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Zdenek Cervenka

AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS MEETS EASTERN EUROPE

A dialogue on common experiences

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AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS MEETS EASTERN EUROPE

A Dialogue on Common Experiences

Notes from the African National Congress (ANC)–Eastern European Dialogue on
“Freedom, democracy and social responsibility: Experiences and tasks ahead”
held on July 1–4, 1992 at Mariefred, Sweden

Zdenek Cervenka

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Foreword

The Oxford English Dictionary defines dialogue as “an exchange of ideas and opinions”. This was precisely the character of the meeting between six members of the National African Congress (ANC) leadership and ten eminent Eastern Europeans from the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland, who met in July 1992 at a conference centre at Mariefred in Sweden. The dialogue had yet another dimension, namely “discovery”, meaning—to quote again the dictionary—“to obtain knowledge for the first time”.

Thus the ANC participants learned that their Eastern European counterparts have neither lost an acute feeling of compassion with victims of human rights abuse, nor that they have abandoned the plight of black South Africans for the restoration of human dignity and democratic rights for all the people of their country.

The Eastern Europeans discovered that the members of the ANC are not the kind of fierce revolutionaries bent on usurping power to install a Marxist-Leninist style of dictatorship of the proletariat, as their communist mentors used to tell them. Indeed, in the past, the theme of apartheid had been misused by the communist regimes for their own political objectives. The communist governments protested vociferously against apartheid while at the same time they themselves were violating human rights in their own countries. The anti-apartheid campaign, while fully justified in itself, became a vehicle of ideology, class hatred and violence.

There are two questions which the ANC had been asking ever since the democratic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989. *Why is Eastern Europe so interested in South Africa ? Why have the new democratic governments in Eastern Europe rushed through the normalization of relations with Pretoria?*

Firstly, before their revolutions, most people in Eastern European countries considered themselves to be living in the communist apartheid. Those without party cards were treated as second class citizens, almost as the blacks. There is, of course, a fundamental difference between apartheid and communism as there is nothing you can do about being born black and stripped of citizen rights, whereas Czechoslovakians, Hungarians and Poles voted their Communist parties into power. These regimes lasted until 1989.

Secondly, the gross disinformation, the hallmark of communist mass media, had reached such proportions, that nobody believed what the communist regime was saying about international affairs, including

conditions in South Africa. People could verify that what was being said about neighbouring countries was false. How could they therefore believe that what was said about a distant country, South Africa? Unfortunately, with the ANC leaving the Eastern European scene, it was the Pretoria Government which seized upon the opportunity to fill the information gap.

Thirdly, Eastern European countries started to act independently as sovereign countries after 1989. Before then all decisions were made in Moscow. Now they wished to make their own international arrangements. This process coincided with the change in South Africa—the unbanning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party, the freeing of Nelson Mandela—hence the Eastern European countries support the reforms in South Africa by resuming contact with the South African Government while emphasising its opposition to apartheid and the need to learn more about the political process in South Africa.

Fourthly, a most important factor spurring public interest in South Africa was the influence of the Eastern European refugees who settled in South Africa and began visiting their home countries of origin. The Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles have always been sceptical about “official information”, but they were prepared to believe their former fellow citizens. They, rather than the South African Embassies are largely responsible for the almost absurd disinformation about the South African situation, a point elaborated in in the appendixes in the the summaries of Eastern European relations with South Africa.

Finally, there is a rather sensitive point: The ANC’s criticism of the Eastern European governments of the rapprochement with the South African government has been resented. It had been noted that there was an absence of a public welcome of the democratic changes in Eastern Europe on the part of the ANC, a movement which had enjoyed such generous support of these countries in the past. This has reinforced the belief about the dominance of communist ideology within the ANC.

However, discussions at Mariefred were not about the past but about the future. The three Eastern European countries represented at the Dialogue, and participants from South Africa, found a common ground in their task of dismantling old structures and replacing them with new democratic institutions. In Eastern Europe this process started in 1989, in South Africa it is about to begin. It was agreed that the path to democracy is not easy, as it never is. Democracy is not only a system of government, it is a way of solving conflicts, it is a way of life and a way of relationships

between people. The partition of Czechoslovakia, the rise of racial hatred in what was formerly the German Democratic Republic, once the staunchest supporter of the ANC, an alarming increase in crime and violence throughout Eastern Europe, in particular in Russia, and the inferno which broke out in former Yugoslavia, brought similarities between Eastern Europe and South Africa uncomfortably closer.

The success of the Dialogue, described in the report, was the success of all who took part in it. The credit for the initiative goes to Carl Tham, Director General of the Swedish International Development Aid Authority (SIDA), which financed the meeting. However, this was only a first step. The second step, unanimously favoured by all participants, is to continue the Dialogue directly to Prague, Bratislava, Budapest and Warsaw. Hopefully, means can be found to make it possible as goodwill to resume lost friendships has already been established.

Zdenek Cervenka

Uppsala, November 1, 1992

Background to the meeting: A new crisis in South Africa

In June 1992 the talks between the ANC and the South African Government reached an impasse and the ANC suspended bilateral talks with the Government. The ANC's decision was prompted by the massacre of 42 people in Boipatong township on June 17. On June 20 a further three died when police opened fire on a crowd on June 20 which had gathered to protest the killing. Addressing a rally in the township of Evaton on June 22, Nelson Mandela, the president of the ANC, said "I can no longer explain to our people why we continue to talk to a regime that is murdering our people and conducting war against us."

On the following day, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC held an emergency meeting issuing a statement describing the situation in South Africa as follows:

The National Party regime of FW de Klerk has brought our country to the brink of disaster. Riddled with corruption and mismanagement, the regime is determined to block any advance towards democracy. It pursues a strategy which embraces negotiations, together with systematic covert actions, including murder, involving its security forces and surrogates. This subversion of the political process to destroy the democratic movement in South Africa cannot be allowed to prevail any longer.

What is at issue is more than the crisis of the negotiating process. The fundamental reason for the deadlock is whether there is to be democratic change or white minority veto powers. There is only one way forward. It is a road which must unmistakably and unequivocally lead to the establishment of a democratic South Africa.

Under these circumstances the fact that members of the ANC leadership left South Africa plunged in the worst political crisis since 1990 to attend a conference in Sweden, has indicated the interest they attach to a dialogue with their Eastern European counterparts.

The ANC delegation was led by Alfred Nzo, the former ANC Secretary General and member of the NEC. He was accompanied by Mondane Wally Serote, Head of the ANC Arts and Culture Department; Penuell Maduna, Head of the ANC Legal Department, member of the ANC Constitutional Committee and of its delegation to CODESA (the Convention for a Democratic South Africa); Seth Nthai, Director of the Law Clinic at the University of the North and Head of the ANC Legal and Constitutional Committee in the Northern Transvaal region; Pierre Cronjé, Member of Parliament, formerly of the Democratic Party, now representing the ANC;

and Simpson Thabang Makwetla, Member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League and co-ordinator of religious and student affairs at the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg.

They were matched by equally high level representatives of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland. From Prague came Dr. Jiri Valenta, Director of the Institute of International Affairs and adviser to the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Tomas Smetanka, Editor in Chief of the most influential Prague daily, *Lidové Noviny*. Slovakia was represented by Pavol Demes, the then Minister of the Slovak Ministry for International Relations, and Juraj Svec, Rector of the Komenius University in Bratislava. From Budapest came Judit Balasz, Director of the African and Oriental Studies and Trade Development Foundation attached to the Institute of World Economy in Budapest; Béla Szombati, foreign policy adviser to the President of the Hungarian Republic, and Miklos Barabas, Director of the European House in Budapest. From Warsaw arrived Halina Bornowska-Dabrowska, editor of ZNAK and co-founder of the Forum Poland in Europe as did Tomas Knothe, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Interparliamentary Relations of the Polish Sejm and Aleksander Muller, Rector of the Warsaw High School of Economics.

