

# TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

*"From corruption, murder and mismanagement to  
democracy, justice and good government. "*

## REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON NEGOTIATIONS TO PLENARY ANC NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE 28-31 MAY 1992

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### INTRODUCTION

The special commission on negotiations considered the balance of forces within South Africa and internationally, our vision of the transition and the mass actions necessary to realise the objective of a united non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. Our country has entered a decisive period in which the issue of transfer of power from the white minority regime to the people as a whole is on the immediate agenda. The impatience of the majority of South Africans and the international community with apartheid rule is such that the transfer of power, which should lead to the fundamental transformation of our society, can be achieved in the shortest possible time.

#### I. BALANCE OF FORCES

1. On the international balance of forces, the following issues were noted:
  - (a) that, despite fundamental changes in the international balance of forces, the system of apartheid remains rejected by the international community;
  - (b) that, on the basis of the false assumption that the country has irreversibly entered a transition to democracy, there has been a tendency in many countries to weaken the isolation of the apartheid regime;
  - (c) that, in the final analysis, the extent of international action against apartheid and solidarity with our struggle depends on the work done by the ANC and other democratic forces among the people in these countries and their respective governments; and
  - (d) that we need to embark on a deliberate campaign to galvanise these forces to help ensure a speedy transition to democracy.
2. On the balance of forces within South Africa, the Commission noted:
  - (a) that the all-round crisis of the apartheid system continues to deepen as shown by the economic decline, rejection of the policies of the ruling bloc and the exposure of the corruption and state involvement in the violence signifying the moral decay to which the National Party regime has sunk;
  - (b) that the regime continues to command huge military and other resources; and

- (c) that the regime pursues a strategy in the transition aimed at weakening and destroying the ANC and other democratic forces through violence and other means, and at locking these forces into a permanent "power-sharing" arrangement in which the system of white minority domination will be largely intact.

3. It was further noted:

- (a) that the ANC and other democratic forces derive their strength primarily from the mass of the down-trodden people;
- (b) that these masses yearn and continue to struggle for a speedy end to National Party minority rule and the establishment of a democratic society in the shortest possible time;
- (c) that in the conduct of day-to-day struggle, the ANC should ensure that negotiations and mass action are creatively linked;
- (d) that the ANC needs to further strengthen its organisational structures and links with the mass of the people in their struggles around day to day and national demands;
- (e) that in the period of transition, the ANC needs to actively equip our people with the capacity to defend themselves against state-organised and vigilante violence, and to mobilise elements of the security forces to support the transition to democracy; and
- (f) that we should all the time co-ordinate our actions with other structures in the Tripartite Alliance, the mass democratic formations and the broad patriotic front.

4. The Commission further agreed that the National Party regime's positions at CODESA II once again confirmed that it is bent on clinging to power at all costs, and prevent the democratic transformation of our country. Combined with the recent revelation around state involvement in the violence and assassinations and rampant corruption in government circles, these developments have further exposed the NP and its allies in the eyes of our people and the international community.

On the other hand, the ANC and its allies have shown their unwavering commitment to democratic ideals and practices, and their preparedness to find lasting solutions to the problems plaguing our country. The possibility exists for

the democratic forces to consolidate their hold onto the initiative and ensure speedy progress to democracy.

5. Further noting:

- (a) that the balance of forces is not a static phenomenon but that it is fluid, influenced in part by the work of the democratic movement to build its forces both nationally and internationally; and
- (b) that in the current phase, negotiations and mass action constitute mutually-reinforcing elements of our struggle.

The Commission adopted broad guidelines to guide our vision of the transition to democracy and a Programme of Mass Action for the coming period.

## II. GUIDELINES FOR THE TRANSITION

### 1. OBJECTIVES:

The transfer of power to the majority leading to the transformation of society.

