

THESE MINUTES ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND RESTRICTED TO MEMBERS OF THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL HELD AT 09h15 ON FRIDAY 15 OCTOBER 1993 AT THE WORLD TRADE CENTRE

PRESENT: See Addendum A

1. Moment of Prayer/Meditation

A moment of prayer/meditation was observed by all members.

2. Welcome and Attendance

The participants were welcomed.

3. Ratification of the Agenda

The agenda was ratified with no amendments.

4. Minutes

Due to time constraints, it was agreed to defer this item to the next meeting of the Negotiating Council.

5. Reportback from the Planning Committee

5.1 The events in the Lebowa area:

It was noted that an urgent meeting was convened this morning between a delegation from the Lebowa Government led by MJ Mahlangu and A Fourie from the South African Government. Furthermore, consideration was given to the immediate issues to be resolved in this regard and the following was agreed:

- * The Planning Committee encouraged both the Lebowa Government and the South African Government to meet bilaterally to resolve the fundamental issues pertaining to this matter. In that regard the Lebowa Cabinet and the State President were encouraged to meet as

a matter of urgency to take the matter further.

- * The delegations present were requested to clarify whether a number of civil servants were actually dismissed or put on long leave. Furthermore, consideration should be given for a joint call for public servants to return to work.
- * Every effort should be made to take account of the perception amongst the Lebowa Government and the civil servants that the South African Police may not be conducting itself in an impartial manner.
- * Consideration should be given by the Lebowa Government and the South African Government to working jointly to ensure that suppliers of services are paid as a matter of urgency.

6. Substantive Issues

6.1 Report on Further Work on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's:

6.1.1 The Task Group on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPR's was welcomed. Present were P Daphne, J du Pisanie, A du Plessis (Co-Chairperson), R Mokate (technical secretary), J Nokgoro, Y Muthien, B Nomvete (Co-Chairperson), I Rautenbach, O Shisana, A Steyn, I van der Merwe (advisor). The Task Group proceeded to present its report:

- * The Co-Chairpersons introduced the report and gave background and summary report;
- * Y Muthien presented the section on the Kwazulu/Natal SPR;
- * P Daphne presented the section on the Eastern Cape/Kei SPR;
- * A Steyn presented the section on the Western Cape and Northern Cape SPR;
- * Job Nokgoro presented the section on the North West/Orange Free State SPR;
- * I Rautenbach presented the section on the Northern Transvaal SPR;
- * J du Pisanie presented the section on the Eastern Transvaal SPR;
- * R Mokate presented the section on the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-

Vereeniging SPR.

- 6.1.2 Questions of clarity were then put forward to the Task Group from participants. The procedure for questions was to deal with each SPR in the order as presented to the meeting.
- 6.1.3 It was noted that the final decision with regard to the Delimitation/Demarcation will be taken by the Negotiating Council.
- 6.1.4 It was suggested that members of the Task Group should be present when the report was debated as the need might arise for questions of clarity to be answered. The Task Group was thanked for its excellent work. The administrative staff were also thanked for their work.

6.2 **The Second Version of the Draft Electoral Bill by the Technical Committee on the Electoral Bill:**

- 6.2.1 The Technical Committee on the IEC was welcomed. Present were J Bruwer (state law adviser), D Davis, SK Ndlovu, RB Rosenthal and F Ginwala. Apologies were noted from HR Laubscher. The Technical Committee proceeded to present its report.
- 6.2.2 Once the Technical Committee had presented its report, it was suggested that an Ad-Hoc Committee should be appointed to deal with the issues identified by the Technical Committee and other issues identified on a continuous basis. After discussion it was agreed in principle to appoint an Ad-Hoc Committee, subject to the debate and discussion in the Council. Furthermore, the Ad-Hoc Committee would not be a substitute for further debate in the Council on the issue but should play a facilitatory role.
- 6.2.3 It was noted that the Technical Committee was still awaiting submissions from participants with regard to the issue of public funding.
- 6.2.4 Questions of clarity were put to the Technical Committee members.
- 6.2.5 Clause 16 "Persons entitled to vote" refers:
 - * The Technical Committee noted that the clause as formulated did not accurately reflect the views of the Technical Committee as time constraints had hindered accurate redrafting. Furthermore, the Explanatory Memorandum did reflect the views of the Technical

Committee with regard to this clause and other clauses referred to in the said memorandum (see Addendum B).

- * It was noted the Technical Committee would include a definition of "ordinarily resident".
- * After lengthy debate and discussion, it was noted that this clause should be referred to the proposed Ad-Hoc Committee for its attention.

6.2.6 Clause 17 "Persons not entitled to vote" refers:

- * After lengthy debate and discussion on this clause, it was agreed to refer this clause to the proposed Ad-Hoc Committee for its attention.

6.2.7 Clause 18 "Voters' cards" refers:

- * After lengthy debate and discussion on this clause, it was noted that this clause should be referred to the proposed Ad-Hoc Committee for its attention.

6.2.8 It was finally agreed that an Ad-Hoc Committee should be formed. The Planning Committee was mandated to make a recommendation with regard to the composition of the Ad-Hoc Committee.

6.2.9 It was noted that the Technical Committee should commence its work, in liaison with the Technical Committee, as a matter of urgency.

6.2.10 The Technical Committee was thanked for its work so far completed. It was noted that this report would be further dealt with by the Negotiating Council on Wednesday 20 October 1993.

6.3 **The Umtata Attack:**

6.3.1 The following procedure to follow was agreed upon:

- * The PAC, the South African Government and the Transkei Government, in that order, would make opening statements to the Council;
- * The issue would be debated and discussed by Council;
- * The PAC, the South African Government and the

Transkei Government, in that order, would make closing statements to the Council.

