



**NATIONAL EXECUTIVE MEETING**

**DOCUMENT 1(a)**

**8 - 11 JUNE 1993**

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# ***AGENDA***

# AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

## NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

### DRAFT AGENDA

#### FIRST DAY TUESDAY 8 JUNE 1993

- 10:00      1. *Opening*  
             2. *Adoption of Agenda*  
             3. *Apologies*  
             4. *Opening Remarks by President*  
             5. *Assessment of Current Political Situation -*  
                    *Paper to be presented*
- 13:00      6. **LUNCH**
- 14:00      7. *Discussion on Assessment*  
16:00      8. *Approval of Minutes of last meeting*  
16:15      9. *NWC Report*  
18:00      10. *Closure*

#### SECOND DAY WEDNESDAY 9 JUNE 1993

- 09:00      1. *Report from Elections Commission*
- 11:00      2. **TEA**
- 11:30      3. *Discussion on Elections cont.*
- 13:00      4. **LUNCH**
- 14:00      5. *Report from Negotiations Commission*  
18:00      6. *Adjournment for Day*

Observer  
status at UN

Meeting  
with I.P.P.

Special role  
for de Klerk  
in GNU.

**THIRD DAY THURSDAY 10 JUNE 1993**

- 09:00 1. *Discussion on Negotiations Commission cont.*
- 11:00 2. **TEA**
- 11:30 3. *Negotiations cont.*
- 13:00 4. **LUNCH**
- 14:00 5. *Report from Inter-Regional Meeting*
- 16:00 6. *General*
- 18:00 7. *Closure*

***NEC***

***MINUTES***

5



**AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING  
16 - 18 FEBRUARY 1993  
MINUTES**

**1. Present :**

As per register

**2. Apologies :**

M. Msimang, A. Sisulu, J. Modise, E. Motsoaledi, S. Nkabinde, G. Shope.

**3. Adoption of Agenda :**

Agenda adopted as presented.

**4. Input by President :**

The President opened with brief introductory remarks drawing the attention of the house to the importance of the agenda before the meeting. In particular he mentioned the report from the latest bilateral with the regime; the report from meetings with the IFP; a report from MHQ; a report from the Elections Commission; and the need to re-examine our stand on sanctions.

**5. Minutes :**

The minutes of the last meeting were accepted with amendments :

5.1 The apologies of Raymond Suttner and Barbara Masakela were duly noted;

5.2 A document " ANC Negotiations Positions" was reflected as adopted.

**6. Harry Gwala's position as Regional Chairperson :**

The President then raised the matter of Comrade Gwala occupying position as member of the NEC chairperson of the Natal Midlands region. He informed the house that the Officials were of the view that Comrade Gwala should resign from the regional position and remain in the NEC.



He also raised the issue of members of the NEC publically disagreeing with decisions of the NEC and in this regard reminded the meeting that the matter of a Government of National Unity was now a policy position of the organisation.

Comrade Gwala said the REC of Natal Midlands had discussed the issue and had appealed to him to remain on in the REC. He however said he was prepared to resign from both positions if this would ease the situation before the house.

The matter was extensively debated, with most of those who spoke, appealing to comrade Gwala to remain in the NEC and resign from the regional position. However the meeting agreed not to finalise the matter and said it should be pursued in further discussion by senior comrades with Comrade Gwala.

## **7. Negotiations Commission Report :**

**7.1** Comrades Thabo Mbeki and Valli Moosa led discussion based on documentation before the house. Several matters of clarification were raised.

Discussion continued on the second day of the meeting.

Comrade Joe Slovo presented a resolution for consideration of the meeting. However it was agreed that discussion needed to continue.

During discussion there were several proposals for a consultative conference or conference of a special kind, to consolidate our strategic positions and to focus on the issue of reconstruction. The idea was also mooted that this conference could serve to mobilise for elections and develop an election platform. It was generally noted that whilst the NEC had taken a decision on the matter, the organisation had failed to take membership along with the decision. The conference needed to ensure that this happened.

The house agreed that comrades Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki, Valli Moosa, Jeremy Cronin and Pallo Jordan would draft a final resolution. This resolution was later presented to the house and accepted with amendments. ( *See NEC Decisions* )

## **7.2 Negotiations Planning Conference :**

Comrade Mac Maharaj presented the report in this regard. The meeting accepted the report, with one amendment : the conference should be opened to all media and not simply print media.

## **8. Angola :**

The President raised the question of the war in Angola and requested the house to adopt a resolution expressing solidarity with the MPLA government. This was accepted. A resolution was adopted. ( *See NEC Decisions* )

## **9. NWC Report :**

The Secretary General spoke to the NWC Report.

### **9.1 Nec Dates :**

The meeting agreed the dates of the next NEC should be changed to 10 - 12 August 1993.

### **9.2 Motsuenyane Commission on Former Detainees :**

This matter was extensively discussed and a number of decisions taken. ( *See NEC Decisions* )

### **9.3 ANC - IFP Bi-laterals :**

The house noted both the decision of the Natal Midlands region asking the NEC to reconsider its position on bi-laterals with the IFP; and the report of the Peace Desk titled " NWC ANNEXURE ONE - ANC-IFP BILATERALS ".

The meeting confirmed the decision to proceed with the bilaterals. A number of related decisions with regard to the process were taken. ( *See NEC Decisions* )

### **9.4 Sanctions :**

The house discussed the matter extensively and adopted a resolution recommending the phased lifting of sanctions, corresponding to our scenario of the transition process. ( *See NEC Decisions* )

### **9.5 Goldstone Investigation of MK :**

The house re-affirmed that Goldstone should investigate all armed formations. However, after noting that no armed formations, including the SADF, had come forward to enable the commission to engage in this investigation, decided the ANC was unable at this point in time to invite Goldstone to investigate MK. ( *Full text of decision : see NEC Decisions* )

### **9.6 Budget :**

The meeting discussed the matter, following the presentation of a proposal by Comrade Trevor Manuel. A resolution was adopted condemning the NP approach to the budget. ( *For full text of decision : see NEC Decisions* )

### **9.8 Deployment of NEC :**

The house adopted the revised deployment list for NEC members to regions as presented by the Organising Department.

### **9.9 Door - to - Door Campaign :**

The house discussed the matter after Comrade Ronnie Kasrils spoke to the document. Concern was expressed about the lack of co-ordination between the Organising Department and the Elections Commission. It was agreed that the two departments should meet to ensure their programmes were reconciled. A consolidated proposal should then be presented to the NWC.

### **9.10 Restructuring of Organising Department :**

The meeting discussed the proposed restructuring of the Organising Department. The proposal was adopted. It further decided that co-ordination at head office level should be improved. This was to ensure more streamlined communication with regions.

### **9.11 MK Commission :**

The house noted with strong disapproval the fact that this commission had not functioned since its establishment. It further noted the recommendations of MHQ that the commission be disbanded. It decided

that Comrade Thenjiwe Mthintso should replace the Deputy Secretary General as convenor of the commission. The commission was further instructed to set time frames for the completion of its work.