### 2. CREATION OF A CLIMATE FOR FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY:

In the phase prior to elections the following, amongst others, must be ensured:

- 2.1 Release of political prisoners and safe return of exiles, which should be put into immediate effect;
- 2.2 Repeal of all repressive legislation;
- 2.3 Effective monitoring of the violence by the international community;
- 2.4 Effective independent control of state owned media;
- 2.5 Independent control of the electoral process;
- 2.6 Effective multi-party control of all security forces;
- 2.7 Multi-party control of state finances; and
- 2.8 Effective multi-party control of further specified areas of government, including provincial and local levels of government.

3. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY:
  - 3.1 A democratically elected single chamber Constituent Assembly (CA) on the basis of proportional representation and one person one vote whose decisions will not be subject to the veto of any other body;
  - 3.2 The CA will take its decisions by a two thirds majority;
  - 3.3 The CA will complete its work within a specified period of time;
  - 3.4 An effective deadlock breaking mechanism. In the event of a deadlock, for example, a constitution which enjoys the support of 51% of the delegates in the CA will be put before the people of South Africa for a decision by means of referendum. Another option could be to call for fresh elections.;
  - 3.5 The elections should be effectively monitored by the international community, and various sections of our community.
4. INTERIM GOVERNMENT
  - 4.1 After the elections the tri-cameral parliament and other legislative structures will be dissolved and legislative functions during the transition will pass into the hands of the elected CA;
  - 4.2 The elected CA would appoint a new executive authority for the country in line with the principle of interim government of national unity;
  - 4.3 All existing regional and local administrations will during the transition period fall under the jurisdiction of the CA and its executive arm. The creation of new regional and local levels of government and the definition of their boundaries, powers and functions shall be decided by the CA; and
  - 4.4 The decision-making mechanism in the legislative and executive arm of the elected Interim Government should be by way of a specified percentage, for example, a two-thirds majority.

5. People residing in the 'TBVC States' shall as of right be entitled to participate fully in the phases of transition, including the right to participate in all elections on the same basis as other South Africans.
6. The above measures should be legislated through the enactment of a 'Transition to Democracy Act' which would replace the 1983 Constitution of South Africa Act. This Act should be strictly confined to measures necessary for the transitional arrangements needed for the limited period of transition to a democratic constitution. A limited time-frame for the entire process should be agreed to and enacted by the Transition to Democracy Act.

### III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

#### 1. STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

- 1.1 Negotiations are an arena of struggle, and our people's participation through mass action should be central to our approach. The context of negotiations is the on-going reality of apartheid and the continued efforts of the regime to entrench minority rule. Therefore the underlying strategic approach of the programme of action is the removal of the De Klerk regime from power and the institution of a democratic government.
- 1.2 Our campaigns should not merely be symbolic or one-off events, but should, in very practical ways advance our struggle and shift the balance in favour of the oppressed and democratic forces. The campaigns should have the following elements:
  - (a) Deepen the crisis of legitimacy of the apartheid regime by exposing its gross abuse of power, focusing sharply on the escalating scandals involving fraud, corruption and murder;
  - (b) Demonstrate that the De Klerk regime has no moral and political authority to rule our country;
  - (c) Expose the blatant attempts by the government and its allies to block a democratically-elected CA from drafting and amending a democratic constitution for our country;
  - (d) Level the political playing field and further strengthen our organisational capacity and rectify our organisational weaknesses;

## 2. GUIDELINES FOR ACTION

The Commission proposes the adoption of the Revised Tri-Partite Alliance "Programme of Action" (POA) of 13 May 1992 (attached) as the basis for the ANC Programme of Action, with certain amendments and additions.

Underpinning the overall approach to this document is our determination to break the resistance of the regime and its allies to the proposals for a speedy transition to democracy, to strengthen our organisational structures, to strengthen the agreements reached in negotiations, to advance the basic aspirations of our people, and bring about a democratic constitution in the shortest possible time.

