

WORK GROUP 2

SECOND ASSIGNMENT

BODY AND PROCEDURES FOR DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION

The ANC proposes that :

1. The Constitution be drafted and adopted by a body to be elected according to the principles of universal franchise.
2. This body (which in this document will be called the Constituent Assembly) shall be as inclusive as possible.
3. All persons over the age of eighteen living within the 1910 borders and regarded in international law as South Africans, shall be entitled to vote.
4. The system of proportional representation shall be used.
5. The Constituent Assembly shall consist of four hundred delegates and have a steering committee which will lay down its procedures.
6. The Constituent Assembly shall elect from its own ranks a representative drafting commission consisting of 40 persons to assist its work.
7. Decisions at the Constituent Assembly shall be by a two thirds majority.
8. The Constituent Assembly shall be obliged to enshrine the principles agreed on by CODESA in the new constitution and shall not contradict such principles.
9. The Constituent Assembly shall appoint an independent constitutional council consisting of ~~five~~ respected and competent persons to hear any disputes concerning the application of Clause 8 submitted to it by members of the Constituent Assembly. (N/A)
10. Functioning within the above framework, the Constituent Assembly shall be legally entrusted with sovereign powers to draft and put into operation a new and binding constitution for South Africa.



TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC AND ALL-INCLUSIVE CONSTITUTION-MAKING BODY.

I. THE NAME OF THE CMB

We prefer the term Constituent Assembly. This is the one most widely used internationally. It indicates that what we are doing is constituting a new South Africa out of the old, and that we function not as self-appointed individuals but as representatives sitting in solemn assembly with a proper mandate and appropriate procedures.

The name in itself is not crucial. We could call it the Congress after the body which drafted the first great modern Constitution, that of the USA. ~~We could refer to it as the South African National Convention [SANCO] or simply the National Convention [NATCO] in keeping with the name of the body which drafted the constitution for the Union of South Africa.~~ What matters is how it is chosen and how it functions, not who first came up with its name.

11. THE BODY MUST BE CREATED AND MUST FUNCTION IN A DEMOCRATIC WAY

Since the objective is to install democracy in South Africa, the body must itself exemplify democracy. At the heart of democracy lies the question of choice and elections. Without elections there can be no democracy.

CODESA has a vital but limited function, namely, to create the conditions for the adoption of a new constitution, not to draft a new constitution itself. The fact that it is self-appointed is appropriate to its function, which is essentially that of negotiating the process of transition from apartheid to democracy. The broad support that it is receiving despite its non-democratic character derives from acceptance of its limited role. When it has established the foundation for the process of drafting a new constitution, its historic task will be completed. Should it attempt to perpetuate itself and usurp the role of the body it was set up to create, CODESA will lose its prestige.

No one who genuinely loves democracy should fear elections. Once the racial and the colonial myths are destroyed, there can be no justification for denying the principles and practice of democracy. Are we to say that elections are only



good for whites in South Africa and blacks in other countries?

Elections after the Anglo-Boer War helped to heal the wounds of conquest and to enable former combatents to live together in the same country. Elections after the 1914 rebellion, after the 1922 strike and after the sabotage of the Second World War brought peace where before there had been strife.

It was the holding of elections more than anything else that brought peace and stability to Namibia and opened the way for the creation of institutions internally and internationally accepted.

Are we to back democracy in Zambia and deny it in our own land?

The dream of the oppressed majority in this country ever since 1910 has been for full participation as ordinary South Africans in elections and the choice of government. The National Convention that preceded the 1910 Constitution was based on whites-only elections for a whites-only convention. That ugly beginning to our constitutional life can only be expunged by non-racial elections for a non-racial convention.

Elections thus have an historically healing role to play in our country. They are the equivalent of independence for the oppressed, a signal that true citizenship has at last arrived.

They will be the proof that we really are in a new South Africa. They will signal a compelling acknowledgement of our common South African-ness. They will open the way to the development of a genuine and generous national vision, and encourage a sense of shared responsibility for the country's future.

When we say that it is elections that give the constitution-making proceedings legitimacy, we accordingly refer not just to formal international and internal legitimacy, but to subjective and moral legitimacy in the hearts and souls of our people.