- 6.3.2 The PAC proceeded to give its opening statement to the Council (see Addendum C), followed by the South African Government (see Addendum D) and the Transkei Government, who tabled its proposed draft resolution during the course of its opening statement (see Addendum E).
- 6.3.3 Discussion and debate followed.
- 6.3.4 The proposed draft resolution of the National Party was tabled to participants (see Addendum F).
- 6.3.5 When the opportunity of the AVU to address the Council arose, a point of order was raised which noted that the AVU had, before the debate on this issue commenced, distributed a document to all participants (see Addendum G). The point of order further noted that the correct procedure for the distribution of documents had not been followed by the AVU. It was suggested that the AVU should not be allowed to participate in the current debate. The AVU disputed this and stated that it had followed the correct procedure for the distribution of documents. No verification of the statement made by the AVU could be obtained. It was noted that the Administration had not been advised of the intended distribution of the document. Further points of order were raised.
- 6.3.6 Before this issue was taken further, a further point of order was raised requesting the withdrawal of the last paragraph of the said document and a public apology by the AVU to the two participants in the Council whom the document referred to. Further points of order were raised.
- 6.3.7 It was suggested that the AVU should withdraw the document completely. Furthermore, such derogatory statements against Council participants were completely unacceptable and went against the dignity and decorum of the Council.
- 6.3.8 The AVU agreed to withdraw the last paragraph of the statement. At this point a further request for an apology to the two Council participants was made. The AVU apologised for any misunderstanding in the distribution of the document but stood by its claim that permission had been sought for the distribution. The AVU requested that the document stands in the Council.

- 6.3.9 Discussion continued around the initial point of order raised. T Eloff stated that no member of the AVU had approached any member of the Administration with regard to the distribution of the said document.
- 6.3.10 It was agreed to note and condone the breach of procedure by the AVU, to delete the last paragraph of the document and to let the document stand. The Council returned to the issue under discussion and the AVU was afforded its opportunity to address the Council.
- 6.3.11 Furthermore, the PAC tabled its proposed draft resolution to the Council (see Addendum H).
- 6.3.12 During the course of its contribution the ANC put forward a number of questions to the South African Government and requested an answer. It was suggested that more time was needed for this issue and no resolution should be passed today. It was further suggested that only once the answers were received by the Council and all the information requested was at hand, a suitable resolution could be considered. It was noted that the ANC would submit the questions raised and any further questions to the Chairperson.
- 6.3.13 Once the debate was curtailed and all participants who wished to express their views had done so, closing statements were made by the PAC, the South African Government and the Transkei Government.
- 6.3.14 Due to time constraints, it was agreed to note the three proposed draft resolutions and defer the issue. The PAC and the Transkei Government noted that it wished the issue to be revisited on Monday. It was further agreed to refer the whole issue, including the three proposed draft resolutions and the information requested, to the Planning Committee on the condition that the issue was brought back to the Negotiating Council.

7. Meetings Schedule and Draft Programme

The meetings schedule and draft programme were noted (see Addendum I and J).

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Closure

The meeting adjourned at 15h00.

These minutes were ratified at the meeting of the Negotiating Council of 3 November 1993 and the amended version signed by the Chairperson of the original meeting on10/11/1993.....



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CHAIRPERSON

Addendum A

The following delegates and advisers were present at the meeting of the Negotiating Council on Friday 15 October 1993:

L Landers : Chairperson
DJ de Villiers : Assistant Chairperson

Organisation	Delegates	Advisers
ANC	C Ramaphosa B Kgositse	M Nokonyane P Molefe
AVU	S Burger C Kruger	G Kruger
Bophuthatswana		
Cape Trad. Leaders	GD Gwadiso SN Sigcau	
Ciskei		
DP	KM Andrew S Botha	E Trent R Harpur
Dikwankwetla	JSS Phatang RT Ramasia	TJ Mohapi K Ngwenya
IFP		
IYP	NS Mtsweni NJ Mahlangu	AP Laka
KP		
INM	GG Zama ND Mokoena	BL Mavuso
Kwazulu		
Labour Party	L Joseph	I Richards D Lockey
NIC/TIC	PJ Gordhan F Hajaij	K Mayet B Pillay
NP	L Wessels TJ King	
NPP	A Rajbansi L Singh	G Chetty J Bachu

QES Trad. Leaders	MB Mota M Moroke	MA Molefe B Rajuli
PAC	B Desai P de Lille	B Alexander
Solidarity	DS Rajah	D Naidoo
SACP	J Slovo L Jacobus	E Pahad
SA Government	A Fourie LR Brink	T Delpont A Tredoux
Transkei	Z Titus N Jajula	R Nogumla
TVL Trad. Leaders	LM Mokoena MA Netshimbupfe	NE Ngomane
UPF	A Chabalala MJ Mahlangu	RJ Dombo J Maake
Venda	NE Mulaudzi	S Makhuvha
XPP	GNK Hetisani	MH Matjokana PT Shilubana

T Eloff	:	Administration
G Hutchings	:	Minutes
P Lelaka	:	Administration
M Radebe	:	Administration

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

SECOND VERSION

DRAFT ELECTORAL BILL

15 OCTOBER 1993

1. This draft has attempted to accommodate the comments, suggestions and criticisms which were levelled against the first draft by members of the Negotiating Council on 5 October 1993. In addition to a large number of textual changes, certain substantive changes of principle have been made to the draft bill, affecting:
 - 1.1 entitlement to vote; **SEE CLAUSE 16**
 - 1.2 procedures for registration of parties; **SEE CLAUSE 20**
 - 1.3 foreign voting; **SEE CLAUSE 26**
 - 1.4 special votes. **SEE CLAUSE 41 & 42**

2. Pursuant to the instruction from the Negotiating Council to recommend criteria for eligibility, the Committee has re-drafted Clause 16 to include as eligible voters the following: **SEE CLAUSE 16**
 - 2.1 South African citizens.
 - 2.2 TBVC citizens. ("The Republic" has been defined in the draft Bill to encompass the borders of South Africa as at 1910).
 - 2.3 Persons born in South Africa, who are now and have been ordinarily resident in South Africa for at least the past 12 months.
 - 2.4 Persons born to a South African parent with the further requirement that such persons must have been likewise ordinarily resident in South Africa for at least the past 12 months.
 - 2.5 Marriage to a South African citizen.
 - 2.6 Persons ordinarily resident in South Africa for the past 5 years.