Breaking the ice

The three Eastern European countries represented at the Dialogue used to be among the staunchest supporters of the ANC's armed struggle against the apartheid regime. This has changed. Since the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, there has been a period of cool relations between the ANC and the new democratic governments of the three countries. Since 1990 there have been no ANC representatives in Eastern European capitals. The visits to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland by the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, and President FW de Klerk, and the opening of South African Embassies in Budapest and Prague, have been criticized by the ANC as premature steps which were giving FW de Klerk an international recognition he did not deserve.

Apart from Nelson Mandela's private visit to Prague in May 1992, where he met the then President Vaclav Havel, there has been virtually no official contact between the ANC and Eastern Europe. Hence the Dialogue in Sweden was, as Jiri Valenta put it "truly historic".

Carl Tham, Director General of SIDA, and the initiator of the Dialogue, in his address to the participants read by the Conference Chairperson,

Eivor Halkjaer, expressed a wish that “the meeting will be a free exchange of experiences and views, preoccupations and hopes between friends”. This was indeed the case. One of the most positive aspects of the Dialogue at Mariefred was that past distrust and allocation of blame for the suspension of relations between the ANC and Eastern Europe was put aside, giving way to a new spirit of understanding, respect and readiness to resume close co-operation. Lively debates continued long after conference hours over dinner, and during walks in the park surrounding the majestic castle of Gripsholm. South Africans and East Europeans got to know each other and the atmosphere at all sessions was relaxed.

The character of the Dialogue was, above all, informative with South Africa at the centre of the talks. At the start of the meeting Alfred Nzo said that “For us it is very important that you leave the meeting with a clear understanding of the situation in South Africa.” He and his colleagues have certainly accomplished that.

“A nation of pigs”

Eastern Europeans were stunned by the moral devastation of South African society illustrated by Penuell Maduna quoting from the *Sunday Star* editorial of May 31:

We live and cheat, we embrace corruption and bribery and exploitation, we encourage torture and terrorism and massacre and murder. We employ people to lie, to betray, we allow psychopathic killers to go free; we fail to prosecute those who rob the poor, and those who waste billions staying in their fat-cat jobs while the people they serve starve. We have become a nation of pigs.

The dialogue’s central themes were the dismantling of old political structures, the building of a democratic society, social security and responsibility, nationalization versus privatization, causes of violence in South Africa, the role of universities and mass media, the cultural heritage, and protection of minorities.

The ANC pulled out from CODESA to save its credibility

Alfred Nzo and Penuell Maduna explained that the lack of political and economic change is leading to growing criticism of the ANC leadership which, in the eyes of the township dwellers, has achieved nothing. In the words of Alfred Nzo: “On February 2, 1990 President FW de Klerk announced that he wants to turn his back on apartheid and move towards democracy. He rescinded the ban on the ANC and released Nelson Mandela. But two years have passed and not a single black person has a vote. We are

no closer towards having a say in choosing the government of the day. That places a tremendous amount of pressure on the ANC. We no longer have the mandate of our people who see us making concessions to the Government without getting anything in return.” Penuell Maduna said that the second Convention for a Democratic South Africa, (CODESA) on May 15-16 failed to solve three critical issues:

- 1) Agreement on Interim Government,
- 2) Agreement on what appropriate democratic structures should pave the way to a new constitution,
- 3) Agreement on a framework—when do we begin, and when do we end the process of transition.

Every debate since February—and there have been hundreds—in the working groups appointed to examine the mechanics of political transition, has centered on the Government’s insistence on clinging on to as much power as possible in post-apartheid South Africa. They discussed minority protection, checks and balances of power and what FW de Klerk describes as “power-sharing”. In essence, the Nationalist Party wants to extract from the ANC and its partners constitutional guarantees, to avoid the possibility of the blacks doing to the whites what they have done to the blacks. The percentage majority for decision-making in a transitional government—whose principal function will be to write a new constitution—proved to be the stumbling block. “Without agreement here,” Penuell Maduna said, “all agreements reached at CODESA became worthless.” They included agreements on fair and free elections and on the setting up a Transitional Executive Council. But the government and its allies were holding out for the 75 per cent majority required for decision making. They want as small minority as possible capable of vetoing decisions of the majority. The government calculates that, in alliance with the Inkhata Freedom Party, it can secure more than 25 per cent of the vote, but not more than 33 per cent. The ANC knows that it cannot count on winning a 75 per cent majority but it is prepared to settle on 66,7 per cent. This was rejected by the Government. “If we give in,” said Alfred Nzo, “we would fail in our 80 years long struggle for the transfer of power to the majority and would remain hostage to the white NO”.

The illegal constitution must be scrapped

A description of the legal mechanism for transition towards democracy proposed by the ANC at CODESA was provided by Seth Nthai.

The ANC demand for an interim government stems from the fact that the present South African constitution is illegal, since the majority of people did not take part in its creation. Similarly, the white majority government cannot be trusted to manage the transition. The interim government will consist of all parties participating in CODESA, and will appoint multi-party committees, including an independent electoral commission, charged with the responsibility of preparing elections for a constituent assembly. The existing tricameral Parliament will be asked to pass a "Transition to Democracy Act", to replace the present constitution. The Act will contain, *inter alia*, a time-frame for the entire process of transition. After the election of a constituent assembly Parliament will cease to exist, and all Bantustan legislation will be abrogated. The election of the constituent assembly should be monitored by international observers, all its decisions requiring a two thirds majority. The assembly will appoint a new executive authority, drafting a new constitution and exercising legislative powers for a specified period of time. (For the guidelines of the Transition to Democratic Act, see appendix 1.)

Seth Nthai briefed the meeting on a document setting out constitutional principles and structures for a democratic South Africa, prepared by the ANC. It envisages a united, democratic, non-racial South Africa as a single unity comprising all present "Bantustan states"—that is Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. The new constitution will contain a Bill of Rights guaranteeing to all South Africans all basic civil and human rights and freedoms. It will also include basic economic rights—a right to food, shelter, education and health care. A Bill of Rights providing also for the establishment of a human rights commission to investigate human rights violations, and to recommend steps for their elimination. Furthermore, the Swedish institution of an "ombudsman" will be adopted to investigate corruption and abuse of office by any government official.

There will be three branches of the government executive, (President and the Government), legislature and judiciary. Parliament will consist of the National Assembly and the Senate, to be representative of the country's ten regions. Finally, the ANC proposes a strong local government to ensure

participation of traditional structures, and the establishment of a Constitutional Court to uphold the Bill of Rights.

The ANC plans for a new legal structure for South Africa have been succinctly summarized in Pierre Cronjé's two papers submitted to the meeting: "Structures of Government" and "Participating in Rebuilding our Society". In the first he describes the aims of a new Constitution as follows:

Reward non-racial political mobilization;

Discourage ethnic competition and the possibility of creating enclaves where minorities could feel threatened by ethnic majorities;

Allow for participation of communities.

In his second paper he puts great emphasis on popular participation, by saying, "The only constitution that will withstand the test of time is one rooted in the life of the community, and reflecting the will of the people", a point he amply elaborated during the debate.

The relevance of the Hungarian constitutional experience

Béla Szombati's review of the Hungarian experience with the National Round Table aroused great interest among the ANC participants. It came into existence after the Communist Government recognized that it could no longer hang on to power, and agreed to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with the opposition parties, a situation comparable to that in South Africa. The opposition parties met at what was called the "Opposition Round Table", where they came to an agreement on each issue which was then presented to the Government at the National Round Table. Parliament accepted all proposals agreed upon at the National Round Table and passed new laws in accordance with the consensus reached. New legislation provided for all basic democratic freedoms, protection of minorities and for strong local government, an institution which did not exist under Communist rule. Furthermore, the following system of checks and balances was agreed upon:

Power was vested in Parliament to which government is responsible. The office of the President was created as an institution defending the democratic functioning of the Government. The President does not have powers to initiate and execute policies, but he has powers to prevent and to stop acts which contravene the democratic principles embodied in the constitution. Béla Szombati pointed out that this system works well if the President comes from the largest opposition party. Should he come from the party which has a majority in Parliament and has formed the government,

the President's role to counter non-democratic measures would be weaker. The new Hungarian legislation pays great attention to the protection of minorities, their right to their own identity, schools, and respect for their cultural heritage. Béla Szombati explained that it took a year to agree on a legal framework, and it will take at least five, or even ten, years before the process will be completed. He warned of the hazards of simple majority rule which may turn into dictatorship by a majority, and thus the oppression of minorities, hence the need for guarantees of minorities' interests. In the Hungarian Parliament a two-third majority vote is required on all constitutional issues.

