




NATIONAL EXECUTIVE MEETING

DOCUMENTS 4

16 - 18 FEBRUARY 1993



1. SANCTIONS

2. MEDIA

3. SPORTS

SANCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA.

FEBRUARY 16, 1993.

1.0. The July 1991 National Conference of the ANC decided on a phased maintenance of sanctions.

2.0. In terms of this process, the conference defined Phase II as being characterised by:

" The installation of an Interim Government according to agreed transitional arrangements and modalities on the transition to a democratic order. "

3.0. In the same resolution, the conference called upon the NEC... " to determine the precise formulation of this process..."

4.0. As a result of this, a "tri-partite seminar on sanctions" was held in Johannesburg on October 4, 1991.

5.0. This seminar recommended to the NEC as follows:

5.1. " With regard to Phase (II), we recommend that following the installation of an Interim Government of national unity, other sanctions, excluding those mentioned

② Loans: Intl bodies
① Represent Intl orgs.
③ Arms.

in 3 below, and including diplomatic isolation, gold coins, trade, trade credits, new investment, loans and other financial sanctions may be lifted at the request of the Interim Government. "

5.2. The NEC accepted the positions put forward by this seminar.

6.0. At this point in time, the Interim Government was understood as one of the products of an all-party congress (CODESA), one of whose tasks, in terms of the NEC statement of January 8, 1991, would be:

6.1. " To establish an interim government to oversee the process of transition until a new parliament was elected, and a democratic government formed, on the basis of the new constitution. "

7.0. Since then, our position on the question of the interim government has changed. There has, however, been no similar and consequent reappraisal of our position on sanctions.

8.0. In terms of our current perspective, we visualise that in the near future, and occurring simultaneously:

8.1. The TEC and its sub-structures will be established;

8.2. An election date will be agreed;

8.3. The independent Electoral and Media Commissions will be established; and,

8.4. The Transition to Democracy Act will be enacted.

9.0. At this point, the OAU, the Commonwealth and the UN will, according to resolutions they have adopted, lift various economic sanctions.

10.0. We propose that the ANC should also take the position that the sanctions listed under 5.1. above should be lifted at this stage.

11.0. We further propose that the ANC should, taking advantage of the lifting of these sanctions, engage in a practical programme of action aimed at the quickest possible delivery of goods and services to raise the standards of living of the people.

12.0. These positions should be communicated to the participants at the World Anti-Apartheid Conference scheduled for February 19 - 21, 1993.

ENDS

MEDIA

African National Congress

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Johannesburg 2001
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DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY

EVALUATION OF THE WORK OF THE MEDIA LIAISON UNIT DURING 1992 AND PROPOSALS FOR THE WAY FORWARD

1. INTRODUCTION

1992 was a very difficult year for the Media Liaison Unit, towards the end of the year the Unit had to function under increasing pressure. This was largely due to the intensity of the disinformation campaign that the media, and the SABC specifically, directed at us. It is clear that many media sectors, with special reference to the Afrikaans media have already entered an election mode and believe that "anything goes" in their attacks on the ANC. We expect this trend to increase strongly during 1993, especially after the announcement of a date for elections, and the months running up to the elections.

Since elections are now becoming very real, our evaluation of the work of the Media Liaison Unit and projections for 1993 must be done with that constantly in mind.

2. LEAKS

In this context the ANC's own undisciplined approach to the media play into the hands of our opponents and cause us much harm. One of the main themes used against the ANC is that we are disorganised, ineffective and contradictory. In surveys with the electorate the ANC's disorganisation and fact that this undermines confidence in our ability to govern features strongly. To a large extent this is a problem of perceptions, because this is how the media portrays us. While it is true that we often have to cope with a malicious and hostile press, we can either strengthen or change this perception through the way that the ANC leadership interact with the media. The undisciplined way in which many senior members of the ANC talk to journalists generates a constant stream of contradictory statements and "leaks". If this was only indiscipline it may still have been

easier to cope with, but the perception exists that some NEC and NWC members are using leaks trying to promote their own point of view. Often through leaks trying to create conditions within which the NEC and NWC is left with little option but to follow the path that they promote. The result is that journalists have an attitude that if they can't get a comment from the official DIP structures they just need to fish around a bit, and they will get it from someone else in the ANC.