3. In making this recommendation, the Committee has attempted to ensure that the election will be as inclusive as possible. It has had regard to the requirements for citizenship as set out in the Citizenship Act of 1949. For example: **SEE CLAUSE 16**

- 3.1 Birth in South Africa gives rise to citizenship.
- 3.2 A person born outside South Africa on or after September 1949 can become a citizen by descent if his or her father was at the time of his or her birth a South African citizen (or if a certificate of resumption of citizenship has been issued to his or her parent/s and he or she has entered the country for permanent residence, or if he or she has been adopted by a citizen provided his or her birth is properly registered.
- 3.3 The Minister of Home Affairs can grant a certificate of naturalisation to persons falling within specific categories of which one of the requirements is that the person has been ordinarily resident in the Republic for at least 1 year immediately preceding his or her application, and that he or she has, in addition, been resident in the Republic for a further period of not less than 4 years during the 8 years preceding the application.

Given the wide range of circumstances in which citizenship could have been lost (see section 15 of the Citizenship Act), it is likely that there are many people who fall within the requirements for citizenship in terms of the Citizenship Act, but who are not presently South African citizens. The Committee has made its recommendations with due regard to these requirements. **SEE CLAUSE 16**

4. One member of the Committee suggested that the IEC be given a discretion to extend the category of eligible voters to include persons not resident in South Africa; that is, persons who would otherwise qualify but who fail to meet the suggested criterion of residency. However, a majority of the Committee felt that this would err on the side of being too inclusive. **SEE CLAUSE 16**
5. As a result of this recommendation, a number of consequential amendments to the Bill are necessary. "Acceptable identity document" has been altered to "voter eligibility document" and the definition of "Republic" now makes clear the applicable documents issued by TBVC Governments are also acceptable. **SEE SECTION 1**
6. Notwithstanding criticism expressed of the clause empowering the IEC to issue voter's cards, the Committee considers that this provision is necessary, particularly in the light of the extended criteria for voter eligibility. Whilst not eligible for an "identity document" or "temporary identity document", the extended range of eligible voters will require acceptable identification, and this can only be achieved by means of a voter's card. Section 4 of the Identification Act 72/86 does not extend to all the proposed categories, hence a temporary ID cannot be issued to all eligible voters as proposed. The clause also makes clear that voter's cards will include a photograph of the bearer. **SEE CLAUSE 18**

The Committee considered the debate on the eligibility of prisoners to vote. A separate memorandum will be tabled in which comparative experience of other countries is described. One member of the Committee, however, feels that there should be a further restriction on the eligibility of prisoners to vote, and has recommended the insertion of the following provision: **SEE CLAUSES 17 &**

58(1)(a)

"No person shall be entitled to vote in an election, if that person is detained in prison, in accordance with a sentence imposed pursuant to a conviction by a court of law in respect of any offence mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51/77 or any other applicable law, as the case may be, provided that any person who commits an offence with a political motive shall not be disqualified by reason of the provisions of this paragraph."

The balance of the Committee holds the view that prisoners should be entitled to vote, on the premise that they should only be denied those rights which are necessary for their incarceration - of which the right to vote is not one.

8. The Committee also reviewed its recommendations in so far as persons not entitled to vote are concerned. The Committee draws attention to the fact that the three disqualified categories referred to are all derived from express prohibitions contained in the present Electoral Act 45/79. Section 4 thereof provides that no person shall be entitled to be registered, or to the continuance of his or her registration, or vote in any division, if he or she is subject to an order of a court declaring him or her to be of unsound mind or mentally disordered or defective, or detained as a mentally ill patient under the Mental Health Act 1973, or in the case of independent states under any law applicable in that state. **SEE CLAUSE 17**
9. In the light of the debate in the Negotiating Council, the Committee reconsidered the requirements for party registration for purposes of elections. Attention is drawn to the fact that the previous clause (16(2)) which provided for a registration fee of R10,000, has been deleted. Furthermore, the requirements for deposits for contesting the election of the National Assembly and SPR's have also been reduced. The procedures for objection to such party registration have been streamlined, and as a result Chapter IV of the draft Bill is considerably altered. It is now proposed that there be only one opportunity for third parties to raise objections to the registration of a party. Provisions have also been made for the registration of alliances of parties, as proposed in the Council. **SEE CLAUSE 20**
10. **SEE CLAUSES 41 & 42**
The Committee has adopted a restrictive approach to special votes. Provisions have been made for special votes for disabled persons and pregnant women. It is also provided that only a presiding officer or a voting officer can attest the special vote. The Committee has also altered the provision regarding foreign voting stations. The Commission is mandated to establish voting stations outside the Republic. It may be

that not all such foreign voting stations will be at South African missions. Attention has been drawn to the position of Muslims on Haj, which might necessitate a foreign voting station in Saudi Arabia where there is no South African mission. The clause has also been altered to enable any eligible voter to be permitted to record his or her vote at a foreign voting station.

The provision dealing with tendered ballots has also been reviewed in the light of submissions made by the Government, but the Committee has not deemed it appropriate to make substantive changes to its earlier proposals in this regard.