The main features of this Alliance Programme of Mass Action are:

- (a) the action must be coordinated, sustained "rolling" mass action to ensure that our objective of transition to democracy is achieved in the shortest possible time.
- (b) the programme involves an intensive process of reportbacks, consultation and mandates on the Negotiations Process and POA to mobilise for mass action.
- (c) the POA focuses on the strategic approach of removing obstacles to an Interim Government and election of a sovereign Constituent Assembly within specified time frames.
- (d) the POA involves the setting of deadlines (end of June) for the regime to meet our demands for, amongst others, an Interim Government and Constituent Assembly and the unleashing of unprecedented mass action in July, if these demands are not met.
- (e) the POA must, at the same time, address issues of immediate concern to the masses, for example the current violence, the drought, and so on. Further, our campaigns should seek to link local, regional and national issues.
- (f) the POA is also seen as part of the unfolding process of preparing for democratic elections.
- (g) Even if our broad demands are met, most elements of this programme will be vigorously pursued in order to advance to a democratic society.

## 3. A BROAD-BASED COALITION CAMPAIGN

Apart from galvanizing the Alliance, a broad-based coalition, incorporating as broad a front of organisations as possible, should be formed around the themes: "End Corruption and Murder: End Apartheid Rule and Advance to Democracy" and "From Corruption, Murder and Mismanagement to Democracy, Justice and Good Government". These themes need to form the basis for popular slogans.

The pillars of this campaign shall include the following:

### First pillar: End Murder

Campaigns to expose the government's complicity in murder, violence and destabilisation of political opponents. The emphasis here should be to expose the regime's double agenda. Decisive action is needed to counter the regime's strategy of violence against our people. This may include campaigns around police and army death squads and covert operations; third force operations; massacres of our people on trains and taxis; and revelations around the involvement of top government officials and ministers in these operations.

Attempts by the regime to secure amnesties for state-employed and sponsored criminals, who are continuing to wage a campaign of violence and destabilisation against our people, must be rejected.

Further, we must embark upon a campaign to ensure that Gen. van der Westhuizen and other assassins are brought to justice.

### Second pillar: End Corruption

Campaigns to expose the scandals and gross abuse of power of the regime to demonstrate their moral and political bankruptcy. The emphasis here should be upon the regime's failure and inability to govern properly. This may include campaigns around rent and service boycotts, and the scandals in departments run by Gerrit Viljoen, Stoffel van der Merwe and Pik Botha, amongst others.

### Third pillar: Dismantle Apartheid Rule

Campaigns to expose the regime's attempts at restructuring Apartheid rule in many disguises at national, provincial and local levels of government. The emphasis here is to show that the book on Apartheid is not closed.

To embark on campaigns in defiance of the 64 pieces of Apartheid legislation on the statute books, as well as ways to ensure free political activity.

Steps need to be taken to build and strengthen organs of local democracy. Furthermore, guidelines must be provided on the question of local level negotiations.

The process of ending Apartheid rule includes as one of its main elements the dismantling of the bantustan system. Our campaign for free political activity should address the concrete problems experienced by our people in the bantustans.

The intransigence of the Bophuthatswana and Ciskei administrations to the democratisation process, must be met with appropriate actions to compel these regimes to meet the peoples' demands. These actions must include the direct participation of senior leadership.

The regime continues to manipulate the SABC as its private propaganda organ. The democratic movement should demand that the SABC is democratised within a given time frame, failing which we will mobilise for a national boycott of all products advertised on SABC from that date. Furthermore, we will launch a boycott of T.V. licences. The democratic movement should elicit support from business to pressurise the government to meet our demands in this respect.

If the regime continues to block the process of transition, we will undertake appropriate actions to make apartheid truly unworkable. Such actions may include the systematic and nation-wide occupation of legislative, administrative and judicial buildings and offices.

#### Fourth pillar: Advance to Democracy

Campaigns to expose the regime's dishonesty in the negotiations process, particularly at CODESA. The objectives of such campaigns should be to expose the moral and political bankruptcy of the National Party's vision for the future of our country. The emphasis here should be to expose the regime's double agenda of participating in negotiations, whilst destabilising and undermining its political opponents.