Miklos Barabas complemented Béla Szombati, commenting on the issue of governing. He said : "It is relatively very easy to attain power, but very difficult to manage it. The new government is expected to rule to the satisfaction of the people. It failed in Hungary, where people have been bitterly disappointed with the performance of the new, democratic government. It appears that it is much easier to mobilize people against a common enemy than to a common cause. The degree of satisfaction of the people largely depends on the economic benefits the government is able to provide." He addressed the ANC with a question: "When the uniting factor of your movement, which is the struggle against apartheid, disappears, with what will you replace it?"

He drew attention to the problem of popular participation. He said that the Communist system, just like the apartheid regime, had established the practice of running the country from the top. People got used to it. He continued: "If you just change the top without bringing people into the decision-making process you will meet with disillusion, resignation, egoism, envy and the withdrawal of people from any involvement in public life. Democratic traditions grow very slowly and require much tolerance and patience before they become rooted in a society."

Miklos Barabas added: "Do not overpoliticize life. Human life should not be filled with political struggle alone. Good life is made of small joys, family happiness, satisfaction from a job well done and interest in music, sport, books and private hobbies. A collector of stamps is sometimes a better man than a professional politician. Political struggle should be aimed at securing conditions for a better life not made synonymous with the meaning of life."

Is apartheid falling apart on its own or are you abolishing it ?

asked Halina Bornowska-Dabrowska, and explained: "The situation is very different if you destroy something which still can function or if you deal with a situation when the political system is disintegrating and you have to decide whether you should do something about salvaging it or let it fall. In Poland the communist system collapsed. It left us with the victim syndrome, a generally low level of responsibility for public affairs, a temptation to blame "them" for everything. There is now a wide choice and various propositions as to who "they" are now: are they still the Communists acting in collusion with new power? Or is the new power acting on its own, having betrayed all its proclaimed ideals and the poor? Is the Church to be blamed or the lack of fidelity to the Church? Is it Western influence or is it we who are responsible for our bad national character?" She continued: "It is not by a chance that a revolution against an abusive power tends to result in a new authoritarian regime or in chaos. We have found out in Poland that even a non-violent revolution, taken in small steps, is no exception. The oppressive power can be violent even without killing. It creates a climate of deep insecurity and dependence. People feel exposed, helpless and deprived. Their civil rights have become *de facto* suspended—some opt for emigration, others are trying to join "the other side".

In answering her question the ANC team was divided. Pierre Cronjé asserted that apartheid would fall apart on its own, while Penuell Maduna said: "If we were to sit back and did nothing, the apartheid would be there forever."

Thomas Knothe's thoughts were similar to those of Halina Bornowska-Dabrowska, and very relevant to the situation in South Africa. His was a strong indictment of Polish politics. " We learned that it is an illusion to believe that democracy can be built overnight. It will take many years. We are in a situation when a totalitarian regime fell apart but democracy is still not yet in place. This is largely due to a general lack of understanding of how democracy works. Democracy is not only about elections, a majority rule, a multi-party system and a new government. It is, first of all, about relations between people and relations between the authorities and the people. In Poland people feel they have been let down in the name of democracy. The massive support for the Solidarity movement has vanished and confidence in political parties—squabbling in the Sejm—has been totally destroyed."

Lenin's theories on the seizure of power are brilliant but when applied to the economy they have been proved disastrous

said Jiri Valenta, opening a debate on the role of the State in the economies of Eastern Europe, and on the relevance of the failure of Communist command economies to the ANC economic policies. He was not satisfied with the general statements on the ANC guidelines on the economy which give only vague references to a mixed economy. He invited the ANC to take a close look at the experiences in Eastern Europe, particularly in Russia and the Ukraine, where the consequences of the breakdown of the state-run economy had been most painful. He explained that it is wrong to believe that *perestroika* had been Michael Gorbachov's invention which brought about the current turmoil. Jiri Valenta described *perestroika* as a brave and desperate attempt at saving a system which was already on the brink of total collapse. He did not see the Chinese approach to privatization a good example to follow. The current Chinese economic boom will be short-lived because a liberalization of the economy without political liberalization is a non-starter. Castro's model is even more tragic, and it devastated the Cuban economy beyond recovery. "It will take decades to sanitize Castro's legacy," he said. Speaking about similarities between the situation in South Africa and Eastern Europe Jiri Valenta made it clear that similarity does not mean the same thing but makes the problems easier to understand. He focused on examples of the Eastern European experience with massive, non-violent and disciplined demonstrations. By developing a strategy of active nonviolent mass actions, the ANC could greatly enhance its impact on the outcome of the stalled constitutional negotiations. The late eighties provided striking evidence of the potential of non-violent action in fighting political oppression. In Berlin, Prague, Bratislava. Warsaw and Budapest a "people power" challenged long-standing communist dictatorships prompting profound political changes. Another example, relevant to the ANC economic policy, is re-distribution of national wealth through a system of vouchers. This has been one of the cornerstones of Vaclav Klaus' economic reform in Czechoslovakia. (Editor's note: Vaclav Klaus, former Federal Minister of Finance of Czechoslovakia is now the Prime Minister in the Czech Republic.) Eastern Europe has much experience of fighting the entrenched bureaucracy of the defunct communist regime, and with trying to erase the influence of former secret police officers and their collaborators, who are still active in politics, the mass media and the economy, similar to

the KGB in Russia where former KGB officers infiltrated the mass media and new private companies

In another intervention, Jiri Valenta expressed understanding of the ANC's pursuit of social justice, reflected in a social net, which the ANC seeks to integrate in the new political and economic structure of South Africa. He emphasised that the importance of social justice, which had been wrongly associated with pseudo-socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. The concept of social justice was not invented by the Communists. It has a long, social democratic tradition in Europe, and has been developed almost to perfection in Sweden and other Scandinavian countries as an indivisible part of democracy. The principle of social justice has been debased by communist regimes where the privileges of Communist rulers were comparable to the privileges of feudal masters in the past century. The problem is how to eradicate gross social and economic inequalities in South Africa where the whites own more than 98 per cent of all means of production.

The social security was one of the first casualties of the transition to a market economy in Hungary

said Judit Balazs, who presented a clear, convincing analysis of its consequences. Hungary was perhaps the first socialist country where the monolithic power of the state began to be eroded, and where the social inequalities defined by relations with the power first manifested themselves.

In all communist regimes financial and material allotments to the privileged class remained covert, therefore they were less irritating than in an open society. Many Hungarian enterprise executives, who had occupied positions of power during President Janos Kadar's regime, survived privatization and continue to be beneficiaries of privileges attached to their jobs. In short, the privatization process has converted the Communists' power into a power of Hungary's new capitalists.

In the 1980s, and in particular in the early 1990s, the latent inequalities became increasingly evident. The fast growing gap between prices and wages caused dissatisfaction in a broad stratum of society. Concurrently with the democratization of political structures, social conditions deteriorated, and hundreds of thousands of people were compelled to live below the minimum existence level.

In 1989 unemployment and homelessness—a previously unknown phenomenon—assumed threatening proportions. In 1990 official statistics put

the number of people living below minimum existence level as over one million, and in 1992 the number has reached three million. Thus, paradoxical as it may seem, the advancement of democracy has been accompanied by the erosion of social security and by rising uncertainties about jobs, housing and social services. In Hungary a political demagoguery has been equated with a market economy and private ownership. At the same time, the pillars of social security—social insurance, free education, state aid to provide basic housing, and living conditions—have begun to collapse. The trade union movements, traditional guardians of social welfare, have become powerless. It has become apparent that the concept of “private ownership” has come into conflict with principles of political and economic freedoms and comprehensive social security.