During 1992 "leaks" have taken on such dimensions that there was hardly anything that could be kept confidential. It is clear that some persons in the NEC and NWC contact their favourite journalists immediately after meetings, often the journalists know more about issues than the DIP spokespersons. Obviously this is devastating for the image of the organisation in general, but it also undermines the credibility of the official spokespersons. It disempowers them and makes a mockery of any strategic approach to the handling of sensitive matters. Under these circumstances it is remarkable that we still have any credibility left. However, we must warn that if the "leaks" and loose talk is going to continue at the same rate in 1993, it will not be long before our ability to function will be destroyed.

The problem of leaks cannot be solved by the Media Liaison Unit or DIP, but is a matter that higher structures of the ANC must address as a matter of urgency. It needs to be handled with care so that it does not result in a decisive "witch-hunt". Shredding of all spoilt paper, locking of offices, prevention of wandering from office to office securing faxes and fax machines etc are measures that can be taken without pain. However, these measures will have little effect if this problem is not also addressed at the political level in the NEC and NWC.

The tendency of regions to issue statements about matters of national importance without consultation with Head Office adds to our image of being disorganised and contradictory.

3. REGIONAL STATEMENTS

Some regions issued statements at the slightest provocation and without due consideration during the latter half of 1992. They seem to equate autonomy of action with a licence to direct national policy through the media. The problem with this approach is that the regions are often not fully appraised of all the facts of the issue or discussions on the strategic thrust that is being suggested by national structures. We have written to the Secretary General to make him aware of this problem and asked him to send a circular letter to all regions requesting comrades in the regions to work closer with National DIP. In November and December there was some improvement in this regard from regions such as the

Western Cape.

4. DEALINGS WITH DEPARTMENTS

There is the general tendency from most departments to treat the media as a low priority issue. Queries that we send to them in order to get urgent answers take sometimes weeks before there is a response, if any. Difficult questions are simply never responded to, as if the matter will go away if it is not addressed. Of course the media do not forget and accusations are published against us, with Media Liaison being unable to give any credible response beyond the unconvincing "no comment" or "we are investigating".

4.1. Interview Requests

Many departments don't seem to appreciate the fact that the media functions with deadlines and that a speedy response is crucial. It is no use to take days to formulate a response, by the time such a statement is issued the media is no longer interested. Far too many senior members of the ANC still refuse to do interviews on the basis that it is "too short notice". Most media requests are short notice, and we must adjust ourselves to this reality. It is clear that some persons use this as an excuse to hardly ever do interviews. If the media is considered a priority, as it should be especially in this year of preparations for elections, people will find the time to do media work - even at short notice. An analyses of the interviews done during the course of 1992 reveals that a few of the leadership, such as cdes Matthew Phosa, Vali Moosa, Mac Maharaj etc., were regularly available and did the bulk of the interviews (see Appendix).

Others, as the analyses indicates, did very few or no interviews while there were a considerable number of requests for them. The main culprit in this regard was cde Cyril Ramaphosa who did approximately 8 interviews in the course of 1992, while close to 40 requests for interviews were received. Cdes Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki also did very few interviews, despite the fact that the Media Liaison Unit forwarded many requests for interviews to them.

We appreciate that some of these comrades are extremely busy and find it difficult to make time for media work, but their failure to do interviews has serious consequences. It results in the over exposure of some persons, including members of the Media Liaison Unit who often have to stand in when no-one else is prepared to do an interview or when an appointment is cancelled at short notice. It also results in the wrong use of President Mandela, who despite his very busy programme is always prepared to make time for the media. The President did approximately 35 interviews las

year. Madiba often ends up doing inappropriate interviews or commenting on daily political developments because none of the other senior officials are prepared/available to do so. This is the wrong use of the President and diminishes his stature.

4.1.2. Media approach for Madiba

We believe that a programme must be developed for Madiba that will allow him to do carefully selected interviews that will ensure maximum exposure and be important political statements/interventions at crucial times. These should be done in conjunction with high profile events (e.g. receiving celebrities in the sport and cultural world such as Mohammed Ali). Such an approach, while far less taxing than last year's many scattered interviews, will ensure a high media profile that enhances the prestige of the President and the ANC.