To facilitate the process of mass involvement, the need for openness and access to information for all, the ANC must campaign to ensure that all CODESA processes are opened to the public. For our part, the ANC has nothing to hide.

We need to embark on a campaign to popularise our guidelines for a transition towards democracy, as soon as possible, in all corners of our country.

#### Fifth pillar: Building a New South African Nation

On the basis of our policies adopted at this Conference, we need to embark on a campaign to popularise our vision of a single South African nation, in all corners of our country and reaching out to all our people.

#### 4. IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

- 4.1 The POA must be implemented without delay. Immediate reportbacks to all ANC branches and structures of allied organisations must be organised with a view towards immediate implementation of the POA.
- 4.2 For the effective implementation of this Programme, resources must be made available to our structures at regional and local level.
- 4.3 The National Campaigns Committee must ensure that Regional Campaigns Committees are functioning and meet as a matter of urgency to immediately embark on implementation of this POA. At least one senior official of the REC must serve on the Regional Campaigns Committee (RCC). Each RCC must be administered by a full-time, paid employee.
- 4.4 The ANC must ensure that the implementation of the POA is monitored on an ongoing basis, and that the relevant elements of the POA are pursued until we achieve a democratic South Africa.
- 4.5 The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) forces must be drawn into this POA as a matter of urgency and necessity. The ANC must in each region ~~must~~ convene a forum of all MDM forces within the next two months. The main purpose of these forums would be to:
  - (a) intensify the implementation of the POA; and
  - (b) establish Coordinating Committees of the MDM Forums.
- 4.6 A National Forum of patriotic forces must be held as soon as possible in order to involve the broadest range of patriotic forces in this programme.
- 4.7 The Tri-Partite Alliance Campaigns Coordinating Committee must be strengthened.

ing Committee should arrange National  
ordinating Forum meetings at least once  
weeks. This Forum should be composed as

embers of the National Organising  
ent;

of the National Negotiations Commission;

representatives from each region: One from  
ional Campaigns Committee; and one REC  
;

representatives each from the ANC-WL, ANC-YL;

ntation of COSATU and SACP;

ntation of the South African National  
Organisation (SANCO); and

ntation of SASCO, COSAS and other  
tic formations.

l Commission needs to be strengthened and  
, as a matter of urgency.

directed to convene a special national  
of the ANC, to map out an integrated  
rspective for the transitional period.

ld organise a conference in South Africa  
national anti-Apartheid and solidarity  
s to map out an international programme of

## Alliance Programme of Action

Revised Version of Alliance Campaign's Committee Proposals adopted at the  
Alliance Summit - 13 May 1992

### 1. Introduction

- 1.1. On 13th May 1992, an Alliance Summit attended by national and regional members of the executive structures of the Alliance considered an earlier draft of this document.
- 1.2. The suggestions from this meeting have been incorporated into the document and the outcome of CODESA 2 taken into account. We would now like the document to be further discussed and the approach endorsed at all levels of our organisations.
- 1.3. The fact that CODESA 2 failed to meet the bottom lines discussed at the Summit i.e. IG by end of June and a commitment to democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly by the end of this year, makes the need for a programme of action as identified below all the more urgent.
- 1.4. This document should not be regarded as a blueprint or set of instructions but rather utilised as a flexible guide in developing an approach to a programme of action of the Alliance.
- 1.5. Regions are encouraged to further enrich this document so that local and regional conditions and struggles can feed into a nationally coherent and integrated programme. We need to transform this document into one that is "owned" by our structures and leadership.
- 1.6. The programme of action attempts to link the CODESA negotiations process, the election campaign, local and regional struggles and struggles around socio-economic issues into a nationally co-ordinated framework. In this way, our efforts to make negotiations a terrain of struggle will be enhanced and the actions of our people will be able to determine what happens at the negotiating table.