Judit Balasz expressed alarm about the Hungarian government’s plans to privatize education and medical services which, if carried out, would destroy the social net and the fabric of Hungarian society. She quoted a Hungarian joke which says: “We endured 40 years of communism but now we find it hard to bear two years of Hungarian capitalism”.

Judith Balasz recognized the situation in South Africa—where 40 per cent of the black labour force is unemployed—is much more serious than in Hungary. She said that in South Africa, as in Hungary, unless the process of democratization is underpinned by economic reforms bringing benefit to the poor, society will be destabilized by eruption of mass protests and violence, and striving for democracy will be reduced to slogans and a struggle for power and privileges of those people holding it.

...and in Poland

Aleksander Muller made some rather sceptical remarks on possibilities of an economic co-operation between Poland and South Africa, which were challenged both by the ANC and Eastern Europeans. However, his main contribution was an excellent, well documented, 67 page long study on “The Polish post-Communist economy and its transformation into a market economy” which was distributed to all participants. It describes, *inter alia*, the Polish “shock therapy” against inflation and its consequences. It reduced inflation, still running at an estimated 80 per cent in 1992, and consolidated the convertibility of the Polish currency, the zloty, which helped to eliminate the black currency market.

The negative impact of the shock therapy was the decline in the living standard of the population, recession in industry demonstrated by a sharp

fall in industrial output, and a growing stratification of incomes of various social groups. Since 1990, when unemployment was publicly admitted to exist, it grew rapidly and in the first half of 1992 it reached an estimated 2,5 m.

In search of light

In one of the most moving speeches made at the meeting, Mongane Wally Serote, author of internationally known book *To Every Birth its Blood*, said:

In my country, there exist two cultures. There is the culture of the oppressed, who are in the majority. There is a culture of the oppressors who are in the minority. It is not so long ago, in fact it seems like yesterday, when the culture of the oppressor, in its defence, coined the slogan 'Total Onslaught' and that of the oppressed said 'Freedom or Death'.

In search of light, where the electricity does not reach, where poverty is not only seen or smelt but can be touched, where there was deliberate and conscious effort to deny education, where life was made cheap by crime, police brutality and disease, in the townships and rural areas of South Africa, the oppressed evolved a culture to claim humanity, not only for themselves but for all South Africans. 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white', as we said in 1955 in Kliptown.

In 1992, as we meet here, the deadly culture of apartheid violence has reached full-blown expression in our country. Daily there are reports of massacres in trains, buses, in townships and villages. Innocent and unarmed men, women and children are butchered either because they belong to the ANC in order to create an atmosphere where free political activity cannot take place.

The South African media, which are either owned by the government, or by white business, whether TV, radio or newspapers, are accustomed to excluding 75 per cent of the population, and, being blind and deaf to its plight, is still steeped in apartheid culture, and articulates it eloquently. It calls this violence either 'black-on-black violence', or a war between the Zulus and the Xhosas, or between the ANC and Inkhata. By stubbornly clinging to apartheid, and refusing to see black people as people and not Xhosas and Zulus, or refusing to come to terms with the fact that although the majority of supporters are black people and that it is, because historically, blacks are oppressed because they are black, the ANC is claiming freedom for all the people of South Africa, black and white.

The reporters and journalists, the editors and sub-editors of the white-dominated South African mass media, are unable, three and half decades later into the history of the struggle, to hear and see the truth. They are deaf and blind to reality. They are unable to think objectively through the facts and reality that the violence which is now devastating life in our country is expressing apartheid culture. They are unable to read the writing on the wall, that as this violence did spill out of Natal into other areas of the country, if it is not curbed by all South Africans it will overflow into and engulf all South Africans, not Xhosas and Zulus only, or the ANC and Inkhata only, but black and white South Africans.

Press freedom is much more complicated than lack of press freedom

said Tomas Smetanka, and described the transition of an underground press in Czechoslovakia which fought communism to a free press which is supposed to write the truth. However, as he put it, "freedom is more

intricate than lack of freedom". It is not enough to say "write the truth". There are different truths starting to emerge as the press begins to diversify. The media in Czechoslovakia now serves not just the former dissidents but former secret policemen as well. The ruling conservative party has its newspaper, the opposition Communist party has its own too. If one paper is reluctant to publish a controversial story, the other does it with glee and makes a lot of noise about it. It has become obvious that information is not generally accepted in our society as information *per se*, but rather as a factor that plays its role in the unfinished conflict with the remnants of totalitarianism.

We discovered that the press in Czechoslovakia, no matter how free, still lacks the respect the press enjoys in Western countries. Whereas in countries with long democratic tradition of free press, such as the United Kingdom, the press has a fairly clear role in domestic politics. It can expose a crook who may end up in court or it can bring down a Government Minister. In Czechoslovakia it cannot do anything like that. There have been disclosures concerning the abuse of power by government officials and of cases of corruption, however the culprits were not reprimanded and remained in office.

A member of Parliament found to have been working for the secret police kept his seat in Parliament. A Minister of the Interior, who ordered the theft of documents and police files, has become Prime Minister. It appears that to win respect and the prestige of the public and the authorities will take years. A similar situation is to be expected in South Africa.

Minorities can complicate relations among States

said Payol Demes, providing the audience with an explanation of the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the ferocity of which is sometimes compared with the situation in South Africa. He stated: "The fall of foreign hegemonies and of totalitarian regimes, and the opening of the way to democracy and to an open society, has not automatically led to an improvement in the position of minorities. This has been adequately demonstrated by events in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union. A plurality of titles have been applied to old conflicts, concepts and prejudices has been joined by primitive nationalistic and even tribal feelings.

But problems of minorities spread far beyond Europe's borders and became a source of conflicts in all parts of the world, including South Africa.

A correct approach towards minorities requires the understanding of the principle that members of diverse nationalities are residents and often citizens of those countries in which they live. Therefore, the countries of their domicile have a prime responsibility for their well-being. At the same time it is not possible to treat the problem of minorities as an internal matter because of links with the states of minorities' origin. Each state must develop its own active, positive policy towards minorities on its territory, and with the states from which they came and are linked with language and culture. Close communication between States with minorities and those from which minorities originate is perhaps the best mechanism for preventing tension and conflict. Full participation of minorities in the political life of the country of residence, self-administration at local government level, provision of schools and cultural institutions to preserve their language and cultural heritage, can greatly facilitate regional co-operation on the rights of minorities.

Student power

Simon Makwetla introduced his contribution with a quote from one of the student movement leaders, Abraham Okgopetse Tiro, made in 1972 when he left South Africa for Botswana: "What use is our education if we cannot serve our people in their hour of need". Two years later he was killed by a parcel bomb mailed by South African security. Simon Makwetla gave an account of the rise of the student power since the establishment of the ANC Youth League in 1944, which championed the student cause to the present student bodies Congress of South African Students (COSAS) and South African National Student Congress, (SANSCO). The students spearheaded the national campaign for the transformation of the present institutions of learning -"ivory towers for the whites"-to institutions for the people to be administered jointly by communities, parents, teachers and students. In order to make it easier to grasp the magnitude of the distortion of the educational system in South Africa, Simon Makpethla quoted the following facts and figures:

- 1) The teacher-pupil ratio is 1:16 for whites and 1:50 for blacks. According to the National Education Co-ordinating Committee (NECC), it is

estimated that 300,000 teachers are needed to bring the teacher-pupil ratio at black schools to an acceptable level.

- 2) More than one-third of teachers at schools for blacks do not have matriculation qualification.
- 3) In 1989 3,000 Rands per head were spent on a white pupil, and only 650 Rands on a black one.
- 4) In 1988 more than 2 million children between 7 and 16 did not attend school.
- 5) An estimated 190,000 black students drop out from school each year.
- 6) Each year at least 300,000 children of school age are added to an estimated 5 to 6 million people who cannot read or write.

