

STATEMENTTrue copy of TZ's introspection document

One would have preferred to do this self-criticism as part of a collective in which one was working, because as an individual it is difficult to know or even acknowledge to yourself your own faults and shortcomings. Normally you are assisted by the comrades around you to be a better functionary provided of course you are willing to accept their help and criticism. However one will here attempt to make an introspection of one's self in terms of the problems that were experienced in our machinery in the light of the discussions that have been taking place and some of the serious shortcomings that one has come to realize and reflect on.

1. As a commander and the overall head of the machinery one should have been more sensitive to criticisms about machinery, its style of work and casualty rate no matter from what source it came, whatever one's opinion about that source and how that opinion was experienced. There was need to pause and reflect on some of these opinions expressed in the main by our counterparts in the political machinery through various ways and not only be defensive and say that after all they are not doing anything in terms of irrigating personnel and therefore can afford to be critical as they can not make mistakes. We as a machinery tended to concentrate more on the irrigation of personnel without giving equal or even more attention to the question of the survival of these comrades when inside the country and our capacity to adequately service them in all respects. I think to a certain extent this was influenced by the view that these are guerrillas, trained, they are amongst our own people and they should show initiative and an ability to survive. However it was also our duty as a command to ensure and facilitate this survival because in the final analysis what counts is not the number of personnel irrigated, but how many continue to survive and carry out movement tasks. The refusal of comrades in the political machinery to join and work with us in the PMC structure should not have been looked at from one side only, but one should have tried to go more deeply into the reasons for it objectively. This is being said because the differences between the political and military machineries were not only in the Natal machineries but also the Transvaal. What however was not a common factor was a refusal by the comrades in the Natal political committee to work with the military comrades. As far as I know despite some problems, the political committee of the Transvaal merged with the military command of that region and up till recently were working together as a PMC structure. In our case I now think that the question of Ralph was an added complicating factor. I still think that in the final analysis the

movement would have benefitted more ~~if~~ these comrades had come into the PMC structure rather than rejecting working with us because even in terms of numbers they outnumbered us and their views would have dominated. From the initial military command there was virtually only Ralph and myself left whilst from the PC there was Ivan and his wife, Fricks, the late Maphumulo, Paul Kgoitsimang and Paul Chetly. Perhaps even the question of Ralph would have precipitated or been clearer much earlier. However now one feels that perhaps one should have reflected more objectively on this rejection regarding the lack of faith that the comrades had in Ralph because it turns out it was justified and they were correct about Ralph.

In terms of the future some form of middle ground needs to be found in approaching the question of the irrigating of personnel between what was the differing views of the political and military structures, because there is something useful in both these views. In all the years of its existence I don't think that the PC irrigated more than 10 trained people and amongst this 10 it was mainly from amongst themselves for certain short periods of time. Even the units that they said that they had, which were internally based, we discovered that virtually none of them had clear underground political tasks when the PMC structures were formed. None of those units were utilised by the new structures except a few that were contributed by the late Maphumulo. On the other hand our military structure has suffered a lot of casualties and a lot of these casualties could have been avoided with a more cautious approach, a constant improvement in the style of work and better planning.

2. There was also a tendency on my part as a commander, of the machinery as a whole, not to plan adequately, not to do a proper post-mortem of events or self-criticism of machinery over past failures, and not even to pause and reflect during the course of the unfolding of plans to determine whether we were still on course or were achieving what we originally set out to do and achieve. I think on my part as a commander additionally there was some bullheadedness in terms of the fact that once a decision had been reached there was a tendency to push ahead whatever the odds despite a need for a view of the situation and perhaps adjustments being made. Here as an example one has in mind the decision to clear our personnel that was stuck here in Lusaka. After my arrest in 1987 and deportation to Lusaka I had the opportunity of going to the underground residences and meeting the comrades belonging or earmarked for our machinery. I think the number was close to 60, of comrades who had been deported from Swaziland during the Nkomati events, comrades who had been interviewed in the West by various members of the machinery and earmarked. All these comrades had been in Lusaka for periods varying from one to three years and when they were relating their