The Media Liaison Unit already had discussions with the President's office about developing such a programme for 1993. However, this will only succeed if we get considerably more cooperation from senior officials. Many of the issues and interviews that Madiba handled will have to be addressed by them. We need a commitment from cdes Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, among others, that they will make themselves available to do many more interviews and comment on short notice about daily political developments.

For this approach to succeed an overall picture of media interviews and who is doing what is needed. DIP therefore repeats our previous requests that all media requests should be channelled through the Media Liaison Unit. This is not an attempt to monopolise access to journalists, but is essential for proper strategising and the best use of our resources. It is important that one should not only be knowledgeable about the issue that the journalist wants to interview you about, but also knows the journalist and the approach that he/she is likely to take. The daily experience of the media liaison personnel with journalists is very useful to make such an evaluation. It is often possible to advise a similar interview with an alternative journalist that will lead to far better results. During 1992 there were numerous instances where ANC members had interviews or made statements to journalists without the knowledge of the Media Liaison Unit which turned out to be embarrassing to the ANC, and undermined carefully worked out strategies about how to handle sensitive issues. (The problems that we experienced in the aftermath of the Bisho massacre is but one prominent example).

4.1.2. Interview strategising and evaluation

Unscheduled interviews make it very difficult for the Media Liaison Unit to evaluate the media performance of the ANC. In 1993 it will be advisable to do a monthly evaluation of the number of interviews that have been conducted, by whom and to what effect. This is obviously not possible when interviews take place without the Media Liaison Unit's knowledge. Some comrades have been insistent that they will arrange their own interviews directly with journalists. The unfortunate result is that these interviews not reflected in the attached 1992 evaluation. We strongly urge all comrades to avoid a repeat of such a situation in the future.

4.2. Flow of information

After the previous requests from DIP that interviews should be channelled through the Media Liaison Unit some comrades have continued to arrange interviews directly with journalists and only informed us subsequently. This is probably due to a misunderstanding about why we have made such a request, but totally undermines the reason why we ask that interviews be arranged through DIP. Once an interview is arranged it is very difficult and often impossible to cancel it or suggest alternatives.

All ANC departments should take it on themselves to contact DIP and inform us about important developments, it is wrong to expect DIP to contact them about every issue that may attract media attention, and then sometimes to literally have to pry the information loose from them.

In order to facilitate a proper working relationship with other departments we have requested each department to appoint a person/persons through whom DIP can officially liaise - arrange interviews etc. These persons must also keep DIP informed about important developments in each department that the media could have an interest in. A few departments have appointed such a contact person, but most have until now not done so. We repeat our request that this be done as a matter of urgency.

A related matter is the need for departments to inform DIP through background briefings. Again this happens very seldomly, and almost exclusively on demand from DIP. It will be very useful if departments, when they are involved in new developments, could take the initiative to arrange for DIP to be briefed.

All of this will help us to have advance warning and enable a strategic approach to the handling of news, rather than crisis management, which is now so often the case.

15-

5. FUNCTIONING OF THE UNIT

As far our departmental functioning is concerned we are seriously hampered by a lack of staff. The Media Liaison Unit is too small to deal effectively with the amount of queries directed at us. This results in us not being able to respond fast enough and the delays are made worse by the problems raised above. We can probably also improve our effectiveness by better co-ordination among ourselves and more strategic planning about how to handle contentious issues. The daily morning planning meetings are crucial in this regard. We have gone through a bad period in this regard towards the end of last year, but they seem to be functioning fairly well now.

Primarily because of our staff shortage we do not spend enough time making personal contact with journalists. Talking to them and providing background information and interpretation of events. The personal contact aspect cannot be overemphasised.

5.1. Research and the timely release of information to the media

A serious concern is that we hardly ever initiate a story, usually we are occupied by responding to what other parties have said, or stories that have already broken. While I think that we are doing fairly well in responding quickly with statements, the effectiveness of those statements is often undermined by the problems raised above. We must find ways of being more pro-active. One of the issues raised some time ago was that the ANC needs a research unit that will constantly investigate issues and on a continuous basis produce data and information with which we can go on the attack. If it proves not to be practical to start an institute we must identify sympathetic academics who can form a more informal group to do such research for us. This should be in addition to our Department of Research.