The meeting also agreed with the recommendation of MHQ that the NWC set up a permanent committee to oversee the work of NAT and MHQ.

#### **9.12 Election of NWC Member :**

Following the resignation of Comrade Chris Hani from the NWC, the meeting duly elected by secret ballot Comrade Raymond Suttner to the NWC.

#### **10. Report from the Elections Commission :**

The meeting discussed the report from the Elections Commission. The decisions of the meeting are reflected in the document : NEC Decisions.

#### **11. Code of Conduct :**

The meeting noted that this matter was long overdue and had been deferred from one meeting to another. It instructed the NWC to finalise the Code of Conduct within one month of the date of the meeting after it had been discussed by regions.

**12.** The meeting closed with a press statement on the business before the house. ( **See NEC Decisions**)



***NEC***

***DECISIONS***

# AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

## NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 16 - 18TH FEBRUARY 1993 DECISIONS

### 1. COMMISSION ON FORMER DETAINEES

This NEC

Noting

1. that the Motsuenyane Commission on Former Detainees will be completing its work in May 1993;
2. that the Thami Zulu and Stuart Commission reports which the Skweyiya Commission recommended be released to the public had not yet been considered and released by the NEC

Decides

- a) to direct the NWC to consider and release the Thami Zulu and Stuart reports;
- b) to develop a pro-active and appropriate media strategy in dealing with the reports;
- c) to meet with the families of those who died in exile and further explore ways of commemorating their deaths so as to effect reconciliation;
- d) requests the Motsuenyane Commission to hasten the work of the Commission.

## 2. **ANC / IFP BI-LATERALS**

This meeting of the NEC

Noting

1. the decision of the Natal Midlands region asking the NEC to reconsider its position on bilateral talks with the IFP;
2. the report of the Peace desk to the NEC titled "NWC REPORT ANNEXURE 1 - ANC/IFP BILATERALS REPORT".

Decides:

- a) to reiterate its decision to engage in bilateral talks with the IFP by way of thorough preparatory discussions through the channel established between the two organisations;
- b) preparatory work for the bilateral should continue and the NWC sub-committee on Natal be empowered to ratify draft agreements to be submitted by the channel;
- c) should the NWC sub-committee on Natal, in its judgement, feel that sufficient basis has been laid for the envisaged bilateral meeting to take place by mid-March 1993, it should recommend to the NWC that the summit should go ahead;
- d) the size of the channel be increased to include two people from the ANCWL and ANCYL.

Further, with regard to the situation in Bophuthatswana, the NEC notes the progress made thus far and endorses the step as outlined in the report from the Peace Desk:

- a. recommending the establishment of a bilateral working party which should be appointed by the NWC and would



include representatives of the regions directly affected by this issue;

- b. agreed that the STATEMENT OF INTENT adopted on 20 November 1992 at Kwa Maritane be adopted as a working document to guide our representatives in the bilateral working group.

### 3. **GOLDSTONE INVESTIGATION ON MK**

This NEC reaffirms:

The principle that the Goldstone Commission should investigate the involvement of all armed formations in the violence ravaging our country.

Noting:

That no armed formations, including the SADF have come forward to enable the Commission to engage in this investigation.

Decides:

- a) Accordingly, the ANC is unable to invite Goldstone at this stage to investigate MK;
- b) In the meantime, the ANC is systematically investigating all instances where there are allegations and/or evidence of involvement in the violence by any member of MK;
- c) Where such investigations are completed, we shall consider

making such information available to the Commission.

#### 4. **SANCTIONS**

This NEC noting:

The proposal presented by the Department of International Affairs, resolves:

Having reviewed the process leading to the democratic election of a Constituent Assembly and the formation of an Interim Government of National Unity;

Confirming its resolve to ensure the earliest possible establishment of a Transitional Executive Council, its sub-structures, the Independent Electoral and Media Commissions and the enactment of a Transition to Democracy Act;  
Convinced that this is essential to enable free and fair elections to take place;

Reaffirming that international sanctions against apartheid have played a critical role in the struggle for a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa;

Recalling the resolution on sanctions adopted by the National Conference of the ANC in July 1991 for a phased approach to sanctions;

Further recalling the decision of the Tripartite Alliance Seminar on Sanctions of October 4, 1991, which made recommendations about sanctions affecting diplomatic relations, gold coins, trade and trade credits, new investment, loans and other financial matters;

Recommends to all the democratic movement of our country and all our allies internationally that:

\* an announcement of an agreed date for elections, and on establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and the Independent Electoral and Media Commissions, as well as the enactment of the Transition to Democracy Act, the sanctions affecting the following areas should be lifted:

- diplomatic relations, gold coins, trade and trade credits, new investment, loans and other financial links.

Further recommends that notwithstanding this decision, no representatives of the white minority regime should be granted accreditation by any international organisation, this being a matter which can only be resolved once an Interim Government of National Unity is established;

Also brings to the attention of the international community that once they are established, the multi-party Transitional Executive Council structures will be the appropriate governmental institution with which to enter into any official agreements;

Calls on the international community to ensure strict observance of the arms and oil embargoes until a democratic government has been installed.

Reaffirms its commitment to do everything in its power to address the burning questions of poverty, unemployment, racial inequalities in the distribution of wealth and income and the social imbalances that are a result of the system of apartheid.

Calls on the investor community, domestic and international, to seek active ways of involving those who were marginalised by

apartheid in the projects of investment that they embark upon.

Calls on the investor community, especially the domestic investors, to respond to the positive climate that will be produced by the lifting of these sanctions by initiating an investment programme that will create new jobs and enable the country to address the various and urgent socio-economic needs of our people.

## 5. **BUDGET**

This NEC noting:

The proposal presented by the Department of Economic Planning;

Resolves;

The National Party government is being shown to be singularly incompetent in managing public finances. In support of the statement, the following can be noted:

- \* an ad hoc approach to expenditure in social services;
- \* repeated revelations of corruption and graft by both senior civil servants and cabinet ministers (without the application of ministerial responsibility);
- \* a totally inadequate delivery system characterised by duplication and a bloated bureaucracy;
- \* the complete absence of controls such as audit trials and performance audits;
- \* the "gifts" of golden handshakes to parliamentarians and bureaucrats.

As a consequence of the levels of government incompetence, an enormous budget deficit has accumulated.

Instead of addressing the problem fundamentally through measures such as:

- the establishment of a representative Fiscal Commission to advise on both revenue and expenditure;
- the establishment of transparent departmental and judicial controls over state expenditure, including an audit on the 1992/3 budget;
- a planned approach to expenditure, including the elimination of tricameral and bantustan duplication and improving on the efficiency of public works programmes.

The government is opting to shift the burden of the deficit on to the taxpayers by means of both direct and indirect taxes.

The ANC finds this shift of responsibility on to the taxpayers totally unacceptable. We believe that it is imperative that National Party incompetence be fully exposed and that immediate steps be taken to expose every bit of the corruption so rampant throughout the bureaucracy.