stories of waiting, their difficulties and problems in Lusaka etc. one could not help but be moved. So we resolved to clear these comrades which MHQ was eager to have us do and priority was to be given to them over those comrades still in the West except in very special situations. I think this was a mammoth task that we were setting ourselves and I think we only gave enough attention to the situation in Maputo where there had been blockages in terms of the movement of personnel and material before. We foresaw this area as the major potential stumbling block to these plans without adequately examining our capacity in Swaziland itself. Thus the decision that I should partly base in Maputo. Meanwhile in Swaziland certain problems had developed and even the capacity for irrigation and servicing of units was being undermined the loss of almost all communication documents by Bulelani and the lack of a proper post-mortem of this and the disappearance and suspected defection of Deon and Neville. One should have reflected more deeply on these events and what they meant in terms of our plans. I should have paid more attention on Charles' report where some of these things were reflected and not just want to press ahead because as said already it is the safety and survival of the work and the personnel that counts in the end. Despite some of the objective difficulties that existed in Swaziland, as a commander, one should have created more opportunities for the machinery as a whole to meet (including its elements) even if it was once a year in Maputo to do a proper review and post-mortem of the year, to try and involve not only the command but all the elements in the actual planning for the future as people on the ground on a day to day basis. These would also have created opportunities for self-criticism of the machinery so that comrades have more self-confidence in their work and also where we begin to notice those who do not improve and persist in the same problems and mistakes.

3. Through these discussions that one has been having and the problems that we experienced as a machinery, one has once again been very sharply reminded from practical experience about certain basic principles which should not just be slogans or things that you talk about in MCW and immediately forget on the operational field:
 - a) Never underestimate the enemy especially where people's lives are concerned;
 - b) Clear understanding that the enemy takes us very seriously and works around the clock to undermine our work;
 - c) Never take anything for granted and where you are not sure assume the worst;
 - d) Stick to underground rules of work at all times no matter how tedious it seems at times or whether they seem to slow down the work as they are scientific and based on practical experience and in the end it is the safety of the work that counts.

In restating some of these basic principles one has in mind some of the serious shortcomings that manifested themselves in the course of our work like the open usage of telephones sometimes to convey sensitive information and the lack of the usage of proper coding systems, especially between Maputo and Swaziland and also not ensuring that there were adequate codes and that these were being used between Swaziland and inside the country. As a result of the difficulty in obtaining new or sufficient phoning contacts in Swaziland there was a tendency to over use these contacts and sometimes even continuing to use those that might have been exposed to the enemy through the arrest of comrades inside the country. The position of these contacts was not being regularly reviewed in the light of developments inside the country. Measures were taken sometimes but this was not done on a systematic and regular basis. Also on a number of occasions when documents were captured there was a failure on our part to do a thorough review of information captured on the basis of the above principles and thus ensuring that correct, remedial decisions are taken and enforced. In fact in retrospect, communication was one of the weakest aspects of the work of the machinery and I think at some stage there was a realization of this fact and thus the attempts that were made to try and overcome some of the objective difficulties and problems, but at the same time this does not excuse some of the subjective weaknesses that we showed as mentioned above, measures that we could have taken on the spot to correct some of the failures experienced. As the commander I should have given more attention to this element of the work especially regarding its importance despite the fact that the personnel manning it were constantly changing as a result of objective difficulties, like arrests, being assigned to other tasks, etc.

Perhaps also in retrospect the tendency to overlook the five principles mentioned above was also because of the fact that the results of undermining them were not felt immediately or as a result of a particular violation you are immediately able to connect the effects with that particular action. Also even in the long term with the absence of thorough going post-mortems this would not come up. This becomes clear now with the discussions that have taken place and once again emphasizes the importance of the adherence to the five stated principles.

4. Now that one is looking back on the situation, one also feels that perhaps one should have been more forceful and open in discussing some of the problems that we were generally experiencing as a machinery with the headquarters. These problems were being raised in reports and even when one happened to be in Lusaka and had meetings with MHQ and the PMC. More forceful in terms of demanding that assistance is given in attending to these problems to the point of threatening not to continue as head of the machinery

if this assistance was not forthcoming. More open in the sense of clearly indicating to HQ the effects of the lack of solution of some of these problems were having in terms undermining our own morale, and having an effect of feeling that you are not developing in that situation a feeling developing that the problem that we were trying to resolve last year is the same that you will be resolving this year and the same that you will be attempting to resolve the following year. A feeling was developing in me for example and perhaps not clearly indicated to HQ that we were marking time and every new year it seemed as if we were starting from scratch and that lvery little progress was being achieved in terms of work inside the country and our operational capacity in a place like Swaziland itself with all its problems and difficulties.