Sometimes there is a lot of information available in Departments, but because a lack of co-ordination and communication this information never reaches us and the media.

6. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE WAY FORWARD

It is urgent that the problems of "leaks," loose talk and unco-operativeness with Media Liaison be discussed at NEC and NWC level.

We should send another circular to each Department requesting again that they formally appoint a person ^{who} ~~that~~ is authorised to deal with media issues. I believe that we should also give serious consideration to having a meeting with each Department, discussing with them how media functions

and how we can co-operate to project the best possible image.

Greater clarity must be reached about the identification of issues that regions and head office should respond to in the media. It is important that regions should clear statements of national importance with DIP HQ, and that they should stick to decided positions.

We must find the financial resources to appoint more persons to the media liaison team. This is a matter of urgency, especially after the resignation of comrade Saki Macozoma. We cannot do a proper job with the current staff.

In the immediate run-up to elections (the last two to three months) we will need many more staff members. In countries such as the USA and Britain large contingents of students are appointed on a temporary basis. We must urgently investigate how many more people will be needed at Media Liaison, and begin to look around for who we can approach. We must also identify how many more telephones, faxes, computers etc. will be needed.

Close co-operation will be needed with the Elections Commission. It will be necessary to soon formalise the working relationship between DIP and the Elections Commission. The best approach will probably be to ensure that DIP, as a department, is fully involved in the media effort for elections.

We are very concerned about the lack of media understanding and presence of many of our leadership. As we will be moving into elections it will be crucial to arrange for those NEC and NWC members who often appear on television and radio to get professional training. This matter must be addressed as a matter of urgency and the correct company, or persons identified to do the training.

Carl Niehaus
Media Liaison Unit

11 January 1993

APPENDIX

REPORT ON GENERAL INTERVIEWS IN 1992

Cde Matthew Phosa has done 45 interviews .
Cde Vallie Moosa has done 43 interviews.
Cde Trevor Emmanuel has done 25 interviews.
Cde Mac Maharaj has done 19 interviews.
Cde Zola Skweyiya and Mr. Maduna have done 18 interviews each.
Cde Walter Sisulu has done 16 interviews.
Cde Kader Asmal and cde Albie Sachs have done 12 interviews each.
Cde Steve Tshwete has done 9 interviews through DIP.
M.K. has done 5 interviews.
Cde Jacob Zuma has done 2 interviews through DIP.
Cde Joe Slovo has done 4 interviews through DIP.
Cde Thabo has done two interviews through DIP.
Cde Cheryl has done one through DIP that was Radio 702.

Some departments are doing their own arrangements with the Press.

The following comrades are very helpful and one can approach them at any time of the day, and will be willing to assist us, commenting, interviews or write articles to the press.

1. Cde Vallie Moosa
2. Cde Mac Maharaj
3. Cde Phosa
4. Cde Kader Asmal
5. Cde Albie Sachs
6. Cde Trevor Emmanuel

INTERVIEWS DONE BY THE ANC PRESIDENT

1. Agenda - four times
2. CCV - two times
3. Saudi Gazette
4. BBC Television
5. Xinhua News Agency
6. Yorkshire television - The World This Week
7. Australian Television - Channel One
8. New York Times - Dele Odejede
9. Bart Magazine - Japanesse).
- 10 London Weekend Television - Walden show
- 11 CBC Lucie Page
- 12 The Financial Post - Canada
- 13 Trix Betlehem -
PVDA was confirmed but left before the interview
took place
- 14 Radio 702
- 15 ZDF German TV
- 16 el Periodica - Spain
- 17 NBC News
- 18 Beeld
- 19 Thames Television
- 20 Nowergian Btroadcasting Co-Operation
- 21 World Television News
- 22 KBS TV - Middle East
- 23 Radio Metro
- 24 ABC Good Morning America
- 25 Press Trust of India
- 26 Randall Douthi
- 27 Sapio Magazine
- 28 Financial Mail
- 29 New Nation
- 30 Time Magazine
- 31 An interview with Paul Husted, Norway /Denmark