### 2. Our Approach

- 2.1. In this period our emphasis should be on getting rid of the De Klerk regime and putting power in the hands of the people in the shortest possible time.
- 2.2. We believe that a co-ordinated and comprehensive programme of action of the

Alliance is needed to achieve the transfer of power to the people and the last two steps to our freedom i.e..

2.2.1 The achievement of an interim government and

2.2.2 Democratic elections for a new constitution.

2.3. The achievement of above will be the key to unlocking many of our other demands e.g.. end to unilateral restructuring, worker rights, an end to the violence e.t.c..

2.4. The outcome of CODESA 2, demonstrates loudly and clearly that the government is not prepared to accept meaningful democracy. We need to take this message to our people.

### 3. Our key demands in this period

3.1. The strategic focus of our programme of action is the removal of obstacles in the shortest possible time for an interim government and democratic elections for a constituent assembly.

3.2. However, we should continue to struggle for the achievement of the following other important demands:

3.2.1. Ensuring the implementation of CODESA decisions within agreed time frames.

3.2.2. Other obstacles in the negotiations process such as Bop and Ciskei, equal access to the mass media and the release of political prisoners.

3.2.3. State sponsored violence.

3.2.4. State unilateral restructuring including government attempts to catch votes e.g. through drought and poverty relief.

3.2.5. Resolution of burning socio-economic issues such as high food prices, the effect of VAT and drought relief. There is a possibility that food prices will continue to rocket as we have to rely on imported food as a result of the drought.

3.3. The recent expose's in regard to corruption and death squads heightens the unacceptability of continued Nationalist Party rule. In addition to using this issue to further emphasise the need for an interim government, we need to make the following specific demands in relation to the above:

3.3.1. An independent commission of inquiry into corruption and death squads.

3.3.2. The resignation and prosecution of all those responsible.

3.4. This list should not be regarded as a comprehensive or exclusive list of demands. Particular regions have particular circumstances. Regions and locals will need to focus on the demands most pertinent to their constituencies.

### 4. Achieving our demands

To achieve an interim government and an overwhelming majority in the elections, we suggest that the following is necessary:

4.1. Unprecedented mass action if our "bottom lines" are not met.

4.2. A highly well organised and dynamic election campaign which, while driven by the Alliance, is as inclusive as possible.

4.3. Enhanced participation of our members in the negotiations process:

4.3.1. On the one hand, we should not underestimate the capacity of our people to take action to achieve their freedom. But on the other, we should not take the masses for granted.

4.3.2. The mobilisation of the masses for support and action can't be a process which is switched on and off; where the people are only called upon where there is a deadlock or problems.

4.3.3. Uppermost in our minds must be our people's impatience for freedom and the fact that our demands have been for an interim government by mid-year and elections by year-end.

4.4. Concerted efforts to resolve some of the burning socio-economic problems of our people including the effects of the drought, high food prices, violence.

### 5. Implementation of programme of action - Time table

#### 5.1. Outcome of CODESA 2

The Alliance Summit said that if CODESA 2 did not meet our "bottom lines", the ANC/Alliance should give the government a deadline of four weeks (15 June 1992). We said that if there was no progress by this date, we would be considering breaking off negotiations or other appropriate mass action.

In the light of the outcome of CODESA 2, we suggest that the end of June should be regarded as sufficient time for the present deadlock to be broken.

5.2. ANC Policy Conference - 28th - 31st May

The ANC Policy Conference is an important forum to begin developing an election platform for the ANC. The ANC needs to be at the forefront of articulating the aspirations of our people.

### 5.3. Report back and consultation process

The ANC/Alliance must embark on a process of report backs and consultation to consider renewing its mandate in relation to the obstacles placed by the government in the negotiations process and on what should occur if the deadline is not met. This should include seeking a mandate on mass action.

This process should include local and regional forums including shop steward councils, general councils, local mass meetings and utilising June 16th and June 26th events.

