

**MATTERS ARISING FROM NWC
DISCUSSION ON CURRENT SITUATION
(FOR NWC ONLY)**

GENERAL CONCLUSION:

1. The principal and immediate danger to the transition is the right-wing. This danger resides in their capacity to mobilise large sectors of whites against change, their paramilitary formations and the support they enjoy within various layers of the army and the police. But an important - if not the most crucial element of this danger - is the deliberate strategy among elements of the NP leadership to savour this development and seek to use it as pressure against the ANC, as well as the lack of resolution on the part of the NP leadership as a whole to deal with the problem decisively. In terms of numbers, the right-wing commands the support of an insignificant percentage of the population. But their capacity to wreak havoc cannot be underestimated.

IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES:

2. Our main task under the current situation is to achieve the scenario(s) most preferable to us in the negotiating forum. This entails sufficient consensus in its strict definition: an agreement among forces which are capable of taking the whole process forward with a minimum of disruption. The right-wing alliance as a whole will most certainly balk at the idea of democratic non-racial elections for a constitution-making body. But this does not necessarily mean that they will act as a united force. It depends on their perception of their own isolation, tactical approaches by the ANC to neutralise some of them, and primarily, De Klerk's determination to ensure that those dependent on the state are not allowed to wreck the process.
3. The programme we adopt should seek to maximise all the factors in our favour. In the immediate period, the following urgent steps are needed:
 - 3.1. Consolidate support for a speedy transition among the core forces of democratic change as well as big business, religious leaders and groups, international governments and the anti-apartheid movement.
 - 3.2. Prepare for decisive action across the board in case there is a three-cornered deadlock.
 - 3.3. Engage black elements of the right-wing, especially the IFP, more systematically around the issues that concern them most, such as regionalism and their leaders' fear of what would happen to them when change comes.
 - 3.4. Start to deliberately engage the social base of the white right such as farmers, workers and the civil service - taking into account their objective fears,

ignorance about the ANC's policies, etc. In this regard, it is quite clear that we have failed to utilise the Strategic Perspective document to pro-actively move into this constituency.

- 3.5. More systematically promote the ANC as a force with the capacity to govern and ensure a secure and peaceful SA, which is in the immediate and long-term interest of all the people. This should be contrasted with the disaster that would befall everyone, including supporters of the right-wing, if there is no democratic settlement.
- 3.6. In the medium-term, the issue of strategies to adopt if the right-wing (backed by elements within the state) intensifies violent actions against the democratic movement, can no longer be postponed.
4. In negotiations, we should try as much as possible to limit the space within which the right-wing elements can manoeuvre. At the core of the debate is the question of elections as the testing of the will of the people about all aspects of the constitution, including the form of state. It is on this basis that parties will in any case campaign during elections, and the outcome will determine popular preferences.

CONCRETE TASKS:

5. Consolidate relations with representatives of big business, senior religious leaders and other middle ground forces, and ensure that they come out strongly in favour of a speedy settlement. (DEP, OD, SGO and President's Office)
6. Consolidate relations with MDM, and start off with urgent consultation with leadership. (SGO and OD)
7. Arrange for a meeting with the IFP and urgently prepare for a summit between NM and GB. (NWC Subcommittee on Natal and President's Office)
8. Engage all other social forces in the right-wing: AVU, CP, the generals, farmers, civil servants, white workers. Also consolidate contacts with NGK. (Negotiations Commission, SGO, President's Office)
9. Speed up organisation of MK and ensure its systematic role in SDU's. Ensure protection of the leadership. (MHQ and NAT)
10. Urgently meet NP leadership, particularly NM and FW, to clarify their positions and convince them of the best way forward. (Negotiations Commission and President's Office)
11. Set up strategising group to further elaborate options in case of a deadlock, and more permanently to feed into NWC discussions on the political situation. (NWC)