LIST OF ALL Cde MANDELA'S REQUESTS

1. Beeld - Tim Du Plessis
2. Sapio Magazine - Louise Gubb
3. Sunday Times - Brian Pottinger
4. Randall Douthit - for Ms Whoopi Goldberg
5. Swiss National Radio - Miranda Varriale
6. Mainichi Shimbun - Satoshi Fukui
7. Algemeen Dagblad
8. London Weekend Television - Jonathan Brunert
9. Radio South Africa - Womens Programme
- 10 CBC - Lucie Page
- 11 The Financial Post
- 12 Trix Betlem
- 13 German Radio - Klause Metzler
- 14 el Periodico
- 15 NBC News - Lynell Gradwell
- 16 Danie Pieterse Productions
- 17 Australian TV Chanell One - Ross Dunn
- 18 The Citizen- Mr. M.A. Johnson
- 19 SBS - Kevin McQuillan
- 20 Thames Television - Sushma Puri
- 21 Bart Magazine - Japanesse
- 22 CNN - Brent Sadler
- 23 Leadership - Martin Schneider
- 24 A Current Affair - Holard Sacre
- 25 ABC TV - ross Dunn
- 26 ITN - Liz Donnelly
- 27 Frankfurter Allgemeine -Dr. Wolf-Ruthart
- 28 Yorkshire Television - Richard Mckerrow
- 29 Xinhua News Agency -Mr. Teng Wenqi
- 30 The Washington Post - Ms. E Weymouth
- 31 BBc Television - The Diamond Empire
- 32 Saaude Gazette
- 33 Penthouse
- 34 The Washington times - Mr Neil McMahon
- 35 "L" Espresso - Mr Gianni Berrelli
- 36 Daily Dinkal - Bangladesh
- 37 CCV - and Agenda 5 times (Three Agenda and Two CCV)
- 38 Free Film Makers - Ingrid Gavshon

- 39 Telavisa - Annemarie Meije
- 40 WTN
- 41 Premiere John Arfs
- 42 Channel Africa
- 43 Frontline - John Mathison
- 44 Israel Broadcasting
- 45 Sunday Times
- 46 Sunday Star
- 47 Sowetan
- 48 City Press
- 49 New Nation
- 50 Weekly Mail
- 51 South Newspaper
- 52 South Magazine - UK
- 53 Los Angeles Times - Scot Macleod
- 54 NHK - Merle Jawitz
- 55 Dallas Morning News - Barbara Whitaker
- 56 Adelaide Advertiser Australia daily paper
- 57 BET NEWS Kim Williams
- 58 Canal International
- 59 San Francisco Chronicle
- 60 Finance International
- 61 Deutsche Well - German TV

INTERVIEW REQUESTS FOR MR. MANDELA -(OUTSTANDING INTERVIEWS)

INTERVIEW REQUESTS	INTERVIEWEE	COMPLETED
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Andre Singer, Documentary
series entitled The Diamond
Empire. BBC .
tel 081 895 6111

Dr. Mandela

Ingrid Gavshon, Free Film
Makers, documentary on
vanishing people.
tel: 64448 1893/4
fax 487 3100/2

Kevin Dowling, BBC TV,
interview on the mining
laws and land acts.
081 749 2376 fax
7268615 Holiday Inn

Dr. Mandela

Makoto Katsuta, The Yomiuri
Shimbun (Japanese Daily
Newspaper) , violence and how
to bring aa new order to South
Africa.
Fax. 3381138 Kenya ,Nairobi
Tel. 337137

Lucie Page, The World Show
CBC, she is requesting an
interview.

Merle Jawitz, NHK requesting
an interview with Dr. Mandela
for January 1993.
tel: 726 4816

Dr. Mandela

John Mathison. Frontline and
Panorama. history of negotiations
between ANC and the Government.
Late October and November.
tel; 7881820

Barbara Whitaker, Dallas Morning
News. Political situation in S.A.
past. present and future.
To have the story by 14/10

Neil McMahon, Adelaide Advertiser
Australia daily paper. current and
future ANC relations with both the
US and Australia.
Tel 021 222 444 (work)
tel 021 434 3319 (Home)
fax: 021 221 155

James F. Blue III, NBC news today,
requesting an interview for the
13th November 1992.
tel: 726 2501
fax: 7261467

Kim Williams, BET NEWS,
Current situation in South
Africa.
tel: 803 9392 / 804 3900
fax: 726 5911

Canal International,
A.S. Boissigallais(They are
interviewing Mr. Nujoma and
Mr. Chassano and all the
interviews are confirmed) They
are doing a documentary on
Southern Africa.
tel. 021 476446

Radio 702. Zev Shalev.
invitation to address the
nation as Christmas approaches.