To give an example of the problems to which one is referring I will just briefly refer to some of the objective difficulties which were having an effect on the performance of our tasks. When "Elephant" was set up by MHQ it had six members in the command structure or regional HQ. It was the commander, commissar, chief of staff, chief of operations, chief of logistics, chief of military intelligence, and this was scientific based on our military knowledge. Of course this regional HQ had then to set up all its elements to ensure adequate and full carrying out of all tasks from MHQ using the personnel available and if not enough appeal MHQ for assistance in terms of requesting what was needed. As a commander and the overall head, you are supposed to exercise your full control and direction through these five other elements. At all times these elements are supposed to be there on the situation and it is through them that the commander ensures that tasks from HQ are properly carried out. But from the time of Nkomati our regional HQ was always limping, functioning with one, two or three members at most of the regional HQ. Up to now one is not clear as to how Chiliza stopped being commissar of the machinery and this problem was being raised with MHQ. In all the time he was commissar not once did he set his foot in Swaziland. After Zweli was killed by the enemy he was never replaced as chief of staff and that is why eventually Ralph became my deputy. Both Magagula and Peter Patel were never replaced when for various reasons it was decided to redeploy them elsewhere. These are problems I could not resolve alone as a commander but which needed the intervention of MHQ which was lacking. So generally one was not functioning as a commander only but at different times had also to try and play the role of these elements that were lacking and thus the lack of adequately reflecting on the work of the machinery from an overall point of view. Whilst I had to fill up on some aspects of the work Ralph had to fill up on the others. It is a situation where you as the commander had to organize everything for yourself including where on what and with what you were going to sleep today, tomorrow, etc. whilst also having to ensure that the work of the machinery was continuing. It was a

a situation completely different from the West i.e. the camps. It was a situation that became worse with the added responsibilities of the PMC structures and the rejection of the PC to merge with us. I think it was in one PMC meeting where as the overall head of the Natal RPMC I was supposed to give an overall report that comrades in the leadership began to realize the seriousness of the situation and it was the late Comrade Cassius who actually exclaimed that was the situation was really bad and he had not realized it. I was not able to give a clear report about the political military situation in Natal basically because as the overall head I did not have any staff or headquarters elements to help me in getting to grips with the situation and carrying out the assigned tasks. No effort was made by the PMC to assist us to resolve the problem of the rejection by the PC and all our other subsequent efforts to strengthen the Natal PMC structure were also ignored. It was MHQ that at least made some effort to assist us by getting us comrades like Charles, Bandi, Mabel, Bulelani. I think that despite problems being raised in reports and verbally by members of our RPMC with the PMC there was very little response from the PMC. This is the reason why one feels today that it is not possible to have a headquarters or a PMC to function in these Frontline Areas. I think it is just deceiving ourselves to think that we have or we can have these structures functioning in their proper sense in these areas. We don't have the capacity as a movement to create the conditions of the proper functioning of a headquarters in these Frontline Areas in the light of their actions against us and the enemy activity. What we can have are just servicing units carrying out specific tasks under the direction of HQ in Lusaka.

The other problems in as far as internal work was concerned were things like the fact that up to now there has never been a single approach or guideline worked out and given as a PMC approach to what was attempted at Ngwavuma, after all the discussions, disagreements etc. finally the PMC failed to say that we as a PMC this is the approach in future to such attempts. This was raised and requested from the PMC. Up to now I don't think that the PMC has worked out a guideline on the question of the building of PMC structures internally despite this having been one of the central tasks or issues discussed in relation to internal work at Kabwe. This is also despite the individual initiatives attempts, failures and successes of various machineries. These experiences have not been put together and PMC give a line as to the fact that this is the guideline on the building of PMC's inside the country. This question has been raised on numerous occasions by our own RPMC in Bay with the PMC.

This was just to give an idea of some of the problems that we were experiencing which were being raised in reports, in meetings without receiving responses from the PMC which

one now says perhaps we should have been more forceful and open in raising them with HQ. At the same time when raising these problems one perhaps was not as forceful as one feels that one should have been because I was mindful of the fact that comrades should not interpret this as an attempt to opt out of the situation and the problems were just being used as an excuse. This was at the time when the situation in Bay itself was extremely difficult and tense and some of the comrades there even felt that they could not survive and left. This is because it is always us who have called for the movement to move forward in terms of internal work with even senior comrades going inside the country for periods of work.

