerely,

**M.C. Ramaphosa
SECRETARY GENERAL**

encl.

REPORT BY THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS TO THE DAILY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE OF CODESA WITH REGARD TO THE TAPPING OF THE TELEPHONE LINES OF THE ANC AND THE SACP AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE.

1. In pursuance of the discussion, held at the Codesa Management Committee meeting 25 May 1992, with regard to the tapping of the ANC and the SACP telephones at the World Trade Centre, we wish to make the following submissions.
2. We enclose herewith a photocopy of computer printouts for five tests carried out on 15 May 1992 on the following telephone lines: 397 2102/3/4. These printouts show that all three lines were tapped during all five tests.
3. The printouts of the test results were submitted by the Sunday Star to Andy Grudko, Technical Director of the Private Information agency INEQ and president of the South African Council of Civil Investigators. He confirmed that the printouts showed that the three lines were tapped at the time that the tests were carried out.
4. After the tests, the technical expert hired by the ANC proceeded to do a physical check on the telephone lines - first at the point where the lines enter the ANC offices at

the WTC. He then followed the lines which go through the ceiling above the NP office and the SA Government office. In the course of this check, the technical expert was asked by a Telkom technician about his credentials, who informed him that Codesa procedure was that if any party or organisation wanted its lines to be checked, it had to be done in the presence of a Codesa security officer. According to the technical expert, who was accompanied by Attorney Peter Harris, the Telkom technician was agitated and looking worried. He proceeded to show the technical expert where the Junction Box is situated in the World Trade Centre. The Junction Box is the point where all the telephone lines at the WTC are connected to the lines that go to the Exchange at the Isando Post Office. He further informed the technical expert hired by the ANC that this was the only Junction Box and that all lines from here went directly to th Isando exchange. As the Junction Box was slightly high up, he offered to bring a stepladder in order to facilitate our technical expert checking the lines at the Junction Box. In fact the Junction Box is not so high up as to need the aid of a stepladder. Nonetheless the Telkom technician immediately left the scene. Our technical expert waited for the Telkom technician to return. When there were no signs that the Telkom technician was likely to return, the technical expert went back to the ANC offices to continue with his checks. After about half an hour the Telkom technician came to the ANC office, accompanied by a Codesa security officer. The Telkom

technician was now relaxed and they together went with the stepladder to check the Junction Box. The check revealed no suspicious devices attached to the lines on the premises.

5. Further tests on the lines after the above incident showed that all lines were clear of any tapping devices.

6. In the opinion of the technical expert, hired, by the ANC, the devices used were unlikely to have been placed on the lines inside the premises of the World Trade Centre because they could have been easily discovered. His conclusion was that the devices were placed on the three phone lines outside the premises and most probably in the exchange at Isando.

7. With regard to the likely points at which the taps could have been connected, the report of the Sunday Star sets out in diagrammatic form all the possible critical points of the telephone lines from the World Trade Centre to the Isando Post Office. In this regard we should also note that Mr Andy Grudko agreed with the view of the company hired by the ANC that the location of the bug of the fax line could have been inside the Isando Exchange. However in the case of the other two bugs, he is of the view that these could have been connected anywhere on the underground cable between the box outside the World Trade Centre and the Isando Exchange. In this connection it should be noted that there are five manholes over this distance leading to the

underground cables.

8. On the basis of the check made by the private company hired by the ANC and taking into account the expert opinion of Mr Grudko with regard to the printouts of the five test results, we submit that it is incontrovertible that the three telephone lines were being monitored.
9. The question arises: who could have been responsible for placing the taps on these three lines?
10. It is our view that this question can only be answered in the context of the very nature of the Codesa process; who could have at their disposal the necessary technical equipment and resources to effect such tapping; and who could have such unimpeded access to the Isando Post Office Exchange. Furthermore, the issue must be placed in the context of accumulating evidence as to how the different agencies of the South African State have been, and are still, operating.
11. In the first place the findings of the court in the Trust Feed Massacre case show that highly placed officers in the South African Police masterminded and were directly involved in the massacre. And that after the massacre, even more highly placed officers in the SAP were involved in efforts to block investigations about this massacre.

12. In the case of the murder of Matthews Goniwe and three others in the Eastern Cape it has recently come to light that their "death warrant" was signed by General van der Westhuizen who is currently the head of the Department of Military Intelligence in the SADF.