Channel Africa. Denzil Taylor
would like to interview
Dr Mandela - the person
Present situation in S.A.
ANC and 1993 - what can we expect
Christmas message to people of S.A.
and Africa.
tel. 714 2545

Deutsche Welle, Jurrgen Hecker
doing a documentary on S.A
fax. 202 393 7427
tel. 202 393 7434

San Franscisco Chronicle
interview on the general
situation in S.A.
fax. 415 777 1111

Finance International.
interview on international
investment and the general
S.A. situation.
fax. 071n 823 1001

INTERVIEWS DONE BY CDE CYRIL

1. Learn and Teach
2. ZDF- German Television
3. Rapport
4. Reuters
5. Radio 702
6. Los Angeles Times
7. C.C.V. and Agenda (SABC)
8. The Guardian -David Beresford

LIST OF INTERVIEW REQUESTS FOR COMRADE CYRIL

1. Frontline - John Matison
2. The Shopsteward - Fiona Dove
3. Fair Lady - Sue Grant Marshall
4. Los Angeles Times - Scott Kraft
5. Sunday Times - Mike Robertson
6. Strategic Group- Vanessa Perumal
7. Pace Magazine - Eddie Jayiya
8. Radio 702 - Zev Shalev
9. Reuters - Rich Mkhond
- 10 Radio TV Luxembourg - Alexander Euteneier
- 11 NBC News - Sue Burt
- 12 Overseas Trading Magazine - Marshall Wilson
- 13 ZDF - Amina Frense
- 14 Nowergian Newsletter - Liv Toires
- 15 Decisions Southern Africa - Des Killalea
- 16 Cosmopolitan
- 17 Washing Post - HR Slack
- 18 Finnish Youth and Swedish TV - Magnus Malan
- 19 Rapport - Dires van Heerden
- 20 Guardian - David Beresford
- 21 Spoomet - Polly Modiko
- 22 Drum\True Love - Barney Cohen
- 23 Saturday Star - John Perlman
- 24 The New York Times - Bill Keller
- 25 BBC Radio 4 - Fergal Keane
- 25 SABC Agenda - Barbara Folscher
- 26 Beeld - Peet Kruger
- 27 Washington Post - Paul Taylor
- 28 BBC TV- Glenda Spiro
- 29 Cover magazine - David Alson
- 30 Sunday Times - Brian Pottinger
- 31 City Press - Themba Khumalo
- 32 Sowetan - Themba Molefe
- 33 Negotiation News - Elsabe Wessels
- 34 Haanoch Marman, (Israel) newspaper
- 35 Financial Times- Patti Waldmeir
- 36 United World - Neil Smith

SPORTS

MEMORANDUM ON THE SETTING UP OF A SPORTS DESK AT THE ANC HEAD OFFICE AND IN THE REGIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

RECEIVED 27 JAN 1993

The NEC Meeting held from 31 August to 2 September 1992 decided that a Sports Desk be set up by the ANC at both National and Regional levels. The NEC did not give terms of reference for the sports desk. Our responsibility in the circumstances, over and above whatever else we are going to say in this document, is to provide such terms of reference. The movement's sports policy as adopted at the Policy Conference in May 1991 will provide the basis for our formulation.

It needs special mention here that the May 1991 sports policy guidelines are not in any way the last word on the matter. As we move forward through the transitional phase to a democratic dispensation for our country we shall need to be guided by the objective reality to improve and adopt the policy. In addition to our own experience, we shall need to use the experiences of other countries and, where conditions allows us, inject them into our own.

The Guidelines on Sport define the context in which sport is played in South Africa. It is a context of deprivation, exclusion and underdevelopment. ANC sports policy will have to find ways of dealing with this legacy in the short term and in the long term.