5. On reflection now on questions like those of Ralph and Uncle one feels that in future one should be more cautious and circumspect in expressing opinions and views especially in the light of the experience about Ralph. One should express one's views about what you think you know about a comrade because otherwise not do so would be cowardice of some form. One should honestly and openly express what has been his experience of a particular cadre, but without going beyond into unknown ground and expressing categorical views on this ground when in actual fact you don't have enough information in your hands to qualify you to express that view or you don't also even have the experience, the expertise, to make that kind of judgement. Our knowledge of each other here in the movement is very limited because, we only know each other here in exile and therefore can never claim to totally know each other. So in such cases it is necessary to be even more cautious in expressing views on what you really don't know about a person and perhaps leave it to the competent people to look into the situation. What you can do as a person perhaps is to begin to try and go out of your way to try and notice whether there is some truth in what is being suspected of that person in his day to day tasks without of course changing what has been your attitude.

This is a difficult and tricky question especially since experience has shown that the movement is not always correct on these questions. One has in mind here examples of comrades like Livingstone Gaza, Ferry Nene, Mainstay Chibuku who were always considered question marks in as far as their security clearance and for most of the time that they spent here outside this was always a factor in their deployment, assignment of tasks, no matter how good their performance was. Eventually they got the opportunity to irrevocably show and prove themselves in very heroic confrontations with the the enemy inside the country where they lost their lives. Despite this factor this factor one feels that in any case caution should be exercised in expressing a view on such matters because if you become defensive and categorical you are really defending what you don't know and this might even create problems not only for the movement but for yourself as well. This is especially in the light of Ralph's case where one had taken a position and stubbornly clinging to

this position because of what one thought were justified reasons when really one started knowing Ralph closely in 1983 when we all became part of "Elephant".

6. One has also reflected on the question of one's own conduct and morality in the situation in Bay. Despite the fact that in a tense situation like in Bay there are moments when one feels the need to really relax, to let your hair down so to say this should not be done at the expense of violating the kind of conduct that is expected from you as a commander and a revolutionary. Whether one likes it or not comrades always look up to their commander, i.e. those who are leading them for guidance example and even inspiration. This is what you partly accept when accepting the responsibility of leadership and therefore your conduct even in what you might even consider your private life must take this into account because to a large extent, you are no more a private person. Questions of excessive drinking and going to discos should have been completely avoided. The question of having a love affair with a married person whilst I myself had recently been married was immoral and must have undermined the respect of comrades for me as a commander. I think this question of personal conduct is a question that one must seriously try to overcome as it has cropped up from time to time although one feels that at times it has been exaggerated and distorted.

7. The last thing that one also reflected on was the question of the difficulties and problems that we were experiencing with my wife around this period. Perhaps these also served in dividing one's attention from the work of the machinery. The problems I am referring to here are the virtual hounding out of Bay by the enemy of my wife. This took place in a series of incidents, the two raids in her house, the breaking into her work offices and ransacking of the place and the kidnap of her secretary. These incidences led to a lot of things most of them bad being said about her in Bay amongst the general population, because Bay is a small country and most of the professionals and people working for government know each other from their school days. At the time the attitude of most Swazis to us the ANC was negative and my wife was seen as one of those who were bringing problems to Bay as a result of their association with us. She also lost many of her friends who felt that it was not safe to associate with her, and people without information thoughtt that she was really to blame for what had happened to her secretary. We realized that she could not continue to live openly in Bay as long as I was there and operating that the enemy would always try to hit at me through her as the enemy was aware that, we had been married. Her family agreed with us that she could not stay on and work in Bay. She gave up her job and around this time was given an impression by Cde Chris that I would be redeployed in VZ. So she moved to VZ with all her furniture and property and only for us to discover later that I was still to go back to Bay. In the light of this we decided that the best place for her to settle and

find work was Maputo which is nearer to Bay. In Maputo also we had some difficulties in that initially we did not have a place to stay,, eventually it was some relatives of hers in Maputo who offered her a flat which was in a terrible state. Our office was uncooperative in assisting us to furnish the place with basic necessities like a fridge and a stove which at that time were available. Siphso the Chief representative was raising questions like is she a member of the movement, that I was based in Bay and that flat did not belong to the movement all which I found ridiculous in the light of how eventually my wife had come to settle in Maputo, basically because of enemy action against her as a result of my work which was not a secret.