13. In case there are parties who are prone to argue that the above two instances belong to the pre-February 2 1990 period, we wish to draw attention to the fact that in May this year the South African Police sought to obtain a court order in the Pretoria Supreme Court in an effort to block the Weekly Mail publishing a disclosure of a covert network of SAP bases in the Southern Transvaal. In this they were not entirely successful. What emerged was incontrovertible evidence that the South African Police have established since 1988 a clandestine network of bases in eleven regions across the country under the Criminal Investigation Services, into which the Security Police were absorbed last year. In the case of the Southern Transvaal network, this secretive police operation has been working from four undercover houses and that it operates with registered vehicles, non-existent companies and falsely registered telephone and page numbers. Furthermore the Weekly Mail uncovered this secret network through leads obtained from two informants. Both informants were approached by this secret police network. In the case of one informant, he was quizzed about information relating to Umkhonto weSizwe cadres, and was promised training to wreak revenge on the

ANC. In the case of the other informant, he was approached to participate in petrol bomb attacks on the homes of ANC leaders in Sebokeng, including a church fieldworker Saul Tsotetsi. Eight days after this approach was made, Tsotetsi was attacked by a group of five men. In the course of the struggle, a hand grenade exploded killing Tsotetsi and injuring two of his attackers.

14. The reports of the Weekly Mail clearly indicate that this Southern Transvaal secret police network is engaged in activities directed at eliminating local leaders of the ANC and that these activities are currently taking place.
15. Without labouring the point it is our considered view that one or other agency of the South African government is involved with the use of state funds and resources in activities aimed at destroying and undermining the ANC.
16. In this context we are of the view that in a similar manner, one or other agency of the South African government has been responsible for the telephone taps place on the ANC and the SACP telephone lines at the World Trade Centre, and that information derived from such taps was sought for the purpose of disadvantaging the ANC and the SACP at the expense of the South African Government.
17. We attach hereto a copy of the test results of the printouts showing that these three lines were tapped on the

15 May 1992 with the express proviso that we are not prepared to disclose the identity of the private company which carried out the tests and the equipment they used for the tests. We further enclose a photocopy of the report which appeared in the Sunday Star on 24 May 1992 for your information.

30th May, 1992. Johannesburg.

15 MAY 92 09-30

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-31

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.40
3 S	52.45	44.65
Avg	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.10

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	12.45	0.05
2 T	12.40	0.10
3 T	12.45	0.10
Avg	12.43	0.05
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
* SUSPECT 3*
AVERAGE 4 ST DV 17

1B	1R	VALUE 103
2R	1R	VALUE 141
3R	1R	VALUE 63

These are the Bugged line combinations at the EXCHANGE

15 MAY 92 09-24

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-24

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.35
3 T	52.45	52.40
Avg	52.45	52.40
S.D.	0.05	0.10

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	12.45	0.05
2 T	12.45	0.15
3 T	12.45	0.10
Avg	12.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
* SUSPECT 3*
AVERAGE 4 ST DV 4

1B	1R	VALUE 101
2R	1R	VALUE 159
3R	1R	VALUE 15

15 MAY 92 09-19

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-19

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.50
2 T	52.40	52.45
3 S	52.45	37.40
Avg	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.05

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	12.45	0.05
2 T	12.45	0.15
3 T	12.50	0.10
Avg	12.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
* SUSPECT 3*
AVERAGE 4 ST DV 9

1B	1R	VALUE 32
2R	1R	VALUE 104
3R	1R	VALUE 151

15 MAY 92 09-14

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the Phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 1 *

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	4

15 MAY 92 09-15

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 S	52.50	25.05
2 T	52.45	52.45
3 T	52.50	52.50
Avg	52.45	52.45
S.D.	0.05	0.05

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	12.45	0.05
2 T	12.45	0.15
3 T	12.50	0.10
Avg	12.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
* SUSPECT 4*
AVERAGE 4 ST DV 2

1B	1R	VALUE 5
2R	1R	VALUE 7
3R	1R	VALUE 218
	1R	VALUE 5

15 MAY 92 09-09

PAIR	I.D.	Numbers of the phones
1	2104	
2	2102	
3	2103	

INACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

ACTIVE
TESTED 3 FAILED 0
SUSPECT 0

AUDIO	
TESTED	15
SUSPECT	3

15 MAY 92 09-10

PAIR	I.D.
1	2104
2	2102
3	2103

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	52.50	52.55
2 T	52.45	52.45
3 T	52.50	52.50
Avg	52.45	52.50
S.D.	0.05	0.05

(line Voltages)

PAIR	RDG 1	RDG 2
1 T	12.45	0.05
2 T	12.45	0.15
3 T	12.50	0.10
Avg	12.45	0.10
S.D.	0.05	0.05

AUDIO COMBINATIONS
TESTED 15 (3)
* SUSPECT 3*
AVERAGE 5 ST DV 3

1B	1R	VALUE 126
2R	1R	VALUE 224
3R	2R	VALUE 15

SURVEY LOCATION: ANC OFFICE, WORLD TRADE CENTRE, CODESA
SURVEY DATE: 15-05-1992