11. The Committee is still giving consideration to a number of issues on which no decision has yet been reached, but has decided not to delay the submission of this new draft. In particular, the Committee is considering:

- 11.1 whether a voter shall be entitled to vote at any voting station in the Republic;
SEE CLAUSE 30

- 11.2 whether the election should be for a period of one or more than one day; and
SEE CLAUSE 32

- 11.3 whether provision should be made for public funding of election campaigns.
NEW CLAUSE

12. The Committee found that there were three options in so far as the situs for voting was concerned, namely:

- 12.1 The option reflected in clause 30 of the first draft namely that a voter shall be entitled to vote at any voting station; and for purposes of the election for any "other legislature", such vote shall be counted where it is has been cast.
SEE CLAUSE 30

- 12.2 The option that voters should be afforded a choice, such that in the event that a person votes outside the region where he or she is ordinarily resident, such voter can request a special ballot paper for voting in which it shall be recorded that he or she is voting in the region of his or her ordinary residence.
SEE CLAUSE 30

- 12.3 The option that voter's cards are issued to all eligible voters (including those with other identity documents) and that the voter's card specify the ordinary residence or applicable region of the voter concerned.
SEE CLAUSE 30

The majority of the Committee favours option 12.2. Option 12.1 was the subject of much dissatisfaction in the Council. It is possible that option 12.3 can be implemented. For example, in Canada and Cambodia the Committee has been advised that voter's cards were issued to all voters in a relatively short period of time. However, the Committee is in no position to assess whether this is feasible in South

Africa nor whether it is financially viable. Thus, whilst option 12.2 is susceptible to possible abuse, the majority of the Committee considered that it would be possible to restrict such abuse by including as an offence, the calling by any party/organisation for voters to vote in a particular region without regard to their ordinary residence. Nonetheless it must be conceded that giving voters an option in this manner could result in substantial distortions. Guidance from Council is sought in this regard.

13. The Committee considered the question of the number of voting days. It considered the recommendations of the Goldstone Commission that the election should take place over one day only. The Committee wishes to consult with the Department of Home Affairs regarding the number of voting stations in order to ascertain whether it would be possible for voters to have easy access to voting stations. Such an analysis will assist the Committee in making a firm recommendation. Other questions flow therefrom, all of which the Committee needs to consider before making a recommendation. These include the implications for an increased number of voters descending on a voting station; the consequent need for more election officials and more accessories, such as ultra violet lamps; the danger of a shortage of ballot papers at a particular voting station which could be rectified on a second day of voting etc.
SEE SECTION 22
14. The Committee has received a detailed submission from the Democratic Party regarding state funding of the election campaigns of registered parties. However, it awaits further submissions before making recommendations for Council's consideration.
NEW CLAUSE
15. Attention is also drawn to a number of important changes in the detail of the Second Draft. Although in the Council to reconcile the definition of "non-governmental military force" as contained in clause 1 of the First Draft, with the definition of "armed force" as contained in the TEC Act, the Committee has been obliged to adopt the definition in order to extend the definition to include non-participants in the TEC.
SEE CLAUSE 1 (DEFINITIONS)
16. The Act has been amended to include the establishment of a formal liaison committee between the IEC and registered parties. Thus chief election agents of the various parties will meet on this committee, which will allow for close co-operation between the parties and the IEC, in so far as the running of the election is concerned. Provision has also been made for members of the liaison committee to object to the appointments of electoral staff, although the Commission's decision will be final and not subject to appeal or review. The Committee has amended the section dealing with the submission of lists of candidates to the Chief Director to allow for more names to be included on the list than are represented by available seats. The Committee has recommended that the names of candidates may appear on both a national and a regional list, but cannot appear on the list of more than one registered party.
SEE CLAUSES 5, 6, 7 & 8

10. The qualifications for a person to be a candidate have been redrafted to accord with the requirements envisaged by the draft Constitution. **SEE CLAUSE 1 & 24**
18. The Committee recommends that the identification mark be administered by means of invisible ink. However, the Committee is presently researching whether suitable ink will be available, and the resultant logistic requirements; for example ultra violet sensors to identify the (invisible) mark. **SEE CLAUSES 1, 36 & 42**
19. The Committee has amended the section dealing with safekeeping of election material in the light of criticisms expressed of the previous draft. The newly elected Government rather than the IEC shall be responsible for the expeditious disposal of election material. **SEE CLAUSE 52**
20. The Committee has included a provision dealing with the establishment and enforcement of an Electoral Code of Conduct. A draft Code is included with this submission, although it must be recorded that this is an early draft which represents only the framework of the Committee's thinking. The Committee intends to give further consideration to the terms of the draft, and may submit a re-draft with its next report. There is a view in the Committee that the Code should be formulated as a popular document rather than one which is couched in legalistic terms. This issue also needs to be resolved. **SEE CLAUSE 53 & SCHEDULE 1**
21. The Committee will give further attention to the drafting of a specimen ballot paper, and to the content of Chapter IX dealing with the system of proportional representation, and the conduct of regional elections. These are matters which will be considered jointly between this Committee and the Committee dealing with Constitutional Issues. **SEE CLAUSE 29**

ADDRESS BY THE PAC OF AZANIA TO THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL ON 14 OCTOBER 1993 CONCERNING THE MURDER OF FIVE CHILDREN BY THE SADF IN UMTATA, TRANSKEI.

Mr Chairman
Members of the Council

During the early hours of Friday 8 October 1993, according to the SADF, 12 fully armed soldiers of the regime, illegally entered the house of Mr Sicelo Mpendulo in Northcrest, Umtata, and shot and killed five school-boys. The tracks around the house suggests that they may well have been more than 12 SADF members. According to the preliminary evidence on the angle the bullets entered their bodies and the blood on the mattresses, it is clear that they were either asleep or made to lie down before being murdered in execution-style.