Eventually after a struggle of several months and when she was even beginning to think of giving up she found a job with Oxlam and the situation took a turn for the better and this was in April-May 1987. Having to assist my wife during this difficult period, as I felt wholly responsible for her uprooting loss of her job, sudden separation from familiar surroundings to a place like Mozambique where she had to also begin learning the language, and loss of friends, etc. in Bay, also contributed in dividing one's full attention from the work of the machinery, and thus not giving adequate attention to some of the problems that were being experienced by the machinery.

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1. As a commander and the overall head of the machinery one should have been more sensitive to criticisms about machinery, its style of work and casualty rate no matter from what source it came, whatever one's opinion about that source and how that opinion was experienced. There was need to pause and reflect on some of these opinions expressed in the main by our counterparts in the political machinery through various ways and not only be defensive and say that after all they are not doing anything in terms of irrigating personnel and therefore can afford to be critical as they can not make mistakes. We as a machinery tended to concentrate more on the irrigation of personnel without giving equal or even more attention to the question of the survival of these comrades when inside the country and our capacity to adequately service them in all respects. I think to a certain extent this was influenced by the view that these are guerrillas, trained, they are amongst our own people and they should show initiative and an ability to survive. However it was also our duty as a command to ensure and facilitate this survival because in the final analysis what counts is not the number of personnel irrigated, but ~~how~~ how many continue to survive and carry out movement tasks. The refusal of comrades in the political machinery to join and work with us in the PMC structure should not have been looked at from one side only, but one should have tried to go more deeply into the reasons for it objectively. This is being said because the differences between the political and military machineries were not only in the Natal machineries but also the Transvaal. What however was not a common factor was a refusal by the comrades in the Natal political committee to work with the military comrades. As far as I know despite some problems, the political committee of the Transvaal merged with the military command of that region and up till recently were working together as a PMC structure. In our case I now think that the question of Ralph was an added complicating factor. I still think that in the final analysis the

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In terms of the future some form of middle ground needs to be found in approaching the question of the irrigating of personnel between what was the differing views of the political and military structures, because there is something useful in both these views. In all the years of its existence I don't think that the PC irrigated more than 10 trained people and amongst this 10 it was mainly from amongst themselves for certain short periods of time. Even the units that they said that they had, which were internally based, we discovered that virtually none of them had clear underground political tasks when the PMC structures were formed. None of those units were utilised by the new structures except a few that were contributed by the late Maphumulo. On the other hand our military structure has suffered a lot of casualties and a lot of these casualties could have been avoided with a more cautious approach, a constant improvement in the style of work and better planning.

2. There was also a tendency on my part as a commander, of the machinery as a whole, not to plan adequately, not to do a proper post-mortem of events or self-criticism of machinery over past failures, and not even to pause and reflect during the course of the unfolding of plans to determine whether we were still on course or were achieving what we originally set out to do and achieve. I think on my part as a commander additionally there was some bullheadedness in terms of the fact that once a decision had been reached there was a tendency to push ahead whatever the odds despite a need for a view of the situation and perhaps adjustments being made. Here as an example one has in mind the decision to clear our personnel that was stuck here in Lusaka. After my arrest in 1987 and deportation to Lusaka I had the opportunity of going to the underground residences and meeting the comrades belonging or earmarked for our machinery. I think the number was close to 60, of comrades who had been deported from Swaziland during the Nkomati events, comrades who had been interviewed in the West by various members of the machinery and earmarked. All these comrades had been in Lusaka for periods varying from one to three years and when they were relating their