It might be difficult for those who take elections for themselves for granted to understand what it will mean to those who have been permanently excluded from the electoral process to at last have a chance to stand up and drop their ballot slip in the ballot box.



It is elections that ensure that the issues are put before the people as a whole and that the people feel involved through their freely chosen representatives in the ultimate outcome. What the voters will be deciding on is who they wish to represent them at the body which drafts the constitution. By voting they identify actively with the whole process and hence take responsibility for its outcome.

There will be a direct nexus through the elected representatives between each voter and the final product.

Furthermore, elections will take away the sense of distance and incomprehension which unfortunately at present separates the general South African public from CODESA. It might be that the character of CODESA as a negotiating forum encourages a certain degree of quiet diplomacy in order to move the process forward. In that sense CODESA is essentially procedural and confidence-building in character, while the CMB deals with the substance of the Constitution.

The people of our country will be entitled to know at each step exactly what is being done at the CMB in their name. Compromises openly struck, honestly agreed to for purposes of mutual advantage and frankly explained, have a much greater chance of being accepted than those negotiated in terms of secret agreements behind closed doors. The electoral process encourages openness and accountability. It places the issues before the people, who take an interest in them because they know that their opinions can make a difference.

#### RATIFICATION BY REFERENDUM

An 'after-the-event' ratification can never be considered as a serious alternative to involving the public in elections for the CMB. Far from legitimising the process, it will ensure that the Constitution is born in an atmosphere of cynicism and indifference.

A referendum is a useful means of testing public opinion in relation to issues where a simple yes or no would be appropriate. It is a grotesque device for ensuring that a ~~lengthy~~ <sup>long</sup> and complicated document corresponds to what the populace thinks is correct.

The public is placed in the invidious position of giving a simple yes or no to a lengthy document, much of which will inevitably be in technical language, without the option of influencing its individual parts.



to continue with the present racist constitution

There is the added problem of persons being compelled to vote in favour of a constitution with which they might not agree simply because ~~they fear that being without a constitution at all would be a greater evil.~~

~~What kind of majority, one wonders, would be appropriate for a referendum of this kind? If a two thirds majority were held to be sufficient, would the third who voted 'no' be able to say that they were not bound by the constitution because they had neither authorised the procedure for its adoption in advance nor ratified its content subsequently?~~

All the practical problems and inconveniences said to relate to elections for a Constituent Assembly would apply to the holding of a referendum.

There are many things that normalisation of public life in South Africa will bring. One of them is that the Head of State will more likely than not be black. Another is that we will accept and abide by the results of elections. Let the normalisation be sooner rather than later.

Some problems go away if you postpone them. In our view, however, democracy is not a problem, but the solution.

#### THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CMB BEING ELECTED

The case for elections in the modern world is so strong that only someone very brave and very cut off from contemporary thinking would argue against it. As we understand it, none of the participants in Working Group 2 are actually against elections in principle.

Certain participants have, however, raised queries about the feasibility of elections in current conditions or about the desirability of granting what they call a 'blank cheque' to an elected assembly. It would be ungracious to suggest that they are opposed to elections because they fear that they themselves will not fare well if they lose their base in apartheid structures and are left to the mercies of the electorate. We accordingly treat the arguments on their merits.

#### Violence

The first point made is that there is too much violence in the country for free elections to be held, and that elections would only encourage further violence [one assumes



that this is meant to express a fear and not to convey a threat].

The danger of this argument is that if the existence of violence is a reason for not holding elections, then those who are fearful of losing an election will have a stake in maintaining the level of violence.

We are in fact convinced that far from contributing to violence, the holding of elections will provide an orderly and publicly supervised manner in which the contest for political leadership can be conducted. It will serve not as a source of violence but as an alternative to it.

The turning point in Namibia from a state of severe internal conflict to a state of peace was the holding of elections for the Constituent Assembly. The way in which the CA there conducted its business, based on extensive give-and-take, promoted national unity and has until now virtually eliminated political violence. We have no doubt that the same process would have the same beneficial results in South Africa.