The five school-boys murdered are the children and relatives of PAC veteran member cde Mpendulo namely his children, 16 year-old twins Samora and Sadat, their 12 year old brother Mzwandile as well as their 12 year-old orphaned cousin Sandiso and 19 year cousin Thando. What must be stressed is that there is absolutely nothing strange about their presence at that house and at that time.

The bullets entered their bodies in a straight 90 degree angle whilst they were on the mattresses. The savagery of the execution-style murders is born out by the fact that the child victims were lying down and one of the 12 year olds was shot 18 times; 4 times in the head and 14 times around the region of the heart.

The regime tried to justify the extra-legal execution murders by alleging that the children offered resistance. Since these children were all executed on their beds and the SADF and the neighbours are agreed that no shot was fired by the school-boys nor was there any sound of a raised voice, no proof of resistance can be deducted from the proceedings of the events or from evidence in the house.

According to the first media statement by the SADF after the murder, they had no information on the names of the people they had killed and the later findings of the investigation by the Lawyers for Human Rights proved that the SADF had no idea of the identities of those they had killed at the time of the murders. Upon the revelation of the names and ages of the victims by the PAC of Azania, the regime admitted that they had made what they called a bona fide mistake because, according to them, the children looked older at the time. The voluntary public admission of a so-called mistake raises serious questions about the source and purpose of the information which lead to the murders. In later

statements the regime tried to downplay their public admission of a so-called mistake.

The execution nature of the murders bears the same pattern of unresolved execution-style murders on the Reef and Natal and may well constitute a clue to the source of violence in these two areas. We have in mind the execution style killings in Boipatong, Sebokeng, Natal, Matthew Goniwe and friends as well as the well publicised incident of a minibus taxi travelling from Natal to the East Rand where passengers were made to lie down near Katlehong before being executed, all bear the pattern of the Umtata execution-style murders. Why do we still read of people dying in detention under the execution hand of the security forces? Why do people in this country still disappear?

The regime stated that the raid was against known APLA operatives but at the time of the murder they had no idea of the names of those they had killed and to date they cannot link any of the children to any APLA activity. They even admitted publicly that the weapons which they allege were found at the house are not linked to any APLA or other activity in the country. It is clear that these children are not members of APLA and APLA has confirmed that they were not and could not have been its members.

The regime, in their daily defensive attempts to justify their actions, claims that the house was an APLA base. White South Africans living in the suburb confirmed that they had not seen any strange activities at the house and they handed a petition to the South African Embassy in Umtata disputing the allegations of their own government and condemning the regime. We have stated time after time that we have no APLA base in the Transkei and this was confirmed by the Transkei government, army and police. We emphatically deny that the house of Mr Mpendulo is an APLA base. Since last year we have made public offers to the regime to accompany us to the Transkei to prove their allegations but to date they have failed to do so.

The regime furthermore outrightly refused to allow Justice Goldstone to go to the Transkei upon the invitation of Maj General Bantu Holomisa, so as to investigate their allegations. We want to be emphatic that Mr Goldstone never investigated APLA in the Transkei and that he merely returned to the regime word-for-word the propaganda which the regime itself submitted to him in the first place. The regime to this day is unable to define what an APLA base is and they gave Mr Goldstone a silly submission that all trees in Transkei are APLA bases as APLA can train someone in the use of weapons in total darkness for a few hours under a tree!

Since the regime cannot prove that these children were APLA members, the Negotiating Council should not allow itself to be side-tracked into discussing APLA related matters. The finding of the independent and credible Lawyers for Human Rights is that this is a straightforward case of murder and that those who are responsible should be brought to book.

There were no illegal weapons or weapons of any type at the house

during the raid. Mr Mpendulo and the school-boys have no use for illegal weapons and the regime itself confirmed publicly that Mr Mpendulo applied for a licence to possess a small defensive hand firearm. Where is the proof that the alleged weapons found did not emanate from the SADF armoury?

Mr Chairman. In conclusion, the following questions arise.

Since the SADF could not have been on a hot-pursuit mission against APLA for a recent incident, why did they embark on this murder a few days before a meeting between the regime and APLA is due to discuss a mutual cessation of hostilities?

Since there was no shoot-out and the children died in their beds, why were they not captured and formally charged?

This incident, which amounts to a straightforward execution outside the rule of law as well as a despicable act of international banditry, was sanctioned at the highest level, namely by

-Mr F.W de Klerk,
-Mr Kobie Coetzee, who ordered the murders,
-Mr Pik Botha who reacted with indifference at the violation of their non-aggression pact with Transkei, and, amongst others, Gen George Meiring and his staff who perpetrated this atrocity.

Since it appears that the perpetrators misled Mr de Klerk on whom they were going to attack, they must take full responsibilities for their actions and we concur with the findings of the Lawyers for Human rights that they must stand trial.

The regime must also tell us whether they consulted any party to the negotiating process. If not why do they still act unilaterally? If they did consult a party to this process we should know as the question of criminal culpability and conspiracy would then arise.

The country is looking to this Negotiating Council to express itself on this matter. The justice minded majority of this country expects the Negotiating Council to:

1. Condemn this act of execution outside the rule of law.
2. Condemn the regime for not using the established channels with its neighbours rather than embarking on international banditry and terrorism.
3. Decide that the due processes of the law must be followed and that those who perpetrated this act should account for their deeds in a court of law.
4. That a committee be established to keep the process informed of the proceedings of the trial.

Take steps to ensure that the regime discontinue with unilateral acts.

6. Decide that compensation be paid to the bereaved family.

7. That the regime discuss with the PAC and APLA the issue of the joint controll of the security forces and a mutual cessation of hostilities. The question of effective joint controll of the security forces is once more underlined by what happened in Umtata. How can it be expected of anybody to join transitional structures where they will be held responsible for that over which they have no effective controll? Actions like this can severely discredited the image of the transitional endeavours. We say: no responsibility without authority!