stories of waiting, their difficulties and problems in Lusaka etc. one could not help but be moved. So we resolved to clear these comrades which MHQ was eager to have us do and priority was to be given to them over these comrades still in the West except in very special situations. I think this was a mammoth task that we were setting ourselves and I think we only gave enough attention to the situation in Maputo where there had been blockages in terms of the movement of personnel and material before. We foresaw this area as the major potential stumbling block to these plans without adequately examining our capacity in Swaziland itself. Thus the decision that I should partly base in Maputo. Meanwhile in Swaziland certain problems had developed and even the capacity for irrigation and servicing of units was being undermined the loss of almost all communication documents by Bulelani and the lack of a proper post-mortem of this and the disappearance and suspected defection of Deon and Neville. One should have reflected more deeply on these events and what they meant in terms of our plans. I should have paid more attention on Charles' report where some of these things were reflected and not just want to press ahead because as said already it is the safety and survival of the work and the personnel that counts in the end. Despite some of the objective difficulties that existed in Swaziland, as a commander, one should have created more opportunities for the machinery as a whole to meet (including its elements) even if it was once a year in Maputo to do a proper review and post-mortem of the year, to try and involve not only the command but all the elements in the actual planning for the future as people on the ground on a day to day basis. These would also have created opportunities for self-criticism of the machinery so that comrades have more self-confidence in their work and also where we begin to notice those who do not improve and persist in the same problems and mistakes.

3. Through these discussions that one has been having and the problems that we experienced as a machinery, one has once again been very sharply reminded from practical experience about certain basic principles which should not just be slogans or things that you talk about in MCW and immediately forget on the operational field:
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In restating some of these basic principles one has in mind some of the serious shortcomings that manifested themselves in the course of our work like the open usage of telephones sometimes to convey sensitive information and the lack of the usage of proper coding systems, especially between Maputo and Swaziland and also not ensuring that there were adequate codes and that these were being used between Swaziland and inside the country. As a result of the difficulty in obtaining new or sufficient phon. contacts in Swaziland there was a tendency to over use these contacts and sometimes even continuing to use those that might have been exposed to the enemy through the arrest of comrades inside the country. The position of these contacts was not being regularly reviewed in the light of developments inside the country. Measures were taken sometimes but this was not done on a systematic and regular basis. Also on a number of occasions when documents were captured there was a failure on our part to do a thorough review of information captured on the basis of the above principles and thus ensuring that correct, remedial decisions are taken and enforced. In fact in retrospect, communication was one of the weakest aspects of the work of the machinery and I think at some stage there was a realization of this fact and thus the attempts that were made to try and overcome some of the objective difficulties and problems, but at the same time this does not excuse some of the subjective weaknesses that we showed as mentioned above, measures that we could have taken on the spot to correct some of the failures experienced. As the commander I should have given more attention to this element of the work especially regarding its importance despite the fact that the personnel manning it were constantly changing as a result of objective difficulties, like arrests, being assigned to other tasks, etc.

Perhaps also in retrospect the tendency to overlook the five principles mentioned above was also because of the fact that the results of undermining them were not felt immediately or as a result of a particular violation you are immediately able to connect the effects with that particular action. Also even in the long term with the absence of thorough going post-mortems this would not come up. This becomes clear now with the discussions that have taken place and once again emphasizes the importance of the adherence to the five stated principles.

4. Now that one is looking back on the situation, one also feels that perhaps one should have been more forceful and open in discussing some of the problems that we were generally experiencing as a machinery with the headquarters. These problems were being raised in reports and even when one happened to be in Lusaka and had meetings with MHQ and the PMC. More forceful in terms of demanding that assistance is given in attending to these problems to the point of threatening not to continue as head of the machinery

if this assistance was not forthcoming. More open in the sense of clearly indicating to HQ the effects of the lack of solution of some of these problems were having in terms undermining our own morale, and having an effect of feeling that you are not developing in that situation a feeling developing that the problem that we were trying to resolve last year is the same that you will be resolving this year and the same that you will be attempting to resolve the following year. A feeling was developing in me for example and perhaps not clearly indicated to HQ that we were marking time and every new year it seemed as if we were starting from scratch and that lvery little progress was being achieved in terms of work inside the country and our operational capacity in a place like Swaziland itself with all its problems and difficulties.