A number of tasks arise from the Policy Guidelines on Sport for the proposed ANC Sports Desk. Most of these tasks relate to the section entitled short - term transitional policy proposals. We will discuss the various tasks below.

The discussion on sports policy at the NEC meeting of 31 August - 2 September began with what seemed to be a commonly held view that the ANC did not have a clear sports policy. When this was clarified by reference to the decisions of the Policy conference two things came clear:

- (a) Many speakers were unhappy about the consultation process when it comes to specific decisions on sport. The rugby situation was uppermost in the minds of NEC members during the discussion. Many expressed the view that there were inadequate consultations and that the mechanisms for consultation did not exist.
- (b) The meeting made the point that ANC sports policies were not sufficiently known even to NEC members. This situation is probably worse when it comes to ordinary members, not to mention the general public.

- (c) It became clear in the meeting that many speakers had difficulties in making a clear distinction between our politico -philosophical approach to sport and recreation and what the exigencies of the moment call for. The result of this lack of distinction between the two elements in our policy is that many lose the strategic perspective when dealing with sport.

SPORT AND PROPAGANDA

The apartheid regime effectively used sport to reinforce its policy of white supremacy. This was done through the underdevelopment of black sport and the development of white sport. The resultant differentials in performance were then used in apartheid propaganda to justify white domination.

Whilst we understand the potential of sport as an instrument of propaganda it is important that sport is depoliticised as much as possible. This does not mean that sport cannot play a role in the reconciliation of our society and the creation of a non-racial culture. However we need to be careful not to be seen to be using it as political instrument. In that case the effect would be quite the opposite.

THE TASKS OF A SPORTS DESK

The function and the structure of the ANC Sports Desk can be derived from all the issues raised above. The best approach is to look at what the Sports Desk has to do and then what structures and personnel will be able to fulfil its tasks.

The following tasks are identified from the issues we have discussed above.

- (a) To popularise ANC Sports Policy as set out in the ANC Policy Guidelines to both ANC members and to the broader society. The extent of ignorance and misunderstanding of our sports policy in the ANC structures is shocking.
- (b) To monitor the implementation of development programmes. The progressive sports movement and ourselves have managed to make a clear link between the return of various codes to international sport and the formulation of development programmes for the underdeveloped sectors of the community. Many codes accepted this deal with great reluctance or under duress. This has meant that many sports codes have found one excuse or another for dragging their feet in the implementation of development programmes.

The situation has been exacerbated by the relative weakness of administrators from the non - racial section of various codes. They are unable to monitor their codes for implementation of development programmes. The Sports Desk will have to monitor the implementation of development programmes as one of its major functions.

The underdevelopment of the majority in South Africa has resulted in a number of sports codes being unknown and unavailable in the deprived communities. These codes are only played by white South Africans. Rather than foster the spirit of understanding amongst South Africans of all races these codes reinforce segregation and racism. What is needed are programmes aimed at the development of the codes in various communities. The Sports Desk will have to set processes in motion that will help deal with issues.

- (c) To foster an understanding of the relationship between health and physical activity . In fact it can be argued that the key to a healthy life - style is adequate levels of physical activity. Unfortunately the conception of sport in our society is that it is a pastime for the competitive. This approach needs to be turned around. A consciousness about the connection between leisure and sport needs to be developed. We must encourage all people in our nation to engage in some kind of physical activity and sport. The sports Desk will have to find ways and means of creating this consciousness and of taking sport and recreation to all and sundry, including children, the old and the handicapped.

The Policy Guidelines call for the creation of a National Sports Commission for the purpose of promoting and regulating the development of sport and recreation in South Africa. The NSC would be a statutory body. The Sports Desk will have to develop the concept of the NSC and give it flesh and structure. This will mean research into its structure, staffing and its relationship with various sports codes. The Sports Desk can set up a sub - committee to work on the National Sports Commission.

Work must commence immediately to bring about unity between establishment COSAS and the democratic National Sports Congress. The continued existence of the two as separate contradictory tendencies can only serve to undermine the drive towards the normalisation and deracialisation of sport. It can, and in fact, does create that situation of disparity when it comes to allocation of resources.