### 5.4. Voter education seminars

Preparing for elections must be seen as an integral part of our programme of action (see below). The first step in our election campaign should be educating our people on voting procedures and the significance of the vote. We also need to creatively link voter education with our ongoing demands.

The programme already launched by the ANC which includes setting up of regional and local electoral commissions needs to be intensified and extended to embrace all allies who are prepared to work for an ANC-led victory e.g. the Alliance, youth and student formations and civics.

### 5.5. Tuesday June 16th

The ANC Youth League to organise June 16th events under the slogan of "Youth action for the vote, peace and democracy". This needs to be linked to a build up of our forces towards breaking the CODESA deadlock.

### 5.6. Friday June 26th and following weekend

The ongoing preparation and activities for Freedom Day must continue and be part of the build up to breaking the deadlock in our favour.

Activities like People's Assemblies are appropriate forums for projecting our demands and preparing for elections.

### 5.7. Consultative conferences - beginning of July

This above report back and mandating process should culminate at the beginning of July in the holding of:

#### 5.7.1. Firstly, a special ANC conference (suggested dates - 4 -5 July).

This conference should be larger enough to ensure adequate local and regional representation as well as representation from components of the Alliance.

#### 5.7.2. A broader forum involving the patriotic forces, civics, other components of the

mass democratic movement (suggested dates: 10 - 12 July). The exact composition of such a conference can be decided at a later date.

The agenda of these events should be to review the deadlock in the CODESA progress and decide on appropriate action.

### 5.8. Mass action - Monday 20 July

Depending on the outcome of the above process, we should target the third week of July for unprecedented and sustained mass action until our demands are met.

The form of this action should also be subject to consultation. We need to consider various forms of simultaneous action e.g. strikes, marches and occupations.

## 6. Preparing for elections

We can't stress sufficiently, the vital significance of decisively winning the elections. Our people have never voted before and a large amount of work is going to be needed to ensure success. All sectors of the democratic movement need to be mobilised to ensure an ANC-led victory. The above timetable must also be regarded as an integral build up to electioneering.

The significance of the election campaign has been detailed in other documents. Here, we have merely identified some principles and then the preparatory steps that need to be taken.

### 6.1. Principles to guide our election campaign

#### 6.1.1. An integrated approach

We need to gear up our whole movement to task of winning the elections. This includes integrating our organisational work, recruitment, local and regional campaigns e.t.c..

#### 6.1.2. An inclusive approach

We need to embark on an inclusive process which involves civics, churches, students, the CODESA patriotic forces, small businesses e.t.c.. We need to build and provide leadership to a broad coalition committed to a common election campaign.

#### 6.1.3. A democratic process

The decisions about the election platform, national and regional lists needs to be a democratic and participatory process within the Alliance as well as with other allies.

### 6.2 Preparatory steps



In order to decisively win the elections, thorough preparation is essential.

- 6.2.1. Sensitising and educating the mass of our people to the issue of elections. This involves telling people to exercise their democratic right and how to do so.
- 6.2.2. Information gathering: This includes the identification of constituencies to be targeted including people's fears and expectations.
- 6.2.3. Taking up of "bread and butter" local and regional issues: The ANC alliance needs to be active in all the struggles affecting our people. We need to integrate an election campaign with campaigns against state restructuring, food prices, local government e.t.c..
- 6.2.4. Development of our organisational capacity through intensive training of cadres. We need to equip our activists not only to manage the election campaign and contribute to strategising.
- 6.2.5. Widespread discussion and a democratic process to decide on an election platform. The ANC policy conference at the end of May is an important part of this process.
- 6.2.6. A democratic process to decide who should be on national and regional lists.
- 6.2.7. Appropriate and effective electoral structures embracing the Alliance and other allies need to be set up urgently.

## 7. Resources

To ensure that such a programme succeeds, adequate resources need to be deployed. This includes personnel and financial resources to regions for report back and mandating processes, media, adequate training of cadres and embarking on socio-economic campaigns.

## 8. The next steps at national and regional level

Below are practical tasks that arise out of the programme of action.