To give an example of the problems to which one is referring I will just briefly refer to some of the objective difficulties which were having an effect on the performance of our tasks. When "Elephant" was set up by MHQ it had six members in the command structure or regional HQ. It was the commander, commissar, chief of staff, chief of operations, chief of logistics, chief of military intelligence, and this was scientific based on our military knowledge. Of course this regional HQ had then to set up all its elements to ensure adequate and full carrying out of all tasks from MHQ using the personnel available and if not enough appeal MHQ for assistance in terms of requesting what was needed. As a commander and the overall head, you are supposed to exercise your full control and direction through these five other elements. At all times these elements are supposed to be there on the situation and it is through them that the commander ensures that tasks from HQ are properly carried out. But from the time of Nkomati our regional HQ was always limping, functioning with one, two or three members at most of the regional HQ. Up to now one is not clear as to how Chiliza stopped being commissar of the machinery and this problem was being raised with MHQ. In all the time he was commissar not once did he set his foot in Swaziland. After Zweli was killed by the enemy he was never replaced as chief of staff and that is why eventually Ralph became my deputy. Both Magagula and Peter Patel were never replaced when for various reasons it was decided to redeploy them elsewhere. These are problems I could not resolve alone as a commander but which needed the intervention of MHQ which was lacking. So generally one was not functioning as a commander only but at different times had also to try and play the role of these elements that were lacking and thus the lack of adequately reflecting on the work of the machinery from an overall point of view. Whilst I had to fill up on some aspects of the work Ralph had to fill up on the others. It is a situation where you as the commander had to organize everything for yourself including where on what and with what you were going to sleep today, tomorrow, etc. whilst also having to ensure that the work of the machinery was continuing. It was a

a situation completely different from the West i.e. the camps. It was a situation that became worse with the added responsibilities of the PMC structures and the rejection of the PC to merge with us. I think it was in one PMC meeting where as the overall head of the Natal RPMC I was supposed to give an overall report that comrades in the leadership began to realize the seriousness of the situation and it was the late Comrade Cassius who actually exclaimed that was the situation was really bad and he had not realized it. I was not able to give a clear report about the political military situation in Natal basically because as the overall head I did not have any staff or headquarters elements to help me in getting to grips with the situation and carrying out the assigned tasks. No effort was made by the PMC to assist us to resolve the problem of the rejection by the PC and all our other subsequent efforts to strengthen the Natal PMC structure were also ignored. It was MHQ that at least made some effort to assist us by getting us comrades like Charles, Bandi, Mabel, Bulelani. I think that despite problems being raised in reports and verbally by members of our RPMC with the PMC there was very little response from the PMC. This is the reason why one feels today that it is not possible to have a headquarters or a PMC to function in these Frontline Areas. I think it is just deceiving ourselves to think that we have or we can have these structures functioning in their proper sense in these areas. We don't have the capacity as a movement to create the conditions of the proper functioning of a headquarters in these Frontline Areas in the light of their actions against us and the enemy activity. What we can have are just servicing units carrying out specific tasks under the direction of HQ in Lusaka.

The other problems in as far as internal work was concerned were things like the fact that up to now there has never been a single approach or guideline worked out and given as a PMC approach to what was attempted at Ngwavuma, after all the discussions, disagreements etc. finally the PMC failed to say that we as a PMC this is the approach in future to such attempts. This was raised and requested from the PMC. Up to now I don't think that the PMC has worked out a guideline on the question of the building of PMC structures internally despite this having been one of the central tasks or issues discussed in relation to internal work at Kabwe. This is also despite the individual initiatives attempts, failures and successes of various machineries. These experiences have not been put together and PMC give a line as to the fact that this is the guideline on the building of PMC's inside the country. This question has been raised on numerous occasions by our own RPMC in Bay with the PMC.

This was just to give an idea of some of the problems that we were experiencing which were being raised in reports, in meetings without receiving responses from the PMC which

one now says perhaps we should have been more forceful and open in raising them with HQ. At the same time when raising these problems one perhaps was not as forceful as one feels that one should have been because I was mindful of the fact that comrades should not interpret this as an attempt to opt out of the situation and the problems were just being used as an excuse. This was at the time when the situation in Bay itself was extremely difficult and tense and some of the comrades there even felt that they could not survive and left. This is because it is always us who have called for the movement to move wforward in terms of internal work with even senior comrades going inside the country for periods of work.

5. On reflection now on questions like those of Ralph and Uncle one feels that in future one should be more cautious and circumspect in expressing opinions and views especially in the light of the experience about Ralph. One should express one's views about what you think you know about a comrade because otherwise not do so would be cowardice of some form. One should honestly and openly express what has been his exp experience of a particular cadre, but without going beyond into unknown ground and expressing categorical views on this ground when in actual fact you don't have enough information in your hands to qualify you to express that view or you don't also even have the experience, the expertise, to make that kind of judgement. Our knowledge of each other here in the movement is very limited because, we only know each other here in exile and therefore can never claim to totally know each other. So in such cases it is necessary to be even more cautious in expressing views on what you really don't know about a person and perhaps leave it to the competent people to look into the situation. What you can do as a person perhaps is to begin to try and go out of your way to try and notice whether there is some truth in what is being suspected of that person in his day to day tasks without of course changing what has been your attitude.