...and the role of Universities in Eastern Europe

Juraj Svec in his contribution entitled "The role of universities in the democratization of societies in Central and Eastern European countries", pointed out that the idea of democracy must also be expressed in the quality of human relations, cultural life and education. Institutions of higher education have played a key role in the democratization process by trying to meet the need for educated and skilled citizens and teachers of tomorrow's generation, as well as informed and reflective people. The new democratic governments endorsed integrity and autonomy of the universities. However, several problems are still being debated: Is the intervention of a new government necessary in order to put a stop to interference by former, but not yet abolished, state educational authorities? How can an imposed ideological bias be removed without being replaced by another one? If the research activities are to be based at universities, should the Academy of Sciences be preserved? If access to university education is to be broadened, how to avoid a decline in the quality of teaching? Juraj Svec added that the transformation of higher education in terms of comprehensive reforms cannot be achieved without international co-operation, a point which is also valid for South Africa. He concluded by saying that education is a great challenge of our time. An educated population is an asset to Eastern Countries as much as to South Africa where people are anxious to "catch-up" with countries with more advanced economies, democracy and civil rights.

Black violence—why ?

Penuell Maduna's speech about the misconception of black violence in South Africa has made the strongest impression on Eastern Europeans who admitted that information of this kind has not reached the mass media in their countries.

“By saying that there is a misconception”, began Penuell Maduna, “I'm not saying that you are part of the propaganda of the regime. Far from that. All I am saying is that I would like you to understand violence in South Africa, and why the ANC has to make a decisive and effective intervention in that situation. Let us begin with a question: black-on-black violence, why? The next question is: Zulu violence. Why? Finally, who are the victims? Are they non-Zulus? What about the role of the state?”

To answer the question about violence, I would like to quote the victims of the violence to whom I spoke and who uniformly told me that there was always the hand of the state involved. This was either in the form of police dropping people from police vehicles at townships or squatter areas and picking them up after some people have been killed. This is going on all over South Africa- in Natal, Western Cape, Transvaal and other parts of the country.

Once you begin to ask yourself whether this is Zulu violence or non-Zulu violence you come to the conclusion that it is not Zulu violence. This is because South Africa has over five million Zulu-speaking people, most of them concentrated in Natal, but quite a lot of them also live in the Transvaal, especially near Pretoria. Violence always starts in Natal. It does not start anywhere else. Interestingly enough it started in Natal in the eighties after Chief Buthulezi and Oliver Tambo of the ANC, fell out with each other. In 1986 Natal accounted for over 10,000 fatal casualties of the violence in which a total 14,000 people were killed. That means the Zulus themselves have been the major victim. Who is killing these Zulus? Is it just a reflection of some Zulu's madness? No. When we began to experience brutal violence in trains and taxis which ordinary workers use to travel to and from work, there was no time for the assassins to come and say: are you a Zulu before I shoot you, are you a Xhosa before I shoot you? It was just bang, bang, bang and many were killed, many thrown out of trains, Zulus, non-Zulus, women, children.

I submit to you that the violence is the making of the State police and security apparatus. The following is my proof: President F.W. de Klerk

appointed one of the outstanding judges, Richard Goldstone, to investigate causes of violence. Allow me to quote three short passages from his report to illustrate my case.

Judge Goldstone, in paragraph 2.3.1 of his report states: "The economic, social and political imbalances amongst the people of South Africa are the consequences of three centuries of racial discrimination, and forty years of an extreme form of racial and economic dislocation in consequence of apartheid policy.

In paragraph 2.3.2 of the same report he says: "The police force and army have been for many decades the instruments of oppression by successive white governments in maintaining a society predicated upon racial discrimination. For many South Africans the police and army are not perceived as fair, objective or friendly institutions."

The next paragraph reads as follows: "A history over some years of state complicity in undercover activities, which include criminal conduct, and that the well-documented criminal conduct by individual members of the South African police and the security forces, exacerbated the perception of many South Africans that the Government or its agencies are active parties responsible for the violence. The government has failed to take sufficiently firm steps to prevent criminal conduct by members of the security forces and the police, and to ensure that the guilty are brought to trial and adequately punished. This is what a white judge appointed by the white government says in his report.

Penuell Maduna continued: "Last week we took the Richard Goldstone commission to a place where we showed it 40 non-South Africans who are members of the Koevoet unit. Koevoet was established to kill SWAPO guerillas in Namibia, and it killed a lot of them. We asked: "Why did you bring Koevoet to this place?" They said, "we are using the unit to track the stock thieves. We told them, "these people were deployed in Namibia in a war which was not about stock thefts."

Penuell Maduna quoted examples of the involvement in violence by Battalion 32, which Judge Goldstone recommended be dissolved, a recommendation rejected by the Battalion's Commander. (Note: At the time of writing this report President FW de Klerk ordered that Battalion 32 be disbanded). Maduna also mentioned attacks against hostels housing ANC members. They were carried out by Inkhata followers using "traditional weapons", and were accompanied by the police when they were returning from the scene of the massacre. No arrests were made, and when the ANC

complained, the police answered that it was still investigating the matter". Penuell Maduna continued: "We have information that certain very high-ranking officers are being involved in two major operations known by the code-words "Operation Springbok" and "Operation Thunderstorm". They carried out raids against ANC members whom they suspected to be involved in preparing mass action. A lot of people were killed. We are in possession of evidence that these officers had been reporting directly on a daily basis to President FW de Klerk on the progress of the operation. This is documented". (For statistics on violence in South Africa, see appendix 2.)

The debate on violence occupied the greater part of the last session.

Conclusion

The Dialogue has achieved what would probably have taken years if it had been left to diplomats accustomed to trading courtesies rather than facts, namely reconciliation and resumption of friendly relations between the ANC and Eastern Europe. In this particular context the word "friendly", which used to be a standard cliché of the communist press reserved for describing meetings between ideological allies, it was an accurate expression of feelings of people who cared for each other's problems. At the Swedish Red Cross conference room at Mariefred, the ANC, which to many is the hope of South Africa, has met with Eastern Europeans who had buried communism but are not yet quite sure if the path of their governments is really leading to democracy. Their experience has proved to have been of great value to the ANC, which is likely to reappraise its vision of socialism in the economic sphere while preserving the principle of social justice. Similarly, the Eastern Europeans were visibly shaken by the insight into the causes of violence in South Africa provided by Penuell Maduna. They will long remember the words of Mongane Wally Serote: "Like the middle passage and the holocaust, apartheid has left a blot of blood on civilization, South Africans are unique in this contribution. That is one way in which we will, from now on, relate to history. The other way is that as a people, we did in time live the day-to-day life of the slogan 'Freedom or Death'. Like millions of other people in history and in the world we have had to claim life by being contemptuous of death, and now we will become part of civilization. It is not only we who must never forget the terrible nightmare of apartheid."

There is no doubt that many similar ANC–Eastern European encounters will take place in the future, thus earning the Dialogue at Mariefred a place in history as the first one.

By the time when this report has been completed, the ANC President Nelson Mandela, and the South African President, WF de Klerk, agreed to set aside the rancour of the past and resume the constitutional talks. In the months of arduous negotiations ahead the ANC will be able to draw on the Eastern European experience.

APPENDIX 1. ANC on the transition to democracy

The following text is the introduction to the document entitled "Transition to Democracy Act", submitted by the African National Congress to the second meeting of CODESA in May, 1992.

The transition to Democracy Act (Transitional Law) is designed to provide the legal and constitutional framework to lead South Africa from the present dispensation (The Republic of South Africa Act, No. 110 of 1983, the National States Act of 1971, the Status of Transkei Act, the Status of Bophuthatswana Act, the Status of Venda Act, the Status of Ciskei Act, as well as the constitutions of the TBVC states) to a new united non-racial non-sexist democratic state.

Abolition

The Transition to Democracy Act abolishes the whole tricameral Parliament, the distinction between Own Affairs and General Affairs, the all-powerful Presidency the Executive Authority, the Presidents Council, and other features of the tricameral system. The transitional law achieves this result by deleting major provisions contained in the Republic of South Africa Act, No. 110 of 1983.