We demand a moratorium on all gratuities outside of what is due to civil servants contractually made to a pension fund.

We call on all ANC regions to be actively involved in mobilisation in order to express opposition to the budget policy of the regime, and to rally support for the ANC's economic policy. In the execution of this tasks, we appeal to regions to be mindful of the responsibilities and constraints which a democratic government will face.

**6. MK COMMISSION**

This NEC noting:

1. The lack of progress in this commission thus far as outlined in the NWC Report;
2. Further proposals from MHQ with regard to a permanent coordinating structure for the military.

Decided:

- a) that the Commission on MK should continue its work;
- b) Comrade Thenjiwe Mthintso be approached to head the commission;
- c) the Commission be instructed to draw up a time frame for the completion of its work;
- d) further, that the Officials urgently attend to the establishment of a permanent NWC Committee to oversee the work of MHQ and NAT.

**7. DEPLOYMENT OF NEC MEMBERS**

This NEC adopted:

The revised deployment for NEC members to regions (see final NEC Documentation)

## 8. DOOR TO DOOR CAMPAIGN

This NEC noted:

1. The proposal from the Campaigns Section for a National "DOOR TO DOOR" campaign;
2. Concerns expressed about the lack of consultation with the Elections Commission in this regard;

Decided:

The Campaigns Section of Organising Department and Elections Commission should meet to streamline their programmes over the coming months and present a consolidated report to the NWC.

## 9. RESTRUCTURING OF ORGANISING DEPARTMENT

This NEC noting:

1. the proposed restructuring of the Organising Department;
2. concerns expressed about the general lack of coordination among departments.

Decided

- a) to endorse the proposed structure of the Organising Department;
- b) that the SGO should convene a meeting of all departments with a view to streamlining coordination at head office level and communication with regions. This meeting should also consider the manner in which departments expect to contribute to the Elections Commission.

## 10. GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY

This NEC, noting:

The joint proposal from the Negotiations Commission and the regime for a Government of National Unity after the adoption of a new constitution:

Resolves that:

Further to our adopted document "Negotiations, a Strategic Perspective", this meeting of the NEC decided as follows:

- a) We reject the National Party's power sharing proposal either for a permanent or fixed period;
- b) In the interest of reconstruction and peace and the need to minimise the potential threat to democratic advance from divisive forces in the period immediately following the adoption of the new constitution, we declare our support for an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) which should exist up to the point of the adoption of a new constitution, the IGNU would continue in the same form as a Government of National Unity and Reconstruction (GNUR) in order to phase in structures provided for in the new constitution.

The GNUR would exist for a specified limited duration, whose term would come to an end by the first election under the new constitution, which would be held no later than five years after the elections for the CA.

- c) Such a GNUR shall be governed by the overriding principle that minority parties shall not have the powers to paralyse the functioning of the executive or to block the process of restructuring, more particularly:



- i) it shall be made up of an executive in which there will be proportional representation of all the parties elected to the CA subject to a minimum threshold of 5% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly;
  - ii) the President shall be elected by a simple majority of the Constituent Assembly;
  - iii) representatives of minority parties in the cabinet shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the leaders of each party in questions. The President shall have the right to insist on an alternative if the person proposed by such leader is, for specified reasons, unacceptable.
  - iv) in general, the President shall exercise his or her executive powers after consultation with the cabinet.
  - v) in the case of certain specified powers, the President shall exercise his or her powers in consultation with the parties represented in the cabinet. In the event of a disagreement, the President's decision shall require support of 2/3 of the members of the cabinet.
  - vi) the specified powers mentioned in (e) are still to be negotiated and before an agreement is reached in this regard, a detailed mandate will have to be obtained from the NWC sitting with either the chairperson or secretary of each region.
- d) The meeting further reaffirms its positions concerning the Constituent Assembly that the Constituent Assembly shall be a sovereign constitution-making body which will be bound only by agreed general constitutional principles. It should be composed of representatives elected on the basis of national and regional lists. It would take decisions

by a two thirds majority of the regional representatives sitting as a whole. The Constituent Assembly should complete its work as quickly as possible and not later than nine months after its election.

The NEC will continue to negotiate the issue of an effective deadlock breaking mechanism which would be used in case the Constituent Assembly is unable to conclude its work within the specified time frame.

- e) The meeting of the NEC resolved that work should continue to build a national consensus on the question of future regional government, through discussions with other parties and organisations. All decisions concerning the powers, functions, boundaries and structure of regional government should be decided by the Constituent Assembly. Any Commission on Regions that may be established by a multi-party forum would, apart from delimiting electoral regions for the Constituent Assembly elections, only make recommendations to this Assembly.

f) **Programme of Reconstruction and Development**

In endorsing the package concerning inter alia a Government of National Unity, the NEC affirmed that such arrangements must, during the transition period itself, be reinforced by an effective programme of reconstruction and democratic transformation.

The ANC immediately needs to embark on a process to consolidate its ranks, supporters and those of the broad democratic forces around a transitional strategy to empower the oppressed majority.

This will entail:

- i) identifying those key sections of the organs of state that require restructuring as a matter of priority;
- ii) evolving an affirmative action programme, with definite time frames, to reconstruct the organs of state in conformity with a democratic society;
- iii) a far-reaching programme of social economic reconstruction to address the pressing needs of the majority of South Africa;
  
- iv) a process of consultation and mobilisation of mass democratic forces and the convening of a conference on reconstruction and broad strategy. Such a conference to be held within four months.

#### **10.2 NEGOTIATIONS PLANNING CONFERENCE**

This NEC noting

The report from the Negotiations Commission for a Negotiations Planning Conference

Decided:

To accept the report presented with the amendment that such conference should be open to all media.

## 11. **ANGOLA**

This NEC noting the situation in Angola

Resolved as follows:

We condemn in the strongest terms the criminal war being waged by UNITA under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi against the people of Angola and their democratically elected government.

We call on UNITA to end this war against democracy immediately and to respond positively to the initiative of the Government of Angola and the United Nations for peace talks between the Government and UNITA.

We further call on UNITA to honour all the commitments it made when it signed the Bicesse Agreements, which remain the valid framework for the resolution of the problems confronting the people of Angola.

We also demand that UNITA respects the outcome of the democratic elections, which the United Nations and other international observers certified as being free and fair.

We further call on the international community to extend no assistance of any kind to UNITA but take all necessary action to oblige UNITA to desist from its actions which are designed to impose itself on the Angolan people by force of arms, and thus subvert the efforts of the people to achieve democracy, peace and development.

In particular we demand of the South African government that it should extend no assistance whatsoever to UNITA and take resolute action to ensure that South African territory is not used by anybody to provide such support.

The UN Security Council and the guarantors of the Bicesse Agreements are obliged to take all necessary action to end the carnage in Angola and to ensure the success of the process of transformation visualised in these Agreements as well as in Security Council resolutions.