This is a difficult and tricky question especially since experience has shown that the movement is not always correct on these questions. One has in mind here examples of comrades like Livingstone Gaza, Ferry Nene, Mainstay Chibuku who were always considered question marks in as far as their security clearance and for most of the time that they spent here outside this was always a factor in their deployment, assignment of tasks, no matter how good their performance was. Eventually they got the opportunity to irrevocably show and prove themselves in very heroic confrontations with the enemy inside the country where they lost their lives. Despite this factor this factor one feels that in any case caution should be exercised in expressing a view on such matters because if you become defensive and categorical you are really defending what you don't know and this might even create problems not only for the movement but for yourself as well. This is especially in the light of Ralph's case where one had taken a position and stubbornly clinging to

this position because of what one thought were justified reasons when really one started knowing Ralph closely in 1983 when we all became part of "Elephant".

6. One has also reflected on the question of one's own conduct and morality in the situation in Bay. Despite the fact that in a tense situation like in Bay there are moments when one feels the need to really relax, to let your hair down so to say this should not be done at the expense of violating the kind of conduct that is expected from you as a commander and a revolutionary. Whether one likes it or not comrades always look up to their commander, i.e. those who are leading them for guidance example and even inspiration. This is what you partly accept when accepting the responsibility of leadership and therefore your conduct even in what you might even consider your private life must take this into account because to a large extent, you are no more a private person. Questions of excessive drinking and going to discos should have been completely avoided. The question of having a love affair with a married person whilst I myself had recently been married was immoral and must have undermined the respect of comrades for me as a commander. I think this question of personal conduct is a question that one must seriously try to overcome as it has cropped up from time to time although one feels that at times it has been exaggerated and distorted.
7. The last thing that one also reflected on was the question of the difficulties and problems that we were experiencing with my wife around this period. Perhaps these also served in dividing one's attention from the work of the machinery. The problems I am referring to here are the virtual hounding out of Bay by the enemy of my wife. This took place in a series of incidents, the two raids in her house, the breaking into her work offices and ransacking of the place and the kidnap of her secretary. These incidences led to a lot of things most of them bad being said about her in Bay amongst the general population, because Bay is a small country and most of the professionals and people working for government know each other from their school days. At the time the attitude of most Swazis to us the ANC was negative and my wife was seen as one of those who were bringing problems to Bay as a result of their association with us. She also lost many of her friends who felt that it was not safe to associate with her, and people without information thoughtt that she was really to blame for what had happened to her secretary. We realized that she could not continue to live openly in Bay as long as I was there and operating that the enemy would always try to hit at me through her as the enemy was aware that, we had been married. Her family agreed with us that she could not stay on and work in Bay. She gave up her job and around this time was given an impression by Cde Chris that I would be redeployed in VZ. So she moved to VZ with all her furniture and property and only for us to discover later that I was still to go back to Bay. In the light of this we decided that the best place for her to settle and

find work was Maputo which is nearer to Bay. In Maputo also we had some difficulties in that initially we did not have a place to stay, eventually it was some relatives of hers in Maputo who offered her a flat which was in a terrible state. Our office was uncooperative in assisting us to furnish the place with basic necessities like a fridge and a stove which at that time were available. Siphso the Chief representative was raising questions like is she a member of the movement, that I was based in Bay and that flat did not belong to the movement all which I found ridiculous in the light of how eventually my wife had come to settle in Maputo, basically because of enemy action against her as a result of my work which was not a secret.

Eventually after a struggle of several months and when she was even beginning to think of giving up she found a job with Oxlam and the situation took a turn for the better and this was in April-May 1987. Having to assist my wife during this difficult period, as I felt wholly responsible for her uprooting loss of her job, sudden separation from familiar surroundings to a place like Mozambique where she had to also begin learning the language, and loss of friends, etc. in Bay, also contributed in dividing one's full attention from the work of the machinery, and thus not giving adequate attention to some of the problems that were being experienced by the machinery.