We need to have confidence in democracy. Our objective should not be to undermine the basic principles of democracy but to ensure that they are accepted by the whole population and that they operate in a manner that is manifestly fair and non-oppressive to everybody. What we should be concerned about is not the fact of holding elections, but how to ensure that voters are free in the exercise their choice and that they are well-informed when doing so.

Elections <sup>are stronger</sup> are held precisely because different ideas compete. The fiercer the competition, the greater the need for elections. Thus, what we should be talking about is not whether or not to have elections - the need to do so is self-evident - but how to ensure that they are properly conducted.

'Simple majoritarianism'

The second argument against having the constitution drafted by an elected assembly is that this would amount to giving a blank cheque to an electoral majority without respecting the rights and interests of minorities. The term 'majoritarianism' is used in this connection as though somehow it is inherently evil. Add the adjective 'simple' and it becomes even worse.



This approach comes badly from people who hold office on the basis either of no elections at all or of elections based on principles of simple majoritarianism.

If the present government were to resign because it had been chosen by means of simple majoritarianism [times three], then its moral position as an opponent of majority rule would indeed be powerful. The same would apply if it were to impugn the validity of the recent referendum on the basis of its simple majoritarian nature, or to deny the validity of all legislation passed since Union in 1910; with one exception, such laws were always based on the approval of a simple majority of Members of Parliament who in turn had been elected on the basis of a simple majority [or less] of voters.

The Presidents of France and the USA as well as the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and India have all been elected on the basis of 'simple majoritarianism'.

One cannot escape the conclusion that the arguments against majority rule are being advanced not so much because of the principle involved but because of dissatisfaction with whom the majority will be. Put simply, 'simple majoritarianism' was good enough for the whites for 82 years, but will not be good enough for the blacks today, unless, that is, they promise to vote for the party presently in office, in which case the virtues of majority rule might re-assert themselves.

The irony of the situation is that while we in the ANC firmly believe that the principle of free elections and majority rule lies at the heart of democracy, we do not support what has been called simple majoritarianism for South Africa. We, who have never benefitted from the Westminster system of government in the past, in fact have a much stronger claim to opt for a different system than those who for decades have been advantaged by it.

There are at least three major respects in terms of which our proposals differ from what is called simple majoritarianism.

More than 15 months ago, ~~the Constitutional Committee of the ANC organised a conference which opted for the system of proportional representation.~~ *the ANC declared its support* We did so for two basic reasons (in addition to the usual arguments in favour of PR). One, it enabled the diverse range of currents in South African society to be accommodated without reference to



group rights and, two, it avoided the problems of delimiting constituencies in a country divided by group areas.

The system of PR lends itself to alliances and joint election lists. In this way relatively small parties or parties with support limited to a particular region are able to secure representation by linking up with other parties in a similar situation. Furthermore, there are very few countries that use PR, that have governments based on one party only. PR thus tends to encourage coalition governments. Applied to the election of the CA, this would suggest a majority that was complex rather than one that was simple.

Secondly, we propose a qualified rather than a simple majority in relation to decision-making at the CMB. Our proposal is that bearing in mind the special nature of the Constitution, the majority be two-thirds. This is the figure that was used in Namibia, where the procedure turned out to be so satisfactory that the final constitution was adopted unanimously.

It is a realistic figure for South Africa. *the commentators suggest that* No single party is likely to achieve two thirds of the representatives in a Constituent Assembly. The figure means that in the case of a dispute, the party with the most seats would be compelled to seek support from groups it had opposed in the elections. At the same time, the figure would not be so high as to place the CA under ransom to small groups lacking significant popular support. The higher the required majority, the more bargaining power is given to groups with a tiny base. A near veto power for very small groups would encourage fanaticism on the one hand, and pork-barrelling or even worse, outright corruption and buying of votes on the other.

*at the CA*  
The pressure should be on to get consensus based on principled points of common ground and a reasonable measure of give-and-take, and not to obtain support by means of threats, bribes or promises.

Thirdly, there will be certain general principles which will be binding on the Constituent Assembly and which will have to be enshrined in the final Constitution, whatever a majority of any size might say. These are the general principles that Working Group 2 is currently debating.