TBVC States

It is envisaged that Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei will simultaneously make appropriate provisions so as to ensure the implementation of a uniform agreed plan for the reincorporation of those territories into the new democratic South Africa. Provision is made for the participation of the people of the TBCV states in all transitional arrangement under this Act as well as in all constitution-making processes including elections provided for in the Transitional Law.

Parliament

The Transitional Law makes provision for a Parliament which consists of a single House made up of 400 women and men elected on the basis of one person one vote of equal value by all persons of the age of 18 years and over, who are citizens of South Africa or who would have been citizens but for the various bantustan laws. An electoral law will, inter alia, make provision for an electoral system based on proportional representation system so as to

ensure that parties are represented in Parliament in direct proportion to the number of votes won by them.

Parliament will perform two functions:

1. It will act as the country's constitution-making body;
2. It will act as the law-making body during the period of transition from the time elections have taken place until the installation of the first government under the new constitution.

The two functions are defined in such a way as to ensure that there is no confusion between these two separate functions. The function of drawing up and adopting a new constitution must not become enmeshed with governing the country in the transitional period. When Parliament sits as the Constitution-making body it will be known as Constituent Assembly. When it sits as the law-making body it will be known as the Legislature. The law makes provision for an Executive Authority based on the principle of a government of National Unity. The Executive during this phase of transition will be made up of representatives of parties which have won 5 per cent or more of seats in the Parliament in proportion to their number of seats in Parliament.

Decision-Making, Deadlock-Breaking and Time-Frames

The Transitional Law seeks to provide for a transition period which is not indefinite. In other words the task of constitution-making must be completed within a defined period of time. This requires that the decision-making formula must be clear and must include time frames and a deadlock-breaking formula.

The Transitional Law, therefore, provides that when Parliament sits as Constituent Assembly, it will adopt each Article of the Constitution and the Constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority. It must do so within a period of nine months from the date of commencement of its first meeting. If a two-thirds majority cannot be obtained, a procedure is created which will ensure that a Constitution is finally adopted within a defined period. Firstly, fresh elections will be held to create a new Constituent Assembly. This provision is an inducement upon members to agree to a duly proposed constitution. This second Constituent Assembly will have only 6 months within which to agree on a new constitution which also would have to be adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) majority. Should this second Constituent

Assembly fail to adopt a new constitution then a constitution enjoying the support of a simple majority of the Constituent Assembly shall be put to the people of South Africa for approval by way of a referendum which the constitution must enjoy a majority of 55 per cent to be adopted. If this constitution also fails to obtain the necessary support the finally, a fresh election will be held for a third Constituent Assembly. This Constituent Assembly shall have the power to adopt a new constitution by a simple majority.

During the period that it takes to draw up and adopt the Constitution, Parliament will also act as interim legislature. In this capacity decision-making will be by two-thirds majority. This will also apply to the Executive in the form of the cabinet.

Additional Measures

In addition to the Transition to Democracy Law a number of other measures will be necessary to take South Africa through the transitional period to a new and democratic order. These measures will have to give legal effects to all agreements designed to level the playing field and to guarantee that elections are fair and free. They will make provision for various structures to be set up during the pre-election (or preparatory) period e.g. a Multi-Party Commission to take control over security forces, an independent Electoral Commission to take responsibility for the conduct of elections and all aspects relating to elections.

The measures will also have to make provision to facilitate the process of re-unifying South Africa and reincorporation of all the homelands.

Regions

The important issue of provincial or regional and local government during the transitional period must also be provided for. The ANC is of the view that the whole issue of demarcation of new regions, the distribution of powers functions as well as regional structures is the prerogative of the Constituent Assembly. Nothing should be done in the transitional period to undermine the work of the Constituent Assembly or its sovereignty in this regard. Therefore and pending the demarcation of regions by the Constituent Assembly the present provincial system with appropriate adjustments to include the homelands should be retained during the transitional period. Interim structures, consistent with the ultimate

objection of a united democratic South Africa will have to be set up and given legal effect through appropriate measures.


Conclusion

The amendments proposed to the existing Act 110 of 1983 in the Transitional Law concentrate largely on aspects required to create a legitimate constitution-making body. It is that body, namely the Constituent Assembly, which will have the right and duty to address the various question of constitutions-making such as the Flag, Anthem, language, religion, culture and other incidental matters. To get an elected Constituent Assembly as quickly as possible these issues need not to be addressed at this stage. It, however, it is decided to address these issues at the present stage, then provision will have to be made for them. This proposed transitional law, however, adopts the approach that those matters must await the Constituent Assembly.

APPENDIX 2. Basic Facts

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Official name** Federation of the the Czech and Slovak Republics. On January 1, 1993 the Federation will cease to exist and both republics will become independent and sovereign states.
- Area** 127,870 square kilometers.
- Population** 15,6 mn.
- Language** Both Czech and Slovak are official languages.
- Religion** 50 per cent Roman Catholics, 20 per cent Protestants, others include Greek Orthodox Church and Judaism.
- Political system** Parliamentary democracy.
- Head of State** Since the resignation of President Vaclav Havel in July 1992, the Presidency is now vacant.
- Main political parties** Civic Democratic Party (the Czech Republic) and Movement for Democratic Slovakia (the Slovak Republic) whose party chairmen are Prime Ministers in the republics.
- Armed forces:** Army and Air Force total 120,000 men.
- GNP per capita:** Ca US\$ 8,000.
- Structure of economy:** Industry 68 per cent, trade, transport and services 21 per cent, agriculture 11 per cent.
- Principal exports** Heavy machinery, light aircraft, sugar mills, power stations, textile factories, trucks, steel, glass, textile and food.
- Currency:** Koruna. One US\$ is ca 26 koruna.




HUNGARY

Official name	The Republic of Hungary.
Area	93.032 square kilometers.
Population	10,5 mn.
Language	Hungarian.
Religion	67 per cent Roman Catholics, 25 per cent, Protestant Church, others include Greek Orthodox Church, Jewish religion.
Political system	Parliamentary democracy.
Head of State	President Arpad Göncz.
Main political parties	Hungarian Democratic Forum, Free Democratic Alliance, Independent Small Farmers' Party, Hungarian, Socialist Party.
Capital	Budapest (2 mn).
Armed forces	91,000 of which Army 68,000, Air Force 23,000 and paramilitary forces 16,000.
GNP per capita	Ca. US\$ 3,000.
Structure of Economy	Industry 40 per cent, agriculture 15 per cent, transport, construction and service 45 per cent.
Principal exports	Machine tools, buses IKARUS, electrical equipment, medicaments, textile products shoes, wine and food.
Currency	Forint. One US\$ is ca 60 forints.



POLAND

Official name	Polish Republic (Rzeczpospolita Polska).
Area	321.683 square kilometers.
Population	38 mn.
Religion	95 per cent Roman Catholics.
Language	Polish.
Political system	Parliamentary democracy (The Parliament is called Sejm).
Head of State	President Lech Walesa.
Main political parties	Democratic Union, Christian: Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic Congress, Polish Farmers Party, Social Democratic Party, X-Party (populist party).
Capital	Warszawa (1,8 mn).
Armed forces	300,000 of which Army 200,000, Air Force 80,000, Navy 19,000.
GNP per capita	Ca US\$ 1,670.
Structure of Economy	Industry 49.2 per cent, agriculture 12.9 per cent, construction and transport 12 per cent.
Principal exports	Machinery, maritime vessels, railway wagons, trucks, coal, chemical and food products.
Currency	Zloty. One US\$ is ca 11,000 zloty.