The anti-democratic activities of UNITA should not be allowed either to derail the peace process in Angola nor to compromise the process of change in which the region of Southern Africa, including our own country, is involved.

We further resolve to keep this situation under constant review and will take all action within our power to support the government and people of Angola in their effort to secure democracy and peace for themselves.

**12. ELECTION OF NWC MEMBER**

This NEC noting:

The vacancy on the NWC following the resignation of Chris Hani

Duly elected:

Raymond Suttner as member of the NWC.

**13. REPORT FROM ELECTIONS COMMISSION**

This NEC noting the report from the Elections Commission

Decided:

1. With regard with the form in which we participate in the election, that a committee of 6 people: Jaques Modipane,

Collins Chabane, Ismail Ebrahim, Trevor Manuel, Willem Steenkamp and Terror Lekota be asked to formulate a proposal on the details about the form in which we participate, spelling out the kind of relationship we want to establish with all other political and mass formations for the purposes of the campaign. They should formulate the proposal after consultation with the relevant regions.

2. With regard to the list of candidates for the for the CA and the proposal for the considerations, criteria and process contained in said report, this matter should be urgently considered in all its complexities by the NWC at the earliest possible sitting. Regions needed to discuss the matter and report to the NWC.
3. With regard to Election Platform, endorsed the process described on page 5 of the report but added that this matter required discussion at the proposed National Conference on Reconstruction and Transformation. (see Resolution on Negotiations)
4. With regard to Voter Identification, endorsed the procedure outlined that one or two types of documents can be used by voters to identify themselves; the identity books (Books of Life) issued by the South African government, TBVC Territories or South African passports being the first, and voter cards issued by the Independent Elections Commission being second. Those without the first category of document can use amongst others, birth certificates, baptismal certificates or affidavits signed by two citizens to get their voters card.
5. To embark on a major drive to encourage all those without valid identity documents to apply for the SA Identity

Document. The ANC should liaise with Home Affairs to speed up the process.

6. That at least three international people should be included in the Independent Elections Commission.
7. That the ballot paper for the elections should have a single column of parties listed in alphabetical order with spaces for the name of the party, its symbol, the picture of the party and a space to mark the ballot. The ballot should be produced by an internationally based commercial company with a reputation for producing security documents. However, the matter of which symbol the ANC would use on the ballot paper needed further processing and was referred to the NWC.
8. That the broadest definition for what is considered a valid ballot should be used; any mark which indicates unambiguously the intention of the voter should be valid, although as the ANC we will popularise the cross in our own material.
9. That the DIA should produce a motivated proposal for the NWC on which international bodies could facilitate the monitoring of elections and act as the body which coordinates all international monitoring of the elections.
10. With regard to the proposed structures for the Election, this matter be referred to the NWC for decision. All departments should meet before hand to iron out any remaining problems with regard to the proposed structure. When the NWC considers the final structure, regions should be represented at said NWC by either the Chairperson or Secretary.

11. With regard to the core slogan for the campaign, this should be "NOW IS THE TIME". It was agreed to accept *in principle* to have approximately ten leaders who represent the high profile, public face of the campaign.
12. With regard to the local level programme of work for the election campaign between now and end of April, to adopt the programme outlined on pages 53 and 54 of the report.
13. With regard to finances and fundraising, that the Elections Campaign Coordinating Team will have responsibility for using the criteria described on page 44 of the report for developing an allocations policy which will describe the ratio of money to be allocated to each region for elections. They will make recommendations to the NWC for decision. This will allow for a strategic allocation based on the criteria and is a shift away from the equal allocation policy. This will apply to all amounts other than a common amount allocated to all regions. The Coordinating Team will use the policy to negotiate and finalise budgets from regions for the elections. The Finance Department will continue to be responsible for financial accountability.
14. Finally, with regard to the proposed directive to all structures of the ANC, it was agreed this matter would be finalised by the Officials who would see to it that the said directive is signed by the President and circulated to all structures of the organisation.

#### 14. CODE OF CONDUCT



This NEC noting:

That this matter was long overdue and required urgent attention;

Decided:

The proposed Code should be urgently discussed by regions and finalised by the NWC within one month.

**ANC PRESS STATEMENT FROM THE MEETING OF THE NATIONAL  
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING AT IPELEGENG CENTRE, SOWETO,  
16TH TO 18TH  
FEBRUARY 1993**

The National Executive Committee of the ANC met in full plenary session from 16 - 18 February 1993 in Soweto, Johannesburg. During its first meeting for 1993, the NEC reviewed the work of its National Working Committee, and received reports from the Organising Department, the Negotiations Commission and the Elections Commission.

The NEC adopted a recommendation to restructure the Organising Department with a view of streamlining the ANC at national, regional and branch level in preparation for the general election campaign we shall embark on in the course of 1993.

The meeting discussed at length, a report and recommendations from the Negotiations Commission. In a resolution on Negotiations, the NEC committed the ANC to a comprehensive programme of reconstruction and development, which will proceed in tandem with the transition to democracy.

The NEC recognised that in the interests of peace, stability and reconstruction there will be a need for a government of national unity of limited duration, that draws on the talents of a representative range of South Africans.

The meeting underscored its rejection of the National Party's proposal of power sharing, whether permanent or for a fixed period. While affirming the need for inclusiveness, the NEC emphasised that it should not impair the capacity of such a Government of National Unity to function effectively in the process of restructuring.

The NEC affirmed that the composition and mandate of a Government of National Unity is not a deal struck between political parties in smoke-filled rooms. It will be the outcome of the preferences of the South African electorate as expressed in the first democratic elections. The ANC declared its commitment to a government composed of all parties elected to the Constituent Assembly, subject to a minimum threshold of 5% of the seats in that assembly. The NEC endorsed the multi-party Negotiations Planning Conference to be held on 25 February 1993 with a view to a speedy resumption of CODESA. The ANC will enter into discussions with a range of political parties in pursuance of this objective.

The NEC emphasised the important inter-connection between the negotiations package and a far-reaching process to restructure the organs of government, the judiciary and the civil service, in the transition period to bring these into conformity with a non-racial democratic political order.

In pursuance of this goal, the ANC will convene a major conference of reconstruction and strategy before the end of June 1993.

The NEC noted with grave concern the present situation in Angola. It is clear that the renewal of the war is a direct consequence of Dr Jonas Savimbi's refusal to accept the electoral verdict of the Angolan people. South African government's involvement in ongoing supplies and other logistical support to UNITA have also fuelled the conflict.

The NEC recorded our indebtedness to the Angolan people and their government for years of solidarity with the South African struggle at great cost to their country and themselves. Accordingly, the meeting resolved to launch a national campaign of solidarity and support for Angola, including demonstrations and other manifestations.

The forthcoming general elections will be the first occasion in the history of our country in which all South Africans will participate as

equals. These elections will mark an historic turning point as the culmination of decades of struggle for a democratic franchise.