Whatever formulation CODESA finally agrees upon, it is clear that these principles will be such as to establish the basic democratic character of the Constitution, its supremacy as



the fundamental law of the country, and the inclusion within it of a Bill of Rights guaranteeing universally recognised rights and freedoms.

Our proposal in this respect is that a special panel of respected and competent persons be chosen to ensure that in the case of any dispute in this connection, the Constituent Assembly does not deviate from the agreed principles. This point will be developed more fully below.

#### 111. THE BODY MUST BE ALL-INCLUSIVE

We feel that a constitution is a very special document that is intended to bind the whole nation and be accepted by all South Africans. Accordingly every attempt should be made to achieve consensus in its elaboration.

*a high degree of*  
In our view, the CA should be as inclusive as possible. Since it will be the constitution for the whole of South Africa, it is important that all South Africans feel that they are represented there, independently of which part of the country they live in and without regard to their race, language, religion, origin or political affiliation. In order to achieve this all-embracing character, we propose the following.

1. That the delegates to the CA be chosen by proportional representation. This issue has already been dealt with.
2. That the threshold or minimum percentage required in terms of PR be relatively low.
3. That the whole territory within the 1910 borders of South Africa be covered by the elections.
4. That the CA be ~~be~~ large rather than small.

#### 2. RELATIVELY LOW THRESHOLD

On the one hand, it is important that the electoral system encourages parties to have a national rather than a purely local vision; we should discourage an electoral system which promotes extreme parochialism and narrow self-interest. On the other hand, it is important that the views and concerns of all South Africans in all the regions of the country, and reflecting both majority and minority opinions, be represented.



~~We feel that there has to be some cut-off point to avoid an undue proliferation of tiny parties. It will be important not to promote the appearance of small groups whose aim it would be to auction off their support to the highest bidder. The experience in Israel, where very small parties have been able to extort disproportionate advantages, is instructive.~~

Estimates of the number of potential voters range from 18 to 23 million. We may assume that there will be a high turnout for the first democratic elections in South Africa, particularly if the objective of the vote was to constitute a body of such historic significance as the CA. For purposes of rough calculation we will suggest that the electorate will be 22 million and that 20 million people will vote.

This would mean that a 2% threshold would be 400 000 while a 3% cut-off point would require 600 000 votes. Five per cent would need a million votes.

There are a number of well-established political organisations in South Africa which might not be able to reach that figure. Keeping them out might reduce the all-inclusive character that the CA should have. To some extent, this problem could be mitigated by the creation of electoral pacts or alliances whereby joint lists are created. We feel however that 5% would be too high and propose a figure of approximately 2 or 3%.

5%

*new parties might well be born*

*though*

### 3. THE ELECTIONS COVER ALL THE TERRITORY BETWEEN THE 1910 BORDERS

It is inconceivable that grand apartheid should rule in relation to the new constitution. The very purpose of CODESA is to bury grand apartheid and establish the way in which non-racial democracy is to be installed in South Africa. We cannot build the mansion of democracy on the pillars of apartheid.

No serious person can doubt that the territorial integrity of South Africa will soon be restored. The only possible dispute can be over the process whereby reincorporation of the TBVC states is to be achieved.

The new constitution will be for all of South Africa. Whatever one's views about the status of the TBVC states, there can be no contesting the fact that the persons living in these areas will be directly affected by the constitution. This will in reality be their future constitution, irrespective of how reincorporation is



achieved. They have a right and a responsibility to participate in its elaboration.

As far as we in the ANC are concerned, they are and always have been South African citizens. It was the system of grand apartheid that sought to deprive them of their rights as South Africans.

Problems related to the modalities and timing of the reincorporation of the TBVC states in reality should not in any way impede the participation of persons living in those states in elections for a Constituent Assembly. Once the principle is agreed that all the persons living within the 1910 boundaries are entitled to South African nationality and citizenship, all of them would have the right to vote in elections for a Constituent Assembly. *The modalities and timing of reincorporation can be dealt with separately.*  
To exclude the millions of people living in those four zones from participation in the process of constitution-making would be an injustice to them and a disservice to the rest of South Africa.