### 8.1. National level

- 8.1.1. The Alliance Campaigns structure must be strengthened i.e. it need to consist of five representatives from each component of the Alliance. It should meet as soon as possible.
- 8.1.2. The Electoral Commission must urgently apply itself to the principles endorsed in this meeting. A meeting should be convened as soon as possible including all components of the Alliance.

- 8.1.3. The Alliance Summit, composed of national and regional leadership should meet regularly to assess and strategise the way forward.

- 8.1.4. It is suggested that the Negotiations Commission should prepare a briefing explaining and assessing CODESA 2 for use at regional and local levels. The national leadership must be involved in these briefings.

- 8.1.5. A mass alliance publication should be produced reporting back on CODESA 2 and the way ahead.

- 8.1.6. Preparations for the Consultative Conference's need to begin as soon as possible.

### 8.2. Regional level

- 8.2.1. Regions need to discuss this document in their structures and in particular begin to implement the following:

- \* Report backs from CODESA
- \* Voter education seminars
- \* Preparing for June 16th and June 26th.
- \* Consider appropriate protest action in relation to the outstanding issues of CODESA 2 and the fact that the government has not yet accepted majority rule.

- 8.2.2. Regions need to establish appropriate structures to carry out this programme of action including:

- \* Strengthening alliance campaign structures at regional and local level.
- \* Setting up broad based electoral commissions.

## Addendum A: Methods of mobilisation

Below are a number of suggestions to improve our mobilisation for the programme of action identified above:

### 1. Reportbacks

Mobilisation can only be effective over a sustained period if there are adequate reportbacks spelling out clear goals, the gains we have made towards these goals as well as the obstacles to achieve them. It is important that people can see the effects of their action in achieving these goals.

### 2. Gatherings

Forms of mobilisation to be considered should include mini-rallies in popular open spaces and the naming such open spaces, "freedom squares".

Such mini-rallies could be seen as a build up to a major event or rally.

### 3. Door-to-door

It is never too early to start on door-to-door activity to win support for the platform of the ANC.

### 4. Media

There is need for more of our own mass media produced by the Alliance as well as on developing mechanisms to use the commercial media to keep our members abreast of activities.

In this regard, the idea of a "Alliance Campaigns/Negotiations" bulletin is suggested - a short mass produced document which would be produced regularly to highlight the major issues in the negotiations process and programme of action.

The ANC May Day poster "Vote for workers rights" should be extended to other areas e.g. "Vote for youth rights" on June 16th and vote for women/pensioner/religious rights e.t.c..

### 5. Slogans

Attention needs to be given to formulating dynamic slogans such as "From Interim Government to Constituent Assembly" and "From a Constituent Assembly to a People's Government".

In the short term we need slogans that relate to the leveling of the playing fields e.g. media, political prisoners, integration of MK and an end to repressive laws.

### 6. Building alliances

We can't merely assert our leadership in communities - this needs to be won.

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This involves being concerned about the problems of all sectors of the community and taking them up if possible. It further involves identifying the link between community problems and the end of Nationalist Party rule.

.7.

### Action

We need to think more creatively about the kinds of actions we embark on.

For example on June 26th, activities could take the form of people's assemblies where laws are enacted and/or symbolic voting occurs. This could help focus on the forthcoming elections, issues for an election platform and what we would like to see in a new constitution.

On-going action can help educate our people about and highlight our negotiations demands and thus help to strengthen the negotiations process e.g marches on the SABC for an independent media commission; to prisons/police stations demanding releases; occupation of railway stations and peace trains to demand an end to violence; to government departments to demand sacking of corrupt officials; to social welfare departments demanding pensioner's rights e.t.c..

Local communities who have been affected by death squads or corruption need to consider local campaigns in this regard e.g.:

- \* Relatives of assassinated and missing activists to form committees to demand inquests.
- \* Communities which were victims of Department of Development Aid corruption. need to be recompensated.