The election campaign will be most important mass action the ANC and other democratic forces will wage in the course of the coming months.

The NEC discussed and endorsed an extensive report from Elections Commission and has instructed all levels of our organisation to gear themselves for that campaign which we will wage under the slogan "Now is the Time" - "Ke nako" - "Sekunjalo" - "Nou is die Tyd".

An election, by secret ballot, was conducted to fill one vacant seat on the National Working Committee. Comrade Raymond Suttner has been duly elected to serve on the National Working Committee.

***NWC***

***REPORT***



# AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

## NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE REPORT: FEBRUARY 1993 TO JUNE 1993

### INTRODUCTION

This report will cover only the most important matters which the NWC dealt with during the period under review.

#### 1 Negotiations

Issues pertaining to negotiations continue to dominate the agenda of most NWC meetings during this period. These will therefore not be covered in this report but will be dealt with more comprehensively in a separate report.

#### 2. Commissions of Inquiry

##### 2.1 The Motsuenyane Commission of Inquiry

The work of this Commission got off to a late start but is now proceeding apace. Hearings began on 13th May and are still proceeding. The Commission will conclude its work during the June month. They will also be visiting Tanzania to follow up certain matters.

The costs related to the Commission have been rather high, as we have also had to pay for the legal fees of the defence as well as the prosecution. Our fund-raising efforts in this regard continue.

##### 2.2 Commission of Inquiry into missing funds in the Department of Social Welfare.

The Commission headed by our late Chairperson, Comrade O R Tambo has submitted an interim report to the Officials.

The final report is awaited as the Commission had to finalise one other matter.

**2.3 MK Commission of Inquiry**

Following the decision of the last NEC to appoint Comrade Thenjiwe Mthintso as Chairperson, this Commission has had difficulty in commencing work as most of its documents have been misplaced.

Plans are under way to make sure that it continues with its work.

**2.4 Commission of Inquiry on conflict in the Vaal**

The Commission which considered, amongst other things, the involvement of SDU's in the above conflict has completed its work. The report awaits the consideration of the NWC.

**2.5 Commission of Inquiry on the Western Transvaal**

Following reports and allegations of financial and other irregularities in the ANC Western Transvaal Region, a Commission was appointed by the Secretary General to investigate these allegations. The Commission headed by Comrade Collins Chabane has presented a preliminary report. A full report is awaited as the results of further investigations by NAT are pending.

**2.6 The Golela Arms Commission of Inquiry**

A Commission was instituted by the NWC following the arrest of MK cadres and ANC members around the issue of infiltration of arms across the Mozambican border. The



Raleka

Commission is still busy with its work having visited Mozambique and Natal.

2.7 **PWV Women's League disciplinary hearing**

Extreme difficulties have been experienced in holding the disciplinary hearing as recommended by an earlier Commission. The NWC has now assigned Comrades Gill Marcus, Zola Skweyiya and Raymond Suttner to finalise this matter. A plan of action has been developed by these comrades and it is hoped that this matter will be finalised soon.

2.8 **Stuart Commission's Report**

The Stuart Commission Report recently became available. It has been handed to the Motsuenyane Commission.

The NWC has requested the Legal Department to advise how the Stuart and Thami Zulu Reports should be released to the media.

3. **APPOINTMENT OF NEW SABC BOARD**

The NWC discussed this matter and agreed that a transparent and credible process should be set in place for the appointment of the SABC Board. The process should be involve the appointment of a panel of selectors who should include Judge Justice Mohammed and Justice Schabort of CODESA. It was also noted that our positions in this regard coincided with the positions of the Campaign for an Independent Broadcasting (CIB).

The President met De Klerk to discuss the procedure through which the board would be appointed and an agreement was reached. Following the selection of the board, it transpired that De Klerk had interfered in the

*Reports by Pallo & Joel*

selection of a panel which necessitated a meeting between himself and the President. The matter could not be settled as De Klerk insisted on proceeding with announcing an altered list. The matter was taken up by the CIB and our DIP in the form of protests.

The Board has now met and there is still confusion about the way this matter will finally be settled.

4

#### **EDUCATION CRISIS**

The crisis around education deepened as students demanded the scrapping of the examination fees and teachers demanded an increase in their salaries. Our Education Department intervened by having consultations with the students' and teacher organisations.

The ANC attended the Education Summit held at Wits University where strategies were developed on how to deal with the crisis. In the end, as teachers' strike loomed our President met De Klerk and arrived at a settlement on the scrapping of the examination fees and the reopening of negotiations on teachers' salaries and retrenchments.

It took some time for the teachers country-wide to decide on returning back to school. The situation is under constant review by the Education Department as the department continues to interact with organisations that are affected.

5

#### **THE YOUTH LEAGUE**

The Officials held a number of meetings with the Youth League where a number of problems that had arisen were addressed. In all the meetings the problems that had arisen were solved satisfactorily to the satisfaction of all parties.

Specific issues that were addressed in those meetings were:

1. An open letter written to Gatsha Buthelezi by the Youth League during the Negotiations Planning Conference in March.
2. The furore that surrounded the "kill the farmer, kill the boer" chant by Comrade Peter Mokaba.
3. The Youth League's reservations about the Interim Government of National Unity and Reconstruction.

During the course of the meetings it became clear that closer regular meetings were essential between the Youth League and the ANC.

6. **EXTENDED NWC'S**

It was agreed that whenever it became necessary to hold Extended NWC's, the Chairpersons and Regional Secretaries of all regions should be asked to attend the Extended NWC meetings.

7. **ELECTION STRUCTURE**

The Elections Structure proposed by the Elections Commission to the NEC in February was adopted with amendments in March. Comrades Popo Molefe and Terror Lekota were confirmed as Coordinator and Deputy Coordinator for Elections.

8. **NEWSPAPER PROJECT**

The NWC received a report from the DIP about the Newspaper project and noted the progress that had been made in launching a Tripartite Alliance newspaper. Comrades Pallo Jordan, Vusi Khanyile, Frene Ginwala and Ivy Matsepe were appointed as ANC Trustees who would joint SACP and COSATU Trustees in being the body that would oversee the affairs of the newspaper.

9. **ANGOLA**

The worsening situation in Angola was discussed by the NWC which issued a statement in solidarity with the MPLA government. It was agreed that the Organising Department (Campaigns) would develop a solidarity campaign.

10. **WORK SCHEDULE FOR OFFICIALS**

It was agreed that the President, Deputy President and the late National Chairperson would work half day shifts except for Wednesdays. It was further agreed that the Deputy President and National Chairperson would work only three (3) days a week, giving them four (4) full days of rest.

11. **FUNERALS OF LATE COMRADES CHRIS HANI AND OR TAMBO**

Preparations for the funerals of the late Comrades Chris Hani and OR Tambo were extensively discussed in NWC meetings in April. In both cases the Tripartite Alliance Funeral Committees were established to oversee preparations and arrangements for the funerals. An assessment of both funerals was conducted by the NWC where the weaknesses were recognised.