SOUTH AFRICA

Official name	The Republic of South Africa.
Area	1,221,042 square kilometers.
Population	35.8 mn (Africans 76 %, Whites 13 %, Coloured people 9 %, Asians 3 %).
Language	Afrikaans and English are official languages, African languages include Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, Shangaa, Ndebele, Swazi and Venda.
Religion	Protestant and Catholic Church, traditional religions, Islam, Hinduism and Judaism.
Political system	Parliamentary democracy for the whites, separate chambers for coloureds and Asians. The Africans do not have a vote.
Head of State	President F.W. de Klerk.
Main political parties and movements	National Party, Democratic Party, Conservative Party, South African Communist Party. Movements: African National Congress, Pan-African Congress and Inkhata.
Armed forces	Army 75,000, Navy 7,500, Air Force 13,000, Paramilitary forces 55,000, Reserves 455,000.
GNP per capita	US\$ 2,290.
Structure of economy	Industry 31 per cent, transport, construction and services 49.3 per cent, mining 13.4 per cent agriculture 6.2 per cent.
Principal exports	Machinery, electrical equipment, textile products, gold, diamonds, terrochrome, coal, chemical and food products.
Currency	Rand. One rand is ca US\$ 0.4.



APPENDIX 3. East-European relations with South Africa

Czechoslovak-South African relations

In 1952 Czechoslovakia opened a Consulate General in Cape Town. It was moved to Johannesburg in 1959 but by 1963 it was closed in accordance with sanctions imposed on South Africa by the Security Council of the United Nations. In the year after that Czechoslovakia banned all trade with South Africa. During the following 25 years Czechoslovakia ranked among the staunchest supporters of the ANC, providing it with both humanitarian and military aid.

However, the superficiality of Communist Czechoslovakia's concern for South Africa is best illustrated by the fact that Czechoslovakia has not published any of Nadine Gordimer's books. ANC students studied at the University of 17th November in Prague under the direct supervision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Arms were supplied and military training was provided to members of the ANC military wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).

After the 1989 "velvet revolution" the speed with which Prague normalized relations with Pretoria had taken the ANC aback, having adopted a very critical view of Prague's response to South Africa's overtures. The ANC strongly objected to what was called the "private visits" to Prague by the Deputy Director of the South African Foreign Ministry's European Department, J.Marais, in May 1990, followed in November of that year by a visit of the Foreign Minister, R.F. Botha, by the Speaker of the Parliament, le Grange, in September 1991, and the following month by the Minister of Constitutional Development, Dr.G.Viljoen.

On August 30, 1991 the Czechoslovak Federal Government adopted a document on a "new policy on South Africa", which called for the re-establishment of consular relations and full diplomatic relations.

In November 1991 the then Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, arrived to South Africa on a official visit during which he signed a protocol on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, an agreement on the protection of investment, and several other treaties. Minister Dienstbier's visit was reciprocated by a visit of President F.W. de Klerk to Prague in February 1992, where he was received by the then President Vaclav Havel. Prime Minister Marian Calfa visited South Africa in April.

President Havel's invitation to the ANC President Nelson Mandela, issued early in 1990, but it was ignored. Nelson Mandela came to a Prague on a "private visit" in May 1992 and had a long meeting with Vaclav Havel - an event which signalled improvement in relations with the ANC.

As in the case of Poland and Hungary, the most influential emissaries of the South African regime came from the 6,000 strong Czechoslovak community in South Africa- perhaps the most right-wing oriented Eastern European immigrants in the country. A group funded a documentary film about South Africa which was shown on Prague TV—a kind of propaganda not even the South African Ministry of Information would risk to produce. South Africa was shown as the white man's golden dream.

The visiting emigrés as well as official South African delegations, wetted the appetite of the Czechoslovak state and private entrepreneurs, both state and private, by offering grandiose schemes of mutual co-operation including the purchase by Czechoslovakia of the license for the South African method to make petrol from coal developed by the state company SASOL, the export of Czechoslovak aircraft, heavy machinery, co-operation in mining, and joint ventures in food, paper industry and engineering, insurance, and other fields.

Trade statistics between the two countries are more telling. In 1991 Czechoslovakian exports to South Africa totalled \$2,312 mn, while imports from South Africa reached \$7,821 mn. Compared with the total volume of the Czechoslovak trade in 1991, which reached \$12,8 bn in exports and \$12,4 bn in imports, trade with South Africa is less than marginal.

After the separation of the Czechoslovak Federation on January 1, 1993, both states—the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic- will have embassies in Pretoria and are likely to compete for the South African market, perceived as the most lucrative in Africa.

Prospects for better relations with the ANC and better understanding of the situation in South Africa by the Czechoslovak intellectuals and general public appears to be very good. The great interest of the Czechoslovak authorities in the Dialogue was shown by their sending the Foreign Minister to attend it. Public interest in South African culture has been shown in 1990 by large attendance at an exhibition of South African books in Prague and at an exhibition of South African art in the Summer 1992. These and similar events have been organized by the South African Embassy in Prague with a focus on books and art by mostly white authors and artists.

Hungarian-South African relations

Prior to 1989 there were only a few official political contacts between Hungary and South Africa. The most significant was General Jan Smuts' visit to Budapest in April 1919 to meet Béla Kun, the leader of the first, short-lived communist regime in Hungary.

The strongest links between the two countries have been forged by a 13,000 strong Hungarian community in South Africa. Most of them arrived in the aftermath of the abortive uprising in 1956. In 1973 the Hungarian settlers were visited by the exiled Hungarian cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty.

Although Hungary had officially severed all commercial relations with South Africa on July 1963 in response to the United Nations resolutions condemning apartheid. In the mid 1970s trade contacts were resumed though, at "shop-keeper" level only via intermediaries. By 1980 South Africans had no difficulty in obtaining tourist visas to Hungary. In 1988 the Stellenbosch String Ensemble gave a concert in Budapest's historical church of St. Mathias, and Gabor Östvös visited South Africa to conduct the South African National Orchestra.

The enforced retirement in May 1988 of the veteran Communist Party leader Janos Kadar, after more than 30 years in office, brought about a profound change in both domestic and international policies in Hungary. Kadar's successors, a collective presidency of reform communists, began to disengage from the grip of the Soviet Union and worked towards improved relations with the United States and Western Europe. It also restored diplomatic ties with former *pariah* states such as Israel, South Korea, Chile and Taiwan. Following the Namibian independence in December 1988, soundings were made at the South African Embassy in Vienna which were warmly received.

In March 1989 a Hungarian trade delegation visited South Africa and in June 1989 the visit was returned by the Director General of the Department of Trade and Industry, Stef Naudé. He signed a protocol on trade with Hungary setting a target figure of DM 100 mn (ca \$ 20 mn), which proved to be an illusory ambition.

Reciprocal visits continued. In July 1989 a three-member delegation, lead by a participant in the Dialogue, Judit Balazs, toured South Africa at the invitation of the South African Foundation. Her visit was followed in December of the same year by Jozsef Marjai, former Hungarian Deputy Minister, to the Cape Town at the invitation of a South African industrialist, Mendel Kaplan.

On January 3, 1990 Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, arrived on an "exploratory visit" at the invitation of his Hungarian counterpart, Gyula Horn. The visit was sharply criticised by the ANC as a betrayal of anti-apartheid movements.

President F.W. de Klerk's speech on February 2, 1990 in which he announced the unbanning of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) added a new impetus to South African-Hungarian relations. On March 26, 1990, the Deputy Director-General of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Istvan Földesi, attended an international conference in Johannesburg on trade with Eastern Europe. One week later, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry announced that offices of interest would shortly be opened in Pretoria and Budapest—seven months before official links with Pretoria by Prague and Warsaw.

At the end of 1990 Judit Balazs established a South African-Hungarian Friendship Society. On July 1991 an agreement was signed on the establishment of full diplomatic relations. South African visitors to Budapest in 1991 included the Head of the ANC International Department, Thabo Mbeki, a group of National Party, Democratic Party and Conservative Party MPs. In February 1992 President F.W. de Klerk started his Eastern European tour in Hungary, which took him to Prague, Bratislava and Warsaw.

In July 1991 Maïke de Klerk, wife of the South African President visited Budapest and the castle of Kesthely, one of the most beautiful in Eastern Europe, showing that Hungary has a special place in South Africa's relations with Eastern Europe.