This Council must come clear on these issues. The justice minded majority in our country must not be disappointed.

We thank you.

Accession
*D***MR H.J. COETSEE : WORLD TRADE CENTRE****15 OCTOBER 1993 : IMMEDIATE (Compare delivery)****THE UMTATA RAID : A BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW**

The SADF strike against a verified APLA facility in Umtata last week has ignited intense and often misleading debate on the justification for the raid and whether it was based on sufficient and accurate intelligence.

Government remains convinced that the raid was not only justified but also absolutely necessary to protect the lives and property of all South Africans.

However, the Government also accepts that, due to the misleading and diversionary nature of much of the debate, that confusion and suspicion have arisen regarding justification and intelligence pertaining to the Umtata issue.

In view of the fact that Government regards itself as accountable to the public, and is committed to the maximum transparency possible in security matters, it has decided to make public all the relevant intelligence - from both the SADF and SAP - on which the decision to strike in Umtata was based.

The raid was not launched merely on the grounds of reasonable suspicion but on the basis of hard, prima facie evidence which had been repeatedly analyzed and cross-checked before action was taken.

The raid can therefore not be described as an arbitrary and impulsive action based on political motives. In fact, consideration was earlier given to attack other identified APLA facilities in the Transkei, but it was felt at the time that intelligence needed further verification. These facilities were situated at places such as St Johns, Butterworth and Mbuzana.

That justification exists for acting against APLA, both in South Africa and in the Transkei itself, is now common cause after a series of attacks for which APLA has claimed responsibility and the findings of the Goldstone Commission on APLA activities. (See page 6 on the Goldstone Commission report).

Transkei is still being used as training area for APLA terrorists and at present 11 fugitives wanted in connection with APLA attacks in South Africa are believed to be in Transkei. (See list on page 6.)

Since 22 February 1991, APLA has allegedly been involved in 54 terror attacks in South Africa. Clearly APLA is waging an armed struggle against innocent civilians. This must be seen against the background of the following:

- * That APLA has ignored all the resolutions passed at the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum pertaining to the curbing of violence.
- * That the PAC still refuses to end or even suspend its armed struggle or sign the National Peace Accord.

* Continued threats, uttered as recently as 23 September by APLA's Chief of Staff, have been made.

Because all peaceful attempts to resolve this matter have failed, Government had a clear responsibility to consider other methods.

Given that more than enough justification therefore exists for striking at APLA, the tragedy of the Umtata operation is not the fact that the SA Government acted to protect its citizens from terror attacks, but that the PAC and APLA are deliberately abusing juveniles for terrorist purposes.

This view is further strengthened by the fact that juveniles were involved in APLA / PASO attacks such as the St James Church, the Beaufort West bus attack and the murder of an American citizen, Ms Amy Biehl.

The SA Government has consistently made it clear that it would take whatever action might be necessary to protect the lives of its citizens. It has also indicated that it would consider appropriate military action against any verified APLA facilities in Transkei.

In the final analysis, Government has no doubt that those killed included militarily trained APLA terrorists and that, although regrettable, the deaths were unavoidable.

It must be remembered that although those killed may well fit the legal definition of juveniles, this does not in any way diminish the threat posed by them.

APLA itself, admitted in a publication called IMVO, quoting Mr Lizo Mali, Border Regional Chairman of the PAC, that it was recruiting and training youths. APLA is therefore not only abusing youths for military training, but clearly is using them as human shields to inhibit possible Security Force action. Attention is also drawn to a report in the Pretoria News of 31 August 1993 according to which the PAC said it was not satisfied with the level of militancy of its youth. This provocative challenge was made at the opening of the Moshesh High School at Maluti by Mr Gilbert Seneke, a PAC spokesman. He said that if other organisations were "afraid to use slogans such as 'Kill the boer, kill the farmer', your duty is to adopt those slogans".

Therefore, given the fact that APLA abuses juveniles for terrorist purposes, the only way to prevent further incidents of this nature in future, would be for the PAC/APLA to abandon their armed struggle.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND INTELLIGENCE LEADING TO OPERATION

The operation was based on intelligence initially provided by three suspects in detention.

The following intelligence and sequence of events, starting on 25 July 1993, resulted in the Umtata operation on 8 October 1993:

On 25 July, the SA Police arrested two men on a passenger bus at the Kei Bridge border and seized weapons. Questioning of one of the suspects produced the following information:

- * That he received "crash" training by APLA in weapons handling in Port Elizabeth in order to attack SAP members.
- * That he on several occasions went to the Transkei to fetch weapons and money and that during one such visit he received weapons at 47 Jordan Street, North Crest, Umtata, (hereafter referred to as the house) to take to Port Elizabeth.
- * During his stay at North Crest he on three occasions witnessed weapons being issued to APLA members and that up to 18 APLA members slept in the house.
- * An accurate sketch of the house was also drawn up as a result of this information.
- * Information gathered independently through other information confirmed that an APLA facility existed at North Crest.

Further intelligence relating to the house in North Crest was obtained on 15 September 1993 after a foreign-trained APLA member was arrested at a roadblock at the Elliot / Cala / Engcobo crossroads in connection with the possession of three M26 grenades.

Questioning of this APLA member revealed:

- * That he returned to South Africa from abroad in September 1992 and went to Umtata.
- * That he was allegedly involved in a robbery of a liquor store in Sterkspruit, Transkei, during October in which R52 000 was taken. The money was taken to Umtata.
- * In Sterkspruit at the end of November 1992, he received orders to proceed to a neighbouring country (Lesotho) and join a group of APLA members surveilling the SA border. He was sent back to fetch weapons in Sterkspruit and afterwards returned to the same place.
- * Attacks were later carried out in the Ficksburg area and an APLA member called Kanny related the details to him.
- * That he allegedly took part in an APLA attack on a Wesselsbron supermarket in which four persons were killed on 3 July 1993. (Five witnesses have since positively connected him with the attack.)
- * That during his stay in Umtata he stayed at the house, where he was involved in loading magazines and processing weaponry which included: 30 AK47 rifles, two RPG7 rockets with three projectiles, two light machineguns, about 150 handgrenades, eight R1 rifles, 4 Uzzi submachineguns, 2 Scorpion machinepistols and landmines.