12. **NWC LEKGOTLA**

An NWC Lekgotla met from 11th to 13th May to discuss the current situation and assess the state of organisation. Documents and full decisions are attached (see Annexure 1)

13. **PATRIOTIC FRONT CONFERENCE**

The Patriotic Front Conference was held on the 23rd March 1993. The Conference endorsed the negotiation positions that had been developed by the ANC. The Conference also decided that PF organisations should contest elections under the banner of the ANC but that

the ANC should first hold bilateral meetings with each organisation to develop a proper understanding on how this would work.

14

### **THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE STRATEGISING MEETING**

A Tripartite Alliance Strategising Meeting was held on 26th and 27th May 1993 with ten (10) each from ANC, SACP and COSATU. Issues that were covered at that meeting revolved around an assessment of the current situation, peace course and the programme of reconstruction.

15

### **THE GENDER QUESTION**

The NWC discussed the question of Gender with regard to raising the consciousness of NEC members to the gender question. It was decided that a workshop on Gender should be held during one session of the next NEC.

It was also agreed that members of the Negotiations Commission should serve on the Emancipation of Women Commission.

It was also agreed that the Women's League should be included in the delegation to the World Conference on Human Rights. It was also agreed that the Women's League and DIA should prepare an approach on the Peking Conference on Women in 1995

16

### **VOTING AGE**

This matter was discussed by the NWC after the President had raised the matter publicly again. It was resolved that for purposes of the coming election, the ANC's position was that the voting age should be eighteen (18) and above. However, the question of reducing the voting age should be a matter for debate within our structures and the public in general.

17

## THE SECURITY OF LEADERSHIP

The NWC discussed the question of security and realized that there were a number of shortcomings which needed to be addressed. It was decided that the matter of security should be prioritised with NAT playing the leading role in this regard. NAT was asked to prepare a document on security and ensure that measures were taken to secure houses of leaders and also those leaders who were vulnerable to attacks.

18

## ANNUAL REPORT

All departments and regions have now submitted their annual activity reports. The National Annual Report is being finalised and will be available before the next NEC meeting.

19

## CODE OF CONDUCT

The NEC at its last meeting directed the NWC to finalise this matter after getting inputs from regions. All regions have not responded to requests for comment.

When the present draft was examined again by the SG and the Political Education Section, it was found to be incomplete and not well drafted. It was decided that a comprehensive draft be prepared for submission to the NWC.

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## FILLING OF NEC VACANCIES

There are now three (3) vacancies on the NEC as a result of the resignation of Comrade Winnie Mandela, the assassination of Comrade Chris Hani and the death of Comrade OR Tambo.

The NWC has requested the Officials to make recommendations on how these vacancies can be filled. A proposal will be tabled at the meeting of the NEC.

21 - ANC - IFP BILATERALS  
meeting agreed to  
46

***POLITICAL***  
***ASSESSMENT***

47

48





## **AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS**

### **CHALLENGES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION (Discussion Document)**

#### **I. INTRODUCTION:**

1. SA is at that critical phase in any struggle which contains possibilities for a major breakthrough or a mighty disaster. The manner in which the various elements play themselves out, including primarily the intervention of the ANC, will impact on the future of the country for decades to come. This assessment addresses the current tactical situation, and it is aimed at generating discussion to lay the basis for our Programme of Action in the next few weeks. At the same time, the current tactical situation has implications for our Strategy and Tactics now as well as after the establishment of pre-election structures and the IGNU.

#### **II. CHARACTER OF THE SITUATION:**

2. The following major factors characterise the state of democratic forces:
  - 2.1. Mass mobilisation - partly spontaneous - on a scale never witnessed before in the recent period, revolving around the immediate issue of CH's assassination, but expressing frustration with the slow negotiations process, worsening of socio-economic conditions, and crises in areas such as education. Yet, events in this period, such as May Day commemorations, showed that this mobilisation can peter out if not creatively harnessed.
  - 2.2. Widest unity of forces around the perspective of speed in negotiations in order for the people to choose a representative government. These forces include black workers and the unemployed, the rural masses, youth, religious and cultural forces, as well as elements among professionals and big business. On the one hand, the objective interest that big business (a segment of the ruling class in our traditional analysis) shares in a speedy transition poses important questions about our tactical approach to various social forces. On the other hand, while the solid core of our support base consists of the working people, recent developments have also shown that a small but significant portion of the militant forces in our mass base is made up of the so-called "marginalised youth" and elements of the lumpen proletariat who require a greater effort in terms of organised leadership.
  - 2.3. Emergence of the ANC more convincingly as the alternative power, particularly around the funerals of both CH and OR. However, the assassination of CH, the threats against the leadership and continuing violence have further exposed our

weaknesses in terms of defending the people, the leadership and the gains thus far made.

2.4. While these events have not resolved our organisational problems, they have showed the capacity of the movement and its allies when seized with a single major issue. They have however also sharply exposed the disjuncture that can emerge if there is no common strategic and tactical approach among the leadership.

3. In so far as the white ruling bloc as a whole is concerned the following factors have come out in bold relief:

3.1. Their crisis of legitimacy and the regime's incapacity to give leadership to the nation.

3.2. De Klerk's further marginalisation as a credible force within society as a whole, and the sense of a rudderless drift and paralysis within his government.

3.3. Divisions within government circles accepted as more or less an open secret.

3.4. A dramatic resurgence of the right-wing reflected in mass mobilisation and consolidation of their unity.

4. All these factors reflect in the main the reality that the negotiations process has reached the stage at which crucial decisions have to be taken about political power relations, and this has been further amplified by the assassination of CH.

What then are the dangers to the transition?

### III. RIGHT-WING THREAT - FORMATIONS OF THE EXTREME RIGHT:

5. A combination of all the above factors has laid the basis for the right-wing to mobilise on the widest scale ever. Both within negotiations and outside, they are able to offer an apparently credible alternative to the present government among forces who fear change. The mobilisation of the right-wing is therefore a phenomenon arising from objective conditions. It consists in the main of the following social forces:

5.1. white workers and the lower layers of the white middle strata;

5.2. farmers, particularly the non-monopoly sector;

5.3. elements of business which benefit directly from relations with the apartheid state;

5.4. sections of black administrators in the apartheid regional and local structures such as the bantustans; and

- 5.5. a sprinkling of blacks mobilised on a narrow ethnic basis.
6. The common denominator among the main right-wing forces is fear of losing the privileges accruing from the system of apartheid. Aggravating this fear among the white right-wingers are the problems deriving from the economic crisis and the drought. At the subjective level, while racism and tribalism do have a role in shaping their consciousness, many of these forces are victims of the disinformation campaign about the transition and the policies of the ANC.
7. Their main political formations can be characterised as follows:
- 7.1. The CP is expressing an open frustration with the white constitutional structures and emphasising on extra-parliamentary mobilisation.
- 7.2. The AVU, having adopted a platform to the left of the CP, has to join this bandwagon or face extinction.
- 7.3. The coalition of these forces with some black regional administrators is being consolidated in negotiations and in the prospect of a violent rebellion against fundamental change. These black administrators, and the IFP in particular, are in the final analysis the main group lending the racist right-wingers a measure of credibility.
8. This is reinforced by the mobilisation of sectors of white civil society around the theme of resisting change: farmers, state employees and organised workers, in particular.
9. The cutting edge to their pronouncements lies above all in their capacity to wreak havoc:
- 9.1. Within the AWB and among the other para-military formations, their conspiratorial operations are of late given much more seriousness, and some of the elements seem to act on their own initiative despite the leadership.
- 9.2. The recent formation of the Committee of Generals, senior retired officers of the army and police - and the role of some of these and others among the black groupings - has given a wider legitimacy to the right-wingers' efforts, and will further consolidate the support for their cause among serving officers and the rank-and-file.