Business relations have developed far less dramatically. The volume of trade was insignificant despite active promotion by both countries, such as an exhibition of South African products in Budapest in May 1990 the South African Foreign Trade Organization (SAFTO), and the signing of a trade agreement on August 10 of the same year by virtue of which Hungary lifted all sanctions against South Africa, with the exception of arms exports. In 1990 trade reached only \$700,000 and represented a combined achievement of 20 small companies.

Although the volume of trade increased to \$11 mn in 1991, it is still negligible in terms of Hungary's Foreign Trade. A delegation of the South African Chamber of Commerce visiting Hungary in June 1991 failed to boost trade.

It is interesting to note that while the Hungarian trade with South Africa has not reached its expectations, it certainly did so in the fields of cultural,

academic and sport relations. In October 1990, a Hungarian Film Festival was held in Johannesburg. In the same month a delegation of the South African Human Sciences Research Council visited the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Agreement on abolishing visas between the two countries is likely to lead to a further expansion of these contacts as well as of tourism.

However, information about South Africa in the Hungarian mass media is as rare as it is in the rest of Eastern European countries, and the role of the ANC in the process of transition of South Africa is virtually unknown. This is rather surprising as Hungary is the only Eastern European country where the ANC has its representative. Andile Yawa, of the ANC Youth League is the current President of the Budapest-based World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY).

Polish-South African relations

Poland, as all other Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, has an impressive record of consistently supporting the ANC and other anti-apartheid movements both in and outside South Africa ever since the mid-1950s, when it broke its ties with the Pretoria Government.

The political change in Poland in 1989 has not changed its attitude towards apartheid which had been repeatedly condemned by Polish government officials. However, the Polish endorsement of President F.W. de Klerk's policy of South Africa's peaceful transformation to democracy—a course which the Polish Government regarded to be irreversible—has alienated the ANC which believed it to be premature and giving President F.W. de Klerk undeserved credit for the change. As a result the ANC has been very cool towards the political changes in Poland; its representative has left Warsaw and ANC-Polish contacts have diminished.

The ANC's withdrawal from Poland and other Eastern European countries is being exploited by the South African Government which has made a great effort to resume political relations with Eastern Europe. A number of South African official visits to Poland, have taken place including a visit by Chief Buthe in 1990, culminating in the visit of President F.W. de Klerk in February 1992. In October 1990 an agreement was signed in Vienna between Poland and South Africa on the establishment of the Bureau of Interests in Warsaw and Pretoria. On December 18, 1991, a protocol was signed on the resumption of diplomatic relations, which had never been broken off, merely suspended. Embassies were opened in the capitals of both countries.

One of the main reasons for the resumption of relations was the need to revive contact with the 16,000—strong Polish community in South Africa, consisting of four immigrant groups. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the first group arrived to join other European settlers. The second group arrived during the Second World War (1939-1945). A "brain drain" of Polish specialists—civil engineers and medical doctors—arrived during the sixties. The fourth and the most numerous group, called "Solidarity immigrants", consisting largely of economic refugees, came to South Africa in the 1980s.

South Africa's Polish community in South Africa is relatively well educated and politically very conservative. Apart from engineers and doctors there are also a number of Polish private business and trading entrepreneurs. Since 1989 many of these visited Poland in search of business contracts and joint


ventures. This group is largely responsible for spreading the myth in Poland that South Africa is the promised land with golden opportunities and great wealth. However, recruitment of Polish specialists—much criticized by the ANC which saw these as competitors for scarce jobs and as countering the ANC pressure for better education of blacks—has never been organized on a large scale and it has been arranged mostly through private Polish contacts. Similarly, the volume of trade between Poland and South Africa is very small and, in Polish foreign trade's terms, quite insignificant. In 1990 it reached \$40 mn of which \$22 mn represented Polish imports from South Africa—iron ore, manganese, food and wine—and \$18 mn accounted for Polish exports consisting of transport containers, glass products, chemicals, mining equipment, machinery, food and coal. In 1991 the volume of trade rose only slightly to \$50 mn. This is less than 14 per cent of Polish trade with Africa in 1990 which stood at \$348 mn. It should be added that Poland's trade with Africa—with Libya, Morocco and Algeria as principal partners—constituted only 2.14 per cent of its total exports in 1990, and 1.94 per cent in 1991, while figures for Polish imports from Africa were 0.47 per cent in 1990, and 0.41 per cent in 1991.

South Africa's profile in the Polish press is so low that it is hardly noteworthy. The main sources of information are cryptic quotes from international press agencies. Even less appears in the South African press about Poland. Very little is known about the ANC in Poland. In general public's mind lingers the memory of the ANC's association with the hard-line Communist ideology of the armed struggle, nationalization and belief in the virtues of a one party system. In South Africa the Polish economy has for long been regarded a chaotic mess while in reality Poland has made an impressive "great leap" towards a market economy and is actually stronger than that of South Africa.


APPENDIX 4. Statistics on violence in South Africa

UNREST SITUATION; NATAL; PERSONS KILLED AND INJURED JUNE 1 TO SEPTEMBER 15, 1992


Total killed in unrest = 237
Total injured in unrest = 278




INCIDENTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PERSONS KILLED AND SERIOUSLY INJURED, 1987 - 23 SEPTEMBER 1992




SOME ARMS SEIZED FROM JANUARY 1 TO SEPTEMBER 10, 1992




UNREST-RELATED MURDERS IN COMPARISON TO MURDER 1991




CAUSES OF DEATH
AUGUST 1990-23 SEPTEMBER, 1992



**BLACK MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE (SAP)
KILLED IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1987-23 SEPTEMBER 1992**



ATTACKS ON SECURITY FORCES JUNE 1992



List of participants

- Judit Balazs**, Director of the Foundation for African and Oriental Research and the Promotion of Economic Relations (AFRORIENT), Deputy Director of the Institute for the World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Miklos Barabas**, Director of the Budapest-based European House, an international association linked with the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
- Halina Bornowska-Dabrowska**, one of the best-known journalists in Poland, Member of the Helsinki Committee, co-founder of the Citizen's Movement for Democratic Union (ROAD) and of Forum Poland in Europe.
- Pierre Cronje**, Member of the South African Parliament, formerly member of the Democratic Party, now representing the ANC in the Parliament.
- Pavol Demes**, former Minister of International Relations of the Slovak Republic, at present the President of the Slovak Academic Information Agency (SAIA) in Bratislava.
- Thomasz Knothe**, Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Inter-Parliamentary Relations at the Polish Sejm, and advisor to the Sejm on relations with Eastern Europe and Africa.
- Penuell Maduna**, Head of the ANC Legal Department, member of the ANC Constitutional Committee and of the ANC delegation to CODESA.
- Sampson Thabang Makwetla**, Member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League, co-ordinator of religious and student affairs in the Youth League.
- Aleksander Müller**, President of the Warsaw School of Economics, editor of a major study on the Polish post-communist economy and its transformation into a Market Economy.
- Alfred Nzo**, former Secretary General of the ANC, member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) and member of the ANC delegation to CODESA.
- Seth Nthai**, Director of the Law Institute at the University of the North, Turfloop, Member of the ANC Constitutional Committee.
- Mongane Wally Serote**, Head of the ANC Department of Arts and Culture, a writer best known for his book *To Every Birth its Blood*.
- Tomas Smetanka**, Editor-in-Chief of the most prestigious Prague's daily *Lidove Noviny*, and leading Czechoslovak expert on North Africa.
- Juraj Svec**, Rector of the Comenius University in Bratislava, Head of the Department of Ontology at the Faculty of Medicine, writer of many scientific books.
- Bela Szombati**, Chief advisor on international affairs to the Hungarian President Arpad Göncz.
- Jiri Valenta**, Director of the Institute of International Affairs in Prague and advisor to the Federal Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs, former Director of the Institute of Soviet Studies at the University of Florida and a leading expert on Cuba.

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High level delegations of the African National Congress of South Africa, and the Czech, Slovak, Polish and Hungarian republics met in July 1992 in Sweden, on the initiative of the Swedish International Development Authority. The conference was held under the auspices of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, with the aim to share lessons of their experiences under crumbling dictatorships. The exchange was intense and frank, as the note in this report conveys.

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