Corroborating information to the above was provided by a third suspect, who revealed:

- * That he was known as "Kenny" and also visited the North Crest house and that it was used as a facility by APLA.
- * That he was part of the APLA group which carried out the Ficksburg attacks mentioned above.
- * That he for a time had stayed in Lesotho and had carried out reconnaissance along the SA border.

This information was handed by the SAP to the SADF and on 1 October 1993, the SA Army was instructed to do a low-risk reconnaissance at the North Crest house to confirm the address as well as the information obtained from the SAP.

On 2 October, the reconnaissance confirmed the address and that all the facts provided by the SAP coincided with what was observed. It was also confirmed that the house was occupied.

The location of weapons in the house could obviously not be confirmed without entering the premises.

This reconnaissance continued up until late afternoon of 7 October.

At all stages of the reconnaissance, the information was cross-checked with the SA Police sources.

THE OPERATION ITSELF

The relevant intelligence was laid before Government and on the morning of 7 October, authority was given by the Government for the SADF to conduct a limited strike on the house, as I stated at a news conference on 8 October 1993.

The aim of the operation was three-fold:

- * To capture APLA weapons and all possible documentation.
- * To obtain information about APLA training, activities and operational planning.
- * If possible to capture and bring back to South Africa members of APLA.

The instructions to the SADF were, if possible, to avoid loss of life. Unfortunately the unit involved did not succeed in this regard because the individuals in the facility were armed and offered resistance according to report back by the SADF. General Liebenberg will issue a separate statement in this regard, since the events at the house are peculiarly within the knowledge of the SADF.

SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION GATHERED FROM HOUSE

The photographs of the dead, taken by the troops, were handed over to the SA Police. According to a report by the SA Police three of the dead were initially identified as trained APLA terrorists, and later a further one. The fifth has not yet been identified.

A loose passport photograph found in the house was also identified by the second and third suspect referred to above as being a trained APLA terrorist linked to the Ficksburg attacks.

Documents seized at the house contained an APLA Code of Discipline; the "seven deadly sins of a political fighter" and "types of ambush".

As mentioned before, this information also confirms that the house was indeed an APLA facility and that four of the five persons killed, were APLA terrorists.

FURTHER BACKGROUND RE APLA ACTIVITIES AND FACILITIES IN TRANSKEI

APLA does not have established bases in the conventional sense, but makes use of temporary facilities, private homes or businesses to store weapons and to carry out training, planning and operational activities.

Much of this training can be described as "crash" training where APLA members receive rudimentary training individually or in small groups at various locations in Transkei.

This training includes basic weapons handling, the use of explosives and grenades, discipline and politics.

Some of the areas used by APLA are (Note : specific locations and addresses have not been included to protect sources):

Qumbe, Qutubeni, Cofimvaba, Centane, Butterworth, Cala, Engcobo, Lusikisiki, Umtata, Hohita, Ntsakana, Quhugu, The Haven (in the area of the nature reserve), Magubeni, Sterkspruit, N dofela, Fort Hook, Kuba, Port St Johns, the area between Coffe Bay and the "Hole in the Wall".

All these areas have been and are still used by APLA at different times to carry out guerilla training, intelligence and explosives training.

There are also specific houses which are used as safe houses, transit houses, weapons caches and training facilities. The number of weapons stored in these facilities vary from very few to large quantities.

The occupants of the houses change regularly as to the number of people occupying them at any given time.

This is standard procedure with all terrorist organisations.

In conclusion,

- * faced with such intelligence as I have set out initially,
- * faced with the friendly ambience of the Transkei towards APLA,
- * the "Black Christmas" that was promised to South Africa last year by APLA and which in fact materialised,
- * faced by fresh promises on the part of APLA of violence against all and sundry, including the MK, and

- * the threat that APLA is working on a series of drastic steps that would have serious consequences and shake South Africa as never before,

the Government was and will remain in duty bound to take pre-emptive measures to safeguard the property and lives of its citizens.

For this reason the solution is clear, namely for APLA and PASO, to abandon or at least suspend the armed struggle forthwith.

Finally I wish to state that the loss of lives is to be regretted. It must again be stressed that the action was not directed at the Government of Transkei or its people, but solely against APLA and its facilities.

FINDINGS OF THE GOLDSTONE COMMISSION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF APLA

In January 1993, the Goldstone Commission conducted an investigation into the activities of APLA.

On 15 March, the Commission found, inter alia, that:

- * APLA used Transkei as a springboard for attacks on South Africa. Arms and ammunition were stored in Transkei for use by APLA units.
- * APLA's operational activities were aimed at members of the SAP, the SADF and civilians in general.
- * APLA's members had received training in the Transkei.
- * Arms and explosives were being smuggled into South Africa and Transkei for use by APLA members.
- * APLA's internal High Command for South Africa was based in Transkei.

The Commission's findings were not reputed and Transkei's inaction created circumstances favouring continued APLA operations.

USE OF TRANSKEI AS HAVEN FOR FUGITIVE APLA MEMBERS

According to information provided by the SA Police, 11 APLA suspects (for whom 12 warrants of arrest have been issued) have fled to the Transkei after allegedly committing terror attacks in South Africa.

Extradition proceedings, by the Attorneys-General of the OFS and Eastern Cape, have already been instituted for two of these 11 suspects.