#### IV. RIGHT-WING THREAT - RELATIONSHIP TO STATE STRATEGIES:

10. The NP government is definitely under great pressure to settle. This is a cumulative result of events since the Boipatong massacre, the fact that the NP machinery is collapsing under the pressures of change, and that delays create the space for the right-wing to consolidate its forces and haemorrhage the NP's support base. Therefore,

objectively, a speedy settlement is in the interest of the NP.

11. But the counter-veiling tendency is to delay, partly to continue clinging to power; but also because of the serious divisions within the political and security establishment and the fear not to precipitate the final showdown with the self-appointed right-wing spokespersons of Afrikanerdom.
12. How does the right-wing relate to the state? Three scenarios deserve consideration:
  - 12.1. The right-wing is a completely independent political force, able to step into the vacuum created by the loss of support for the NP and its indecisiveness.
  - 12.2. While the resurgence of the right-wing is an objective political phenomenon, it enjoys the indirect support of a faction within the NP and state machinery - or at least is closely monitored, indirectly controlled and encouraged by these forces - to serve as a challenge to De Klerk and the "moderate faction", as well as a rod to prod the ANC into further compromises in negotiations.
  - 12.3. While the resurgence of the right-wing is an objective phenomenon, the government as a whole was from the beginning able to forecast this danger, and among the contingency plans it worked out included measures to infiltrate and seek to control especially the para-military wings; and it is seeking now to exaggerate the threat in order to extract further compromises from the ANC.
13. There is an element of truth in all the three suppositions, most probably in the following combination:
  - 13.1. The resurgence of the right-wing is an objective phenomenon, not directly of the NP's making, but a response to the decisive period that the negotiations process has reached.
  - 13.2. The NP government would have been completely naive not to forecast the right-wing danger in broad terms; and it is fully informed of their plans and has a measure of control over some of the actions they undertake.
  - 13.3. There are divisions within the NP establishment - both the party and the state machineries - including around the question of alliances with elements of the right-wing such as the IFP to secure an electoral victory for an anti-ANC "moderate alliance", and the extent to which the strategy of using these forces to exert pressure on the ANC will be of benefit to the NP and the country as a whole.
  - 13.4. Related to the above is the reliance of particularly the black sections of the right-wing on central government for their survival. Therefore, underpinning their impact on developments is the lack of resolution on the part of De Klerk's government in dealing with these forces, as well as the role of state structures in reinforcing these forces through LIC strategies. This however does not subtract the fact that these forces are capable, politically, of adopting an independent line,

and that, in the current period they see their survival in pinning their colours to the mast of extreme right-wing reaction.

14. What then is the overall threat to the transition? The principal and immediate danger to the transition is the right-wing. This danger resides in their capacity to mobilise large sectors of whites against change, their paramilitary formations and the support they enjoy within various layers of the army and the police. But an important - if not the most crucial element of this danger - is the deliberate strategy among elements of the NP leadership to savour this development and seek to use it as pressure against the ANC, as well as the lack of resolution on the part of the NP leadership as a whole to deal with the problem decisively. In terms of numbers, the right-wing commands the support of an insignificant percentage of the population. But their capacity to wreak havoc cannot be underestimated.

#### V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TRANSITION:

15. The crunch moment in the negotiations process has arrived. On the one hand, the extreme right-wing is desperately trying to wreck negotiations and wreak havoc in broader society. On the other hand, while its objective political interests are served by a speedy resolution of the problems, the NP leadership is hamstrung by internal divisions and the fear not to provoke a showdown with the extreme right.
16. Within society as a whole, there is a groundswell of support for a speedy resolution of the crisis gripping the country, in particular, through a speedy transition underpinned by elections for a constitution-making body. The social forces supporting this approach straddle virtually all sectors of society, and at their core is the social base of the ANC and its allies. These forces command tremendous mass power and moral authority. They are united around the demand for an election date as a beacon to the whole process, and a settlement package that should be realised in the next few weeks. At the same time as focusing the energies of a wide spectrum of forces in society, these demands also address the impatience within our own constituency. If the latter is not attended to, the ANC faces the danger of losing credibility and support.
17. Thus far, the democratic forces have been able to break the disruptive resistance of the extreme right to the effort to move to discussion of substantive questions in negotiations. In our debate with the right-wing, however, we have not sufficiently used the argument that elections for the CA are in fact a testing of the will of the people - and the final product, including form of state, should reflect that will.
18. What then are the prospects for the coming period? The following possible scenarios for the crunch moment should be examined:
- 18.1. Sufficient consensus which divides the Cosag grouping: a walk-out by the white right, with the IFP, Ciskei and possibly Bop remaining within. This is achievable if the NP acts with resolution.

- 18.2. Sufficient consensus including the NP, XPP and DiP, DP and Patriotic Front forces, with the whole of Cosag walking out. In allowing this the NP could calculate that the disruptions by Cosag elements would force the ANC later to make further compromises.
- 18.3. A three-cornered deadlock, with the NP refusing to move forward without IFP et al agreement. The PF forces would either have to walk out or intensify mass action while remaining within negotiations. The NP would in this instance try to portray itself as the centrist reasonable force.
19. Our preference is for the first and second scenarios. But, does the NP have the will for a showdown with the extreme right, including the IFP and Bop? Among the dangers it is trying to avoid is an open debilitating split within its own leadership and an apparent consolidation of important sectors of Afrikanerdom against it.
20. This raises an important question about the state of the NP during the transition and how this relates to our own strategies. Our central task is to break the power of white minority rule and see to the creation of a just and democratic society. On the one hand, as the party in power representing neo-apartheid, the NP is our main adversary. This applies to the transition as a whole, and it is sure to be the case during elections. On the other hand, our approach to the transition is to secure a democratic transitional package primarily with the NP - a deal that would hold. We are therefore duty-bound to ensure that the NP as a whole is persuaded and compelled to accept such a package, and that its traditional constituency is brought along. Therefore, a balance needs to be struck between two considerations:
- 20.1. A National Party that is unable to deliver a sizeable constituency or one dominated by forces more committed to the LIC strategy or even sympathetic to the right-wing is not of much benefit to the democratic process.
- 20.2. The weakening of the NP means that, in addition to seeking an agreement on the transition with this party, we need to directly engage the forces in its traditional constituency and ensure that they understand our policies and accept the scenario for a democratic transition.