The appropriate legal mechanisms to achieve a franchise that can truly be called universal, can be worked out at CODESA by Working Groups 4 and 5. Our Group should insist that no-one be deprived of the right to participate in the electoral process.

#### 4. THE CA SHOULD BE LARGE RATHER THAN SMALL

On the basis that there should be one representative for every 50 000 voters, an Assembly of 400 persons would be required for a voting population of 20 million. If the potential number of voters is 22 million, then there would have to be 440 seats. This figure is larger than we are used to for the white House of Assembly or even for the Tricameral as a whole, but then the Tricameral represents only a quarter of the total population. The House of Commons in the United Kingdom has about 650 members for a population roughly one and a half times that of South Africa.

Whereas an assembly of 400 or over might be unduly large for a future legislature, it is our view that the CA should err of the side of largeness rather than on the side of smallness. This would facilitate the creation of large rather than small party lists composed not just of top party leaders but of a wide range of personalities representing an extensive spectrum of interest groups. *It would facilitate regional participation.*



In other words, a relatively large body would more easily accommodate the diversity of the South African nation than would a small one.

We are of the view that it would be of great advantage for individuals and communities to feel that they are directly represented at the CA through persons they know and who will be able to report back and explain the proceedings to them.

It would not, of course, be necessary for the CA to work all the time in plenary. Our proposals for a drafting commission are set out below. This commission would be relatively small in size and would be responsible for the day-to-day business of establishing draft terms for the new constitution.

#### THE DRAFTING COMMISSION

The drafting of the Namibian Constitution was considerably facilitated by the establishment by the CA of a drafting commission from its own ranks, supported by three independent legal advisors from outside. We propose that the CA for South Africa elect a drafting commission of approximately 40 persons from its own ranks. These need not be lawyers or political scientists, but should be persons with competence in drafting and in handling constitutional concepts. The commission should be chosen on the basis of proportional representation, subject to the right of every party represented in the CA having at least one member.

Provision could be made for legal advisors to participate in support of the respective parties as they have done at CODESA.

#### FUNCTIONING OF THE CMB

The CMB, which should function in Parliament in Cape Town, should be given ~~three~~ <sup>four</sup> months to complete its work. Should it fail to do so, it should be compelled to dissolve itself so that new elections could be held. The threat of imminent elections would ~~then~~ concentrate the minds of the delegates.

The CMB should at its first session elect a steering committee on the basis of proportional representation. This committee would be responsible for questions of management. It would make rules of procedure and decide on who from the ranks of the CA would chair sessions. It would attempt to achieve consensus wherever possible, but if an issue were to go to a vote, a simple majority should suffice.



The Drafting Committee, on the other hand, should take its decisions by a two thirds majority. It may submit majority and minority reports to plenary sessions.

If a dispute arises in this Committee as to whether an agreed general principle has been ignored or contradicted, the problem should be referred to the steering committee, and if the steering committee in turn is unable to find a solution satisfactory to all, the issue shall be sent to the Constitutional Panel.

## Caps [The Constitutional Panel

The Constitutional Panel should consist of ~~five~~<sup>nine</sup> persons selected on the basis of their integrity and competence by the CA. We propose that they be chosen en bloc, with a vote of at least 80% in favour of the panel as a whole. This would conform with procedures in European countries where the Constitutional Court is ~~chosen~~ nominated by Parliament.

The members of the Panel would not be members of the CA, and would be independent in their functioning. They would entertain petitions by the Steering Committee, or by at least ~~20%~~<sup>15%</sup> of the members of the CA, in relation to whether draft proposals for the Constitution contradicted or failed to enshrine general principles agreed to at CODESA. They would also be called upon to ~~can~~



be such as to impede totally the proper functioning of the CA. Decisions will have to be taken swiftly so as ~~to~~ enable the constitution-drafting process to proceed.

The Panel will in fact function very much along the lines of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which decides on questions of the constitutionality of proposed laws submitted to it from Parliament, and which enjoys considerable prestige. Members of the present judiciary would not, of course, be debarred from ~~not~~ being selected for the Panel, but they would serve as respected and competent persons, not as members of the judiciary.

ENDS HERE!