- (d) To sensitise our constitutional structures to what needs to go into the new constitution to guarantee rights related to sports and leisure. The Constitutional Committee needs to be engaged in this regard. Other legal aspects of sports relate to setting up of statutory bodies such as the National Sports Commission and the regulation of professional sport. Important issues to be considered are how the autonomy of sports can be maintained while due regard is paid to the provision of facilities and the accessibility of various codes to the masses.
- (e) To research and advise on the whole question of sponsorship. Most sports codes cannot survive on their internally generated resources but need sponsorship from either the public or the private sector. The problem, of course is that a number of factors, including the strength of organisation in a particular code, the class and consumer power of those who play the sport etc, influence the extent to which sport is sponsored. The Sports Desk will have to examine current sports sponsorship, prospects for the future, relationship with sports development etc.
- (f) To ensure that the development of sports is directly linked with school sports. With the collapse of black education sport collapsed in black schools. The majority of schools do not have any sports facilities. The schools also do not have qualified coaches who can identify talent, nurture and develop it. The Sports Desk will have to pay particular attention to the development of sport in the schools. An assessment of the present situation in the schools will have to be undertaken with a view to determining what needs to be done.
- (g) To make sure that work and sport are not seen as opposites. The conception of sport as encompassing all forms of physical activity and as integral part of the leisure time means that sport must be directly linked to work. In broad terms this implies, a philosophical integration of work and sport.

The black athletes, for instance, do not enjoy the same rights as accrue to their white counterparts when it comes to time-offs and remuneration. This discriminatory practice must be addressed now. In that regard unions and employers must be engaged.

- (h) To address the legacy of the rural areas being the most under-resourced places in South Africa in terms of facilities Sports development in rural areas of greater population density such as schools, mission stations, hospitals etc needs to be given a top priority. A need assessment is probably necessary before any concrete proposals can be made. The Sports Desk will have to find ways in which the lack of sports facilities in the rural areas can be dealt with. Various sports codes will also have to be engaged so that they can work towards the playing of the sport they represent in the rural areas. Also the existence of indigenous sport and forms of leisure must be researched to foster development.
- (i) To look into the development of sports medicine in South Africa so that injuries and fatalities can be minimised. This should entail both a primary care approach where doctors and health professionals are not involved and curative high tech medicine to deal with more serious injuries. This means that the Sports Desk will have to discuss the matter with various codes as well as the health sector.
- (j) To popularise the concept of "Sports and recreation for all". An attitude exists across the board in our society that sport is for the young and the physically fit. The disabled or, as Steve Wonder puts it, the physically challenged, are left out of account when sports and sports facilities are under discussion. This has to change. The ANC Sports Desk needs to find ways of changing the attitude of people to sport for the disabled and to encourage the development of sports among the disabled.

12. SPORT IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD

The National Policy Conference decided that the ANC should adopt a number of policy positions that will help it to manage the transition from apartheid to non-racial sport. These policy positions will be aimed at achieving maximum democratisation in sport and setting up the mechanisms for doing so. These policy positions include the following:

1. Continued facilitation, encouragement and monitoring of the unity process on national, regional and local level.
2. Encouraging and monitoring of concrete affirmative action development programmes.
3. Facilitating agreements on symbols not associated with Apartheid as prerequisites for admission into international sport.
4. To ensure the de-ritualization and democratisation of the sports movement in line with the Olympic Charter and principles of international federations.
5. Ensure regular and consistent consultations with the various sports bodies to enable us acceptable policy.

The Sports Desk of the ANC will, naturally, be seized of these day to day issues.

13. POLICY FORMULATION PROCESSES

This covers the same point referred to in point 5 above. the reality is that a policy - formulation process especially with regards to points 1 to 4 above needs to be developed. If that does not happen tensions between the ANC and progressive sports organisations develop. These tensions weaken the thrust of the non-racial movement in the Unity Process.

THE STRUCTURES OF SPORTS DESK

The Sports desk will have to be structured such that it is able to perform all the tasks and functions that arise from the duties we have discussed above. Because of the close relationship between the sports issues in South Africa and our ability to organise in certain sectors of the community the Sports desk has been located within the Organising Department. The same approach should be followed in the regions.

8.1 THE NATIONAL SPORTS DESK

The National Sports Desk shall report to the Head of the Organising Department. It is proposed that it be structured as follows: