


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**C O N S T I T U T I O N
R E P O R T S
E I G H T H R E P O R T**

26 JULY 1993



EMBARGOED UNTIL TABLING IN THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL

**EIGHTH REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES TO THE
NEGOTIATING COUNCIL
26 JULY 1993**

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 In terms of the Resolution on Steps to be Taken for the Purposes of Establishing a New Constitutional Order, we were instructed by the Negotiating Council to draft a Constitution for the transition which shall make provision for:

1.1.1 the election according to a system of proportional representation of a constitution making body, legislature and national government for the transitional phase which will include a national and regional component. With regard to constitution making, this Constitution shall provide for deadlock breaking and special majorities by which decisions will be taken;

1.1.2 the election of regional legislatures and the establishment of regional governments in the transition;

- 1.1.3 the powers, functions and structures of regions for the transitional period;
 - 1.1.4 fundamental human rights on a justiciable basis during the transitional period;
 - 1.1.5 a constitutional court/tribunal to ensure the justiciability of the constitutional principles, of the fundamental rights and of the Constitution itself.
- 1.2 This Resolution requires us to proceed along the lines of the "two stage process", and to formulate the provisions of a constitution for a transitional period during which an elected body will function both as a legislature and a constitution making body charged with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution in accordance with Constitutional Principles agreed upon by the MPNP. Some of the submissions to us continue to urge us to follow a "one stage process" according to which a rigid constitution will be adopted by the MPNP. In the light of our instruction we cannot proceed along these lines: we are required to follow the "two stage process" and have done so. We have, however, paid particular regard to the status of SPRs and have made provisions in our draft to ensure that they will have both autonomy and original powers - factors which are stressed as being of importance in some submissions dealing with the "one stage process".
- 1.3 In our Fifth Report we drew attention to a number of issues relevant to the drafting of a constitution for the transitional period on which decisions still have to be taken by the Negotiating Council. Participants were asked by the Negotiating Council to submit their proposals concerning such matters to us by 12 July. We have received responses to our Fifth Report from various

participants. In preparing this report we have had regard to these responses, as well as to the previous submissions made to us. The previous submissions include both submissions of a general nature and drafts of proposed constitutional legislation.

1.4 We have prepared a Draft Outline of a constitution for the transition which we attach to this report. This draft provides an indication of the subject matter of a possible constitution, and includes preliminary texts of two chapters of the Constitution: these preliminary texts are intended to provide an indication of how the legislative and constitution making process would be conducted, and how SPRs would be established and developed, if the outline is approved. *The preliminary texts will be edited and refined and developed in the light of the debates in the Negotiating Council.*

1.5 *This report provides an overview of the Draft Outline, but it is essential that the Draft Outline (including the texts) be studied by all the participants.*

The technical interpretation of the Draft Outline will be further elaborated to the Negotiating Council when we present this Report.

1.6 Certain issues relevant to the constitution for the transition, concern matters of principle on which political decisions are required from the Negotiating Council. We deal with some of these matters below.

2. CONFEDERATION

The national territory should be defined in the Constitution. The territorial boundaries are relevant to the holding of elections and also to the definition of the SPR boundaries. The question of confederalism needs therefore to be addressed expeditiously to enable the constitution to be finalised.

3. THE TBVC STATES

We have received a recent submission from the government of Bophuthatswana which proposes "associate membership of the Republic of South Africa" for Bophuthatswana. What it has in mind is a retention of its present identity, representation in the South African parliament on a non-voting basis save in regard to issues directly affecting the constitution, and submission to South African laws only if they are specifically adopted by its own Parliament. We cannot, however, explore the possibilities of this proposal unless we are assured by the Negotiating Council that instead of reincorporation, Bophuthatswana will be accorded the status of an "associate member of the RSA."

The question of the reincorporation of the TBVC states is relevant to the definition of the national territory, the boundaries of the SPRs, and the holding of elections. Whether reincorporation should take place, and if it does, when and on what terms this should be done has not yet been resolved.

Apart from the issue of boundaries and elections, there are a number of technical issues that will have to be addressed if there is to be reincorporation. These include the legal forms according to which it will be effected, arrangements to be made in respect of existing contractual liabilities, and the creation of a single legal order in the SPRs into which the TBVC states will fall.

If there is to be reincorporation it would be easier from a practical point of view to address these issues before the elections are held. This would not only facilitate the conducting of the elections, but would also allow more time for the process of rationalisation and integration of the existing administrations, and make it easier to establish SPR government and administration during the transitional period. For the purpose of drafting a constitution for the transitional period it is essential to reach finality on the question whether, and if so, when and on what terms the TBVC states will be reincorporated. Similarly, we are not in a position to assess the constitutional implications of those submissions in which the retention of sovereign status for SPRs

is proposed. Such "inalienable and untransferable sovereignty" which according to these submissions, gives preference to the provisions of SPR constitutions over and above those of the National Constitution, is essentially confederalist in nature and does not correspond with the approach consistently adopted in the Negotiating Council and in our previous Reports. Again, as stated in paragraph 2, we urge the Negotiating Council to take a decision on the matter of confederalism.

4. NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND LANGUAGES

The question of languages during the transition both at national and SPR level needs to be addressed in the constitution for the transitional period. This, and the question of symbols, such as the anthem, the flag and the coat of arms, are political rather than technical constitutional issues. The MPNP must decide how these issues are to be dealt with. Possibly a special committee of the MPNP could be appointed to address such issues which call for political decisions, and to make recommendations thereon to the MPNP.

5. COMING INTO FORCE OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

The Constitution for the transitional period will have to make provision for the holding of the elections and the governing of the country after the elections have been held. We have assumed that in the period between the enactment of the constitution, and the holding of elections, existing administrations either on their own or in consultation with the TEC will remain responsible in terms of existing constitutional legislation for the governing of the country. If this is so, the constitution could stipulate that the provisions relevant to the holding of elections and the making of preparations for the establishment of SPR government and administration in the newly created SPRs, shall come into force at an appropriate time before the elections are

held, and that the other provisions shall come into force immediately after the elections have been held. Appropriate transitional provisions will be necessary to ensure that there is constitutional continuity and that there is at no stage a political vacuum.

6. CITIZENSHIP IN THE TRANSITION

The constitution should make provision for all existing South African citizens and all citizens of reincorporated TBVC states to be citizens of the new Republic of South Africa. There should also be provisions authorising the acquisition of citizenship in terms of the prevailing citizenship legislation which should be amended in so far as the MPNP may consider this to be necessary, for the purpose of the elections. Because of a possible link between citizenship and voting, and the need for existing citizenship legislation to be rationalised, this would have to be addressed during the pre-election period. We will deal further with this issue after the Negotiating Council has responded to the report of the Technical Committee on the Independent Electoral Commission and after we have had an opportunity of consulting with such Committee on these matters.

7. COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE ELECTED BODY

7.1 The elected body functioning as legislature

This is dealt with in **Chapter 4** of the Draft Outline.

7.1.1 *Composition of the legislature*

During the time of the transitional period, the elected body will constitute parliament. Parliaments may be unicameral or bicameral. A unicameral parliament during the period of transition could accommodate SPR interests through an electoral system which makes provision for a proportion of the

members to be elected on regional lists. However, in the light of the constitutional principles adopted by the MPNP which imply a dispensation with safeguarded and entrenched SPR autonomy, as well as regional participation by SPR representatives in the constitution making process, and the need to address the matters referred to in paragraph 8 below, we consider that a bicameral system may be more appropriate: a second house elected on an SPR basis would provide an important link between the SPRs and the National Assembly during this period.

In the draft constitution we therefore make provision for a bicameral system with a National Assembly of 400 members and a Senate to be elected on an SPR basis. The election for the National Assembly will be according to a system of proportional representation in which there will be both regional and national lists. The Draft Outline refers to a schedule in which the voting system is described. We have not yet finalised the schedule, but will do so in our subsequent reports.

In order to establish the equality of SPR dispensations during the transitional period, the Senate will be composed of an equal number of representatives for each SPR. With SPR representation on an equal footing and SPR representatives in the National Assembly, the Senate does not need to be a large body, and provision has been made for 10 senators per SPR. Senators could be elected directly or indirectly by SPR legislatures or by the SPR representatives in the National Assembly. We favour a system of indirect election for the Senate for the transitional period. This will provide the necessary link between SPR interests and the constitution making process, and will do so in a way which ensures that the

first general election is not unduly complicated. This will not preclude the adoption of a system of direct election of a Senate if the constitution making body decides that a bicameral system should be adopted for the future.

7.1.2 *Powers of the legislature*

Parliament for the period of transition, will have full legislative powers, which means that all laws must be adopted by it subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Immunities and privileges of Parliament and its members should be regulated by law.

7.1.3 *Procedures*

During the transitional period Parliament will have to pass ordinary laws, laws dealing with the budget and appropriations and may even have to amend the constitution for the period of transition. Different procedures and deadlock breaking mechanisms must be devised for these different kinds of legislation. In the draft constitution we have dealt with these issues as follows:

7.1.3.1 We consider that it is important that the Senate be involved in legislation during this period, which will involve the phasing in of the new SPRs, and will also be a time when close co-operation will be required between the national legislature and SPR legislatures. We have therefore provided that ordinary legislation should generally be passed with a majority in both the National Assembly and the Senate. If

the Senate rejects a bill, a joint meeting of both houses will be held so that they can attempt to resolve their differences. The legislation could then be passed by a majority at such a joint sitting. To facilitate co-operation and where possible, to avoid disagreements arising between the two houses, provision is made for a system of standing joint committees of the National Assembly and the Senate. The requirement that there be both SPR and national lists for the election of the National Assembly ensures that SPR interests will be adequately represented in the National Assembly and in the joint sitting.

7.1.3.2

Money bills (namely budgetary measures and appropriation bills) must also be approved by both the National Assembly and the Senate, but in the case of rejection by the Senate, such bills could be adopted by the National Assembly with an ordinary majority.

7.1.3.3

Bills concerning specific SPR matters must also be approved by the National Assembly and the Senate. However, should the Senate reject such a bill, it cannot be overruled by the National Assembly. A bill which affects a particular region or regions only, must be approved by a majority of the Senate representatives of that particular region or regions.

7.1.3.4

It may be necessary for technical reasons to amend the Constitution for the transitional period in order to address situations which have not been contemplated or difficulties which are encountered in the application of the Constitution. A distinction must be drawn between fundamental provisions such as the Constitutional Principles, and key aspects of the constitution making process, which should not be amended, and other provisions of the Constitution which may be capable of being amended.

We have provided that these core provisions cannot be amended by the legislature during the period of transition. We have also made special provision for the protection of SPR boundaries and SPR interests. Other amendments to the constitution for the period of transition, which are not designed to subvert the essence of the Constitutional Principles, can be passed by a two-thirds majority of both the National Assembly and the Senate, sitting together in joint session.

The reason why Constitutional Principles, and the key aspects of the constitution making process should not be amended by the legislature during the time of transition, is that these provisions are contained in a **solemn pact** agreed upon by the parties in the MPNP, and constitute the basis of the future constitutional

state and constitution making process. Constitutionally, once the MPNP is dissolved, there will be no other body which can change this solemn pact, which must remain binding until the new constitution has been adopted in accordance with its requirements.

7.2 The Elected Body as Constitution Making Body

This is dealt with in **Chapter 5** of the Draft Outline. The process which is contemplated by the Draft Outline of the Constitution for the transitional period, can be described as follows:

7.2.1 The MPNP, through the adoption of a solemn pact of Constitutional Principles, has laid the foundations of the future constitutional state. The elected body acting as a constitution making body, will have the legitimacy to perform the task of giving precise form and content to the constitutional state. In doing so, the elected body (whether it acts as legislature or constitution making body) must act in terms of the constitution for the period of transition drawn up and approved by the MPNP.

7.2.2 In strict constitutional terms, the nature and task as well as the functions of the elected body acting as a constitution making body could be described in the following way:

The elected body, acting in accordance with the precepts of the Constitutional Principles, concluded as a solemn pact by the MPNP, is specifically charged under the constitution for the transitional period, to undertake a *total revision* of that constitution.

Constitutionally, total revision of a constitution means the writing of a new constitution. There are various precedents for this elsewhere in the world.

An understanding of the process in this way, namely that an elected body, authorized and charged to do so by the MPNP, will undertake a total revision of the Constitution, within prescribed forms, and will adopt a new constitution according to prescribed specified majorities within prescribed time frames will, we believe, put the contemplated processes in their proper context.

7.2.3

The elected body acting as constitution making body, should be seen as separate from the elected body acting as legislature or Parliament. It has therefore been provided in the draft that we have prepared, that for the purposes of totally revising the constitution, the elected bodies will sit together. The National Assembly and Senate sitting jointly will be the constitution making body. The constitution making body should be given an appropriate name - those suggested so far are: **Constitutional Conference; Constitutional Assembly; Parliament in Constitutional Conference** or **Constituent Assembly**. In the draft text we refer to the CMB, but an appropriate name must be chosen, and used in the text of the constitution. To indicate its constitution making task, the CMB will have its own chairperson, and provision is also made for the CMB to appoint its own commissions, technical and parliamentary committees and advisory bodies to assist it in its task.

7.2.4 The general constitutional principles which are agreed to by the MPNP in the form of a solemn pact are fundamental to the total revision to be undertaken by the CMB. As stated above, these principles cannot be amended. On completion of the total revision in accordance with the provisions of the constitution for the transitional period, the CMB must submit its draft of the new constitution to the Constitutional Court for endorsement.

7.2.5 The CMB, by the specified majority, and with the endorsement by the Constitutional Court, could if it so decides adopt certain separate parts of the constitution before the total revision has been completed. It may be possible for instance for SPR constitutions to be adopted in this way if a decision is taken that there should be such constitutions. This will, of course, only be possible if the SPR constitutions are designed in ways which ensure that they will be compatible with the new national constitution when it is ultimately adopted.

7.2.6 The total revision of the Constitution has to be completed within a period of two years. If this is not done a draft Constitution adopted by a simple majority of the CMB, and endorsed by the Constitutional Court, may be submitted to a popular referendum. If the draft is ratified by a specified majority in the referendum it shall become the new Constitution. If it is not adopted, or if a referendum is not held, then Parliament shall be dissolved, new elections shall be held, and the total revision shall be undertaken by the new Parliament and be completed within a period of one year.

8. SPR GOVERNMENT IN THE TRANSITION

8.1 In formulating the powers and functions of the SPRs in Chapter 9 of the attached Draft Outline we have made provision for the establishment and implementation of elected SPR government during the transitional period on a flexible basis under the supervision and co-ordination of the national government and the constitution making body as well as a Financial and Fiscal Commission and a Commission on SPR government, on both of which SPRs will be represented.

8.2 This flexibility seems to us to be necessary for various reasons.

8.2.1 First, the details of the allocation of powers and functions by the constitution-making body to SPRs, within the framework of the Constitutional Principles, may prove to be different to any allocation of such powers and functions to them under the constitution for the transitional period. Until the final allocation has been made, it seems to us to be appropriate that the SPRs should have concurrent rather than exclusive powers, and that there should be consultation and co-operation between the National Government and the various SPR governments in the exercise and implementation of such powers.

8.2.2 There will inevitably have to be a rationalisation and reallocation of posts from existing administrations to new administrations. The TBVC states, the Self-governing Territories, and the Provinces will no longer exist, and the former employees of these administrations will, where possible, have to be accommodated in administrations to be established by the new SPRs.

If material changes are made in the functions and responsibilities of the National Government, this will also have an impact on the structure and functions of existing government departments. How the various former administrations can best be incorporated into the administrations to be created under the constitutional arrangement for the transitional period, will depend not only on the number, boundaries and administrative capitals of the new SPRs, and their relationship to the number, boundaries and administrative capitals of the former administrations, but also on the allocation of powers and functions to the National Government and the SPR governments in the transition.

The Constitution for the transitional period will have to make provision for the transfer of responsibilities from existing structures, to structures to be created under the new constitution, and for this to be done in a way which least disrupts the functioning of the civil service in all its aspects and delivery of services throughout the country.

8.2.3

Another factor favouring the phased introduction of SPR government is the need to establish a uniform system of law nationally, as well as uniformity within the different SPRs. The legal order existing immediately after the elections will include pre-existing legislation of the Tricameral Parliament, Provincial Ordinances, TBVC legislation, and legislation of the Self-governing Territories. In some SPRs all these forms of legislation will have to be accommodated. The constitution can provide a framework for the rationalisation, but there will be a need for close co-operation between the national government and the SPR governments in sorting out the problems that will arise.

There will also be a need to co-ordinate and rationalise existing structures for the administration of justice including possibly the establishment of new courts and the maintenance of law and order. Here too the national government will have a crucial role to play in the process of co-ordination and restructuring.

8.2.4

It may be possible for certain preparatory work and planning to be undertaken by the TEC in the period between the enactment of the Constitution for the transitional period and its coming into force. We suggest that consideration be given to appointing a Secretariat for each SPR (we assume that this would be done by the TEC), and for these Secretariats to be charged with the task of making preparations for the changes which will occur when the Constitution for the transitional period comes into force. Their work would include the identification of all administrations and providers of services within the boundaries of the new SPRs, the differences in the statutory regimes under which portions of the new SPRs may previously have been governed, and what may be needed to establish a uniform legal order and effective administration. The Secretariats could report to the TEC and carry out all other duties allocated to them by the TEC. They could also be made responsible for convening the first meetings of the SPR legislatures, and conducting elections within the SPR legislatures for the appointment of the various elected positions.

But even allowing for this, it seems to us to be likely that much of the restructuring will have to take place after the Constitution for the transitional period has come into force, and political decisions have been taken by the newly elected SPR

legislatures in regard to the establishing and staffing of departments for the implementation of the responsibilities entrusted to them.

There will have to be close co-operation between the National Government and the SPR governments during this period to ensure that there is no breakdown in services, and the National Government will clearly have a crucial role to play in the supervision and implementation of the restructuring.

8.2.5 In our view the best way of ensuring continuity of services and of rationalising and co-ordinating the existing administrations is to require the rationalisation and co-ordination to be done by the National Government and the SPR governments in co-operation with each other. When necessary, the National Government will be able to take responsibility for the continuity of services while the new SPR administrations are being set up, and to transfer appropriate functions to the SPR administrations as soon as they are in a position to assume responsibility for them. Some SPRs may have the infrastructure to take on administrative responsibilities sooner than other SPRs. We propose the establishment of a Commission on SPRs which will have the task, inter alia, of facilitating the process of establishment of SPR governments during the period of the transition as well as the development of the final SPR dispensation.

8.2.6 The need for flexibility and co-operation between the National Government and SPR governments during the transitional period, are factors which favour proportional representation in the executive, and a bicameral legislature in which one chamber will consist of SPR representatives. The Draft

Outline of the constitution that we have formulated makes provision for these structures, as well as for proportional representation in the SPR executives.

- 8.3 In line with the equilibrium suggested in our Sixth and Seventh Reports we have made provision in the preliminary texts for a process according to which SPR constitutions would be formulated and adopted, possibly even prior to the adoption of a new national constitution and subject to the approval of the CMB.
- 8.4 We have continued to use the expression SPR in our Reports and in the Draft Outline. A decision, must however, be taken in regard to the term which will be used to describe these entities in the text of the Constitution.
9. We are continuing our work and will complete drafts of the other sections of the Constitution as soon as we are able to do so. Our work will be facilitated if the Negotiating Council would consider as soon as possible the matters raised by us in this Report, and indicate whether or not the basis on which we are proceeding is acceptable to it.

SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED BY THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

1.	ANC	12/05/93	Form of State and Constitutional principles
2.	Government	12/05/93	Principles Governing Constitution making in South Africa
3.	M A McLoughlin	26/03/93	Constitution and Bill of Rights (C5)
4.	Bophuthatswana	12/05/93	Submission on Constitutional Matters
5.	Democratic Party	12/05/93	Submission re Constitutional Matters
6.	PAC	29/04/93	Input on Constitutional Principles and the Form of State
7.	Dikwankwetla	28/04/93	Constitution Making Process

8.	AZANYU	27/04/93	Demand for a Constituent Assembly
9.	Ciskei	13/05/93	Head Notes - Constitutional Affairs
10.	Venda	13/05/93	Position Paper on the Form of State
11.	IFP/KwaZulu	13/05/93	Heads of Arguments and Positions
12.	AVU	13/05/93	Constitutional Proposals
13.	Government	13/05/93	Constitutional Proposals Regarding which Position Papers will be Presented to the Negotiating Council
14.	Conservative Party	13/05/93	Heads of Arguments on constitutional issues
15.	KwaZulu	13/05/93	Draft statement/ proposal on constitutional issues
16.	Transkei	13/05/93	Submission: Constitutional Issues
17.	NIC	14/05/93	Outline of Submission
18.	Gender Advisory Committee		Report to Codesa
19.	M A McLaughlan	15/04/93	Constitution and Bill of Rights
20.	Government	18/05/93	Draft Legislation for the Reincorporation of the TBVC States into the RSA
21.	M A McLaughlan	30/03/93	Submission: Constitution and Bill of

Rights

22.	College of Magoshi in Lebowa	19/05/93	Contribution on role of traditional leaders
23.	Inyandza National Movement	19/05/93	Form of state and constitutional principles
24.	United People's Front	19/05/93	The Balance of Power Between the Central, Regional and Local Levels of Government
25.	Ciskei	19/05/93	Submission on constitutional issues
26.	Bophuthatswana	19/05/93	On powers and functions of regions
27.	Bophuthatswana	19/05/93	Fundamental Principles Recommended to be Contained in a Constitution
28.	Ximoko Progressive Party	16/05/93	Submission on future constitutional development
29.	AVU	19/05/93	On transitional arrangements
30.	ANC	19/05/93	Consultative Conference on Regional Policy
31.	TIC/NIC	19/05/93	Memorandum to Planning Committee on constitutional matters

32.	Intando Ye Sizwe	19/05/93	On Codesa agreements
33.	AVU	19/05/93	Submission: Self-determination
34.	Democratic Party	19/05/93	Powers, Duties and Functions of Regions
35.	IFP	19/05/93	Position of the IFP on Constitutional Issues
36.	Cape Province Traditional Leaders	19/05/93	Interim Position on the Form of State and on Constitutional Principles
37.	KwaZulu	19/05/93	The Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal
38.	Afrikanervryheidstigting Prof. A W G Raath	19/05/93	Selfbeskikking en Sessessie: Die Saak van die Afrikanervolk
39.	Afrikaner Freedom Foundation	19/05/93	Codesa and Afrikaner Self-determination
40.	PAC	19/05/93	Submission on constitutional principles and fundamental rights
41.	ANC	19/05/93	Interim Regional Administration
42.	PAC	21/05/93	Submission (duplicate of no.40)
43.	Konserwatiewe Party	21/05/93	Response of the KP on the Report of the Technical Committee on Self-determination, Form of State, the Future

of the TBVC States and other Related Matters

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| 44. | UPF | 24/05/93 | The Balance of Power Between the Central, Regional and Local Levels of Government |
| 45. | S. A. Government | 25/05/93 | Principles Governing Constitution Making in South Africa |
| 46. | S. A. Government | 27/05/93 | First Draft Text of a Proposed Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993. |
| 47. | PAC | 21/05/93 | PAC of Azania Input Regarding Constitutional Principles |
| 48. | Government of Bophuthatswana | 21/05/93 | Submission by the Government of Bophuthatswana on the Second Report of the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues |
| 49. | Annette Reinecke | 24/05/93 | Proposed New Constitution |
| 50. | Dikwankwetia Party | 03/06/93 | Constitutional Principles |
| 51. | Cape Traditional Leaders | 03/06/93 | General Constitutional Principle and Traditional Leaders and Indigenous Forms of Government |
| 52. | Transvaal Traditional | | |

	Leaders	03/06/93	General Constitutional Principles: on the Third Report
66.	IFP	08/06/93	Reaction to the Fourth Report
67.	Inyandza National Movement	09/06/93	Submission: Form of State and Constitutional Principles.
68.	Bophuthatwana Government	08/06/93	Submission on traditional law
69.	Democratic Party	08/06/93	Comments on the Third Report
70.	Democratic Party	08/06/93	Comments on the Fourth Report
71.	Democratic Party	08/06/93	Amendments to comments on Third Report
72.	Cape Traditional Leaders	08/06/93	Comments on Reports
73.	KwaZulu Government	15/06/93	Submission on constitutional issues
74.	Women's National Coalition	15/06/93	Comments on Third Report
75.	Kwasizabantu Ministers' Conference	09/06/93	Re: No Discrimination towards Sexual Orientation
76.	SACOB	18/06/93	Regional Boundaries and the National Economy: Fundamental Constitutional

Rights and Issues

77.	PAC	01/06/93	Working Document : Comments on Regionalism
78.	Democratic Party	17/06/93	Suggested alternatives to Paragraphs 3.7 and 3.8 of the Third Report
79.	Democratic Party	21/06/93	Further Comments by the Democratic Party on the Third Report of the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues
80.	Women's National Coalition	21/06/93	Letter re constitutional principles
81.	ANC	22/06/93	ANC Response to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters : The question of constitutions for the regions and regional assymetry.
82.	IFP	25/06/93	The constitution of the Federal Republic of South Africa
83.	IFP	25/06/93	Response to the Schedule attached to the Committee's Sixth Report with reference to the Committee's representation of the IFP process proposal
84.	S.A. Government	28/06/93	Suggested Allocations of Functions and Powers between the Central and

Regional Levels of Government.

85.	IFP	18/06/93	The Constitution of the Federal Republic of South Africa
86.	IFP, Kwazulu Government Afrikaner Volksunie, Conservative Party, Bophuthatswana and Ciskei Governments	28/06/93	Joint Submission on a Process of Transformation.
87.	Democratic Party		Transitional Arrangements for SPR's
88.	Inkatha	24/06/93	Submission: comments on 6th report of the technical committee
89.	Koelkas Werkwinkel c.c.	30/06/93	Submission: Proposals on alternative constitution and borders
90.	The English Academy of Southern Africa	15/06/93	Language Clauses in the Constitution.
91.	ESKOM	05/07/93	Submission on allocation of powers and functions to the various levels of government in the future RSA
92.	Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs	08/07/93	Memorandum
93.	A S van Gass	06/07/93	Southern Africa : The Way

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| 94. | Telkom S A Limited | 05/07/93 | Demarcation, Functions and Powers of Regions |
| 95. | Civil Aviation and Defence
Bophuthatswana Govt. | 12/07/93 | Submission - Main Elements of a Draft Constitution |
| 96. | Democratic Party | 13/07/93 | Response to the Fifth Report: Constitutional Issues (15/6/93) |
| 97. | Inkatha Freedom Party | 13/07/93 | Submission of the IFP to the Technical Committee on Constitutional Matters |
| 98. | Gay Rights | 28/06/93 | Submission on gay rights.
135 Petition letters. |
| 99. | Dr GPN Venter
Dept. of Mineral
and Energy Affairs | 8/07/93 | Submission on energy policy |
| 100. | Afrikaanse
Handelsintituut | 16/07/93 | Submission: Ekonomiese bestel vir
Suid Afrika in 'n nuwe bedeling |
| 101. | Ciskei Government | 13/7/93 | Submission to the Commission on the
Delimitation of Regions:the Constitution of the
Kei State |
| 102. | Bophuthatswana Govt. | 13/7/93 | Supplementary remarks on constitutional
matters |