## VI. IMMEDIATE CHALLENGES:

21. Our main task under the current situation is to achieve the scenario(s) most preferable to us in the negotiating forum. This entails sufficient consensus in its strict definition: an agreement among forces which are capable of taking the whole process forward with a minimum of disruption. The right-wing alliance as a whole will most certainly balk at the idea of democratic non-racial elections for a constitution-making body. But this does not necessarily mean that they will act as a united force. It depends on their perception of their own isolation, tactical approaches by the ANC to neutralise some of them, and primarily, De Klerk's determination to ensure that those dependent on the state are not allowed to wreck the process.

22. The programme we adopt should seek to maximise all the factors in our favour. In the immediate period, the following urgent steps are needed:
- 22.1. Consolidate support for a speedy transition among the core forces of democratic change as well as big business, religious leaders and groups, international governments and the anti-apartheid movement.
  - 22.2. Prepare for decisive action across the board in case there is a three-cornered deadlock.
  - 22.3. Engage black elements of the right-wing, especially the IFP, more systematically around the issues that concern them most, such as regionalism and their leaders' fear of what would happen to them when change comes.
  - 22.4. Start to deliberately engage the social base of the white right such as farmers, workers and the civil service - taking into account their objective fears, ignorance about the ANC's policies, etc. In this regard, it is quite clear that we have failed to utilise the Strategic Perspective document to pro-actively move into this constituency.
  - 22.5. More systematically promote the ANC as a force with the capacity to govern and ensure a secure and peaceful SA, which is in the immediate and long-term interest of all the people. This should be contrasted with the disaster that would befall everyone, including supporters of the right-wing, if there is no democratic settlement.
  - 22.6. In the medium-term, the issue of strategies to adopt if the right-wing (backed by elements within the state) intensifies violent actions against the democratic movement, can no longer be postponed.
23. In negotiations, we should try as much as possible to limit the space within which the right-wing elements can manoeuvre. At the core of the debate is the question of elections to the CA as the testing of the will of the people about all aspects of the constitution, including the form of state. It is on this basis that parties will in any case campaign during elections, and the outcome will determine popular preferences.

In the event of a "three-cornered" deadlock, the democratic movement should consider two options, among others.

#### VII. OPTION 1 - A NON-RACIAL REFERENDUM:

24. The option of a referendum takes into account the need for maximum pressure on the regime and the extreme right in the form of decisive mass and other actions. But it also recognises that mass action on its own might not alter the quandary in which the NP finds itself.

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25. Some of the positive elements of a non-racial referendum, with a question around the scenario for the transition, would be:
- 25.1. It will be seen universally as essentially democratic.
  - 25.2. It will further legitimise the process and undercut the protestations of the extreme right.
  - 25.3. Whether they take part or not, the right-wing forces will be seen as the spoilers, and exposed as essentially undemocratic.
  - 25.4. It will create a basis for future non-racial national self-determination.
  - 25.5. It will create the possibility to consolidate ANC leadership of the country as a whole, and for us to make in-roads into the white, Coloured and Indian constituencies.
  - 25.6. It will help test and gear our machineries for the CA elections.
26. But such a solution has its own weaknesses and dangers:
- 26.1. While there might currently be problems with the right-wing, the majority of whites last year gave an overwhelming broad mandate for negotiations; and there cannot be any justification for yet another referendum.
  - 26.2. There is not a shred of doubt that virtually all blacks want negotiations to deliver, for them to urgently elect representatives who will draft a new constitution and form a new government.
  - 26.3. A referendum will not resolve the problem of right-wing mobilisation and resistance since they will reject it on the basis of their current arguments.
  - 26.4. It would introduce unnecessary delays; and in any case elections for a CA constitute a testing of the will of the people.
  - 26.5. The participation of the ANC and the NP on one side of the contest will serve to legitimise the NP among the majority and create a platform for it to penetrate black areas in preparation for future elections. Using its media resources and skills the NP will portray the victory as De Klerk's and its own.
  - 26.6. We will not be able to raise sufficient funds for two campaigns, and this will result in a situation in which we play junior partner to the better-endowed NP and possibly DP.
  - 26.7. The appearance of the ANC on the same side with the NP in such a contest will lay the basis for our detractors to portray us as collaborators.



27. Can it be, given the analysis of the relationship between the extreme right and the state, that the referendum option is in fact what the NP is driving towards? Some researchers have drawn attention to the following trend:
- 27.1. The hype about the right-wing in 1990 came in the period when the ANC was being pressurised to abandon armed struggle: the bombings, threats of assassination and massive propaganda. Some of the participants in that campaign were later exposed to be state agents.
  - 27.2. The second major hype was around the Potchefstroom by-election, laying the basis for the all-white referendum. The winner in the by-election soon thereafter broke away from the CP in support of negotiations.
  - 27.3. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that the current hype (aided by massive SABC propaganda) could in fact be part of the drive towards a non-racial referendum, for the NP to delay the process with a measure of legitimacy and, at the same time, piggy-back on the ANC to make serious in-roads into the black constituency in preparation for CA elections.

#### VIII. OPTION 2 - BUILDING UP PRESSURE FOR SUFFICIENT CONSENSUS:

28. The decision on the kind of pressure needed should be guided by the assessment of the main threat to the transition as outlined above. Three points for all-round pressure should therefore be identified:
- 28.1. Targeting the extreme right-wing for maximum pressure on such issues as free political activity, and ensuring their maximum isolation. This should however not create the impression that they are the main adversary; and it should intensify divisions among them rather than consolidate their unity.
  - 28.2. Targeting the broad right-wingers including those in the NP leadership who rely heavily on the strategy of LIC.
  - 28.3. Targeting the whole ruling bloc to ensure particularly that De Klerk and his government act with resolution on the need for a speedy settlement.
29. The central demands have been correctly identified as an election date, agreement on the whole package, and free political activity. All these demands enjoy the support of the widest spectrum of forces, including significant elements of big business and the religious community. Therefore in deciding on the form of actions, we should also pose the question, how they will consolidate these forces.
30. Some of the major initiatives needed are:
- 30.1. Ensure further consolidation of the forces united around the burial of CH and OR,

especially mobilising civil society including big business and religious leaders to pronounce and themselves exert pressure on these issues.

- 30.2. Follow up action could include a decisive campaign e.g., around payment of taxes, as well as Consumer Boycott, industrial actions, etc. Do these actions have to start on June 1, or should we seek to consolidate the broader forces first?
- 30.3. While exposing and dealing with problems of police and army repression, the positive developments towards co-operation which emerged during the recent demonstrations need to be nurtured.
- 30.4. In our medium-term planning, we should devise strategies of how to deal with the possibility - no matter how remote - of the outbreak of civil war.

18 May, 1993