

# URGENT: THELINS EIOFF

VIR AANDAG : CHRISTO VAN NOORDWYK

CHRISTO,

'n baie kort antwoord op van jou vraag. Ek het gepraat met wie ek in die hande kon kry maar jy besef seker tyd was 'n probleem. Kon ook nie die koerant berigte kry nie. Ek hoop tog dat hierdie sa help. Dit was lekker om met jou te praat - laat weet hoe dit gaan - groete vir alle bekendes en sterkte vir vanaand - hoop nie dis jou vuurdoop nie!

Santie

1. Radical factions - left and rightwing - will they be taking part in Codesa 2. Is there any factions within for instance PAC who are positive about attending any future negotiations? Any definite indications who parties will be to Codesa 2 - same list as for 1?

A Conservative Party split is expected with a faction, led by Koos van der Merwe participating in Codesa 2. The PAC position is currently unclear, but there is a substantial leadership grouping who have said they are being marginalised by not participating, and would therefore like to be more involved in Codesa 2.

19 parties participated in Codesa 1. 20 other organisations have since applied to participate in Codesa 2. The (fairly vague) criteria by which this will be decided : all groupings must show to have a substantial following. A number of interest groupings will be invited to provide information to the working groups but will not be invited to attend Codesa 2 as participants.

2. Agreements reached at Codesa 1 - are they all still being upheld, were they successful and binding or have there been any "backtracking"? Are there any problems with the upkeep of these agreements/resolutions?

Most important decision was that working groups would be formed to take the process forward. Very few other substantial decisions were made, except for this process that was agreed to. The working groups will meet on Monday, 20 January for the first time and there has been no problems/hitched in this regard - therefore decisions made could be said to still be on track.

The Declaration was not signed by the Inkatha Freedom Party and the Bophuthatswana government. They have been submit proposed changes to the other 17 organisations, but have not yet done so.

3. Agreements NOT reached, for instance on Economic Forum, constituent assembly, Interim government - are there any informal agreements on

these, what is the current status of these issues? Is it expected that the State President will address these issues in speech at opening of parliament?

Re Economic Forum: a process has started with business and labour meeting next week to decide on their position re proposed economic forum. If consensus can be reached, it is expected that the meeting will propose a parallel process to Codesa 2, but with no political groupings.

Re constituent assembly: no agreements but it is expected that a compromise will be reached between government and ANC on weight of representation based on perceived power. An election is not expected.

Re Interim government: government is talking about a 10 year period before interim government, ANC of a 18 month period, compromise is expected at 2 years. The working groups are expected to advise cabinet on these major issues.

4. Any "inside" explanation on the "fall-out" between de Klerk and Mandela? Could it be said that this was not as negative an incident as then presumed, but rather acted as a catalyst for the negotiations?

Feeling that State President misjudged the mood of the convention and was concentrating on the by-election in Potchefstroom. The "fall-out" was apparently patched up that same evening and it is furthermore seen as an indication of how easily the process could go wrong and how important it was to keep it on track.

5. Could Codesa be seen as an interim government? What would be the legal status of decisions taken? What should be answered to allegation the government is selling out SA?

Government would probably like Codesa to be an interim government and for it to become further involved in constitution making. The ANC is seeing it as a temporary measure until an interim government is in place when Codesa will be dissolved. The rightwing will definitely see Codesa as a "sell-out" by government, but Zimbabwe and Namibia have shown that attention must be given to majority rights and aspirations, especially if economic concerns are taken into account.

6. What subcommittees have been formed?

working group 1: creation of a climate for free political participation; role of the international community;

working group 2: general constitutional principles; constitution-making process

working group 3: transitional arrangements/interim government/transitional authority

working group 4: future of the TBVC states

working group 5: time frames and implementation of Codesa's agreements

7. What would be seen as the way forward by people who attended Codesa 1? Are they positive about the future and Codesa 2?

Very positive. Codesa 1 itself was successful, but the difficult part will now be following as substantive issues will have to be addressed.