They are:

- * Letlapa Mphahlele (for whom two arrest warrants have been issued) and Welile Mafalika. Both are wanted for an attack on Lady Grey Police barracks on 3 January 1992. Mphalele is also wanted in connection with an armed attack on the Batho police station in Bloemfontein on 14 December 1992.

The others are:

- * Noppice Sefatse - also wanted for the armed attack on 3 January 1992 on SA Police barracks in Lady Grey.
- * David Sigcau - wanted for an armed attack on a passing vehicle on 18 March 1992 on the Zastron / Sterkspruit road. One person was killed.
- * Luyanda Gqomfa - wanted for an attack on a Lady Grey farm on 26 March 1992.
- * Donald Tsembeyi - wanted for the same incident.
- * Andile Matyhila - wanted for an attack on 18 November 1992 on Zasron / Sterkspruit road. One person was wounded.
- * Tembelani Zundu - wanted for the attack on the King Williams Town Golf Club on 28 November 1992, in which four people were killed and 17 injured.
- * Xolile Ngzabane - wanted for the attack on the Highgate Hotel in East London on 1 May 1993 in which one person was killed.
- * Dumizile Nontshokweni - also wanted in connection with the above incident.
- * Lungisa Ntintile - also wanted for above incident.

ndv/umtaza

MIN H.J. COETSEE

OPSOMMING VAN REGERINGSTANDPUNT

ONMIDDELIK : 15 OKTOBER 1993

INLEIDING

Ek spreek u graag by hierdie geleentheid toe oor die kwessie van die SA Weermag se optrede in Umtata. Hierdie optrede van die Weermag moet gesien word teen die volgende agtergrond.

1. Die Transkei of sy inwoners is beslis nie die teiken van die optrede nie; dit was doelbewus gemik teen 'n fasiliteit van APLA, die militêre vleuel van die PAC, en wat vooraf behoorlik waargeneem en geverifieer is.
2. Hierdie "private leër" hou vol met die gewapende stryd teen die onskuldige burgers. Hoeveel menseleuens moet nog voor die gewere van APLA opgeoffer word voordat hierdie organisasie beseft dat die pad van Suid-Afrika NIE deur die geweerloop soos die AK-47 bepaal moet word nie, maar deur konstruktiewe deelname aan 'n onderhandelingsproses wat demokrasie na elkeen in die land wil uitbrei?
3. Teenoor hierdie ideaal hou hierdie organisasie steeds vol met sy "struggle". Verskeie onlangse uitsprake bevestig dit.
4. Hierdie organisasie is ook besig met die meedoen aan die vloei van wapens na die RSA wat op verskillende plekke opgegaan word.
5. Talle erkennings deur APLA, net maar in die afgelope maande bevestig dat hy met die "continuation of the struggle" nie ligtelik opgeneem kan word nie.
6. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Suid-Afrikaanse Regering steeds 'n plig en verantwoordelikheid om op te tree om:
 - * Burgerlikes te beskerm.
 - * Voorkomende optredes te doen.
 - * 'n Boodskap aan geweldenaars te stuur hul optrede onnodig en onaanvaarbaar is.
7. Die Regering se standpunt is dat dit internasionaal onaanvaarbaar is dat enige staat sy grondgebied beskikbaar stel vir optredes teen die burgers van 'n ander staat vir geweldsdoeleindes in watter vorm ook al. Dit geld in die besonder vir die staat Transkei wat buitendien 'n nie-aanvalsverdrag met die RSA het.

8. Om hierdie rede is daar vir die Regering volle regverdiging om die veiligheidsmagte in diens te stel om op te tree teen diegene wat hierdie basiese beginsels verontagsaam.

9. Die veiligheidsmagte word en sal weer, waar nodig na behoorlike evaluasie en verkenning, met volle staatsmagtiging aangewend word in die belang van veiligheid, orde, stabiliteit en die beskerming van beskaafde waardes.

hov/tnel

APLA confesses **We train task forces**



APLA's trainee task force members march during a training session where in the bush. Now their existence and training are no longer secret.

THE Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) this week be rising everyday. We train them exactly in the same way that APLA soldiers

By: Mankeli Ngam

Youth not militant enough – Sineke

PIN 218 P2

Sapa

UMTATA. — The Pan Africanist Congress is not yet satisfied with the level of militancy of its youth and wants every Pan Africanist Students Organisation (Paso) member to know he is "Paso by day and Apla by night".

This was the message to pupils at the opening of Moshesh High School in the Matluti district at the weekend by Transkei regional PAC vice-chairman Gilbert Sineke.

Mr Sineke said if other organisations were "afraid to use slogans such as 'Kill the boer, kill the farmer', your duty is to adopt those slogans".

He said it was "in good

faith" that the PAC had been calling on foreign visitors to keep out of the country "until we have sorted out our problems".

However, to demonstrate its goodwill the PAC suggested visitors follow the example of United Nations and European Community observers by wearing tags or stickers identifying themselves and stating the purpose of their visit.

"It is the PAC which started serious armed struggle in the country and it is the PAC which will decide when the time is right to end serious armed struggle," Mr Sineke said.

*Assessment
E*

DRAFT RESOLUTION - TRANSKEI GOVERNMENT

This Negotiating Council meeting on Friday 15 October 1993 at the World Trade Centre:

Angered:

By the recent violation by the South African Defence Force of the territorial integrity of Transkei and the non-aggression pact between the South African and Transkeian Governments;

Shocked:

By the callous murder of children whose ages range from 12 to 17 years;

Believing:

That the South African Government is seeking to destabilise Transkei and that this attack constitutes part of a sinister plot which has serious implications for the maintenance of peace and also for the negotiations process generally;

Further Believing:

That Transkei is a relatively peaceful area and that there should be no interference from the South African Government in the internal affairs of Transkei which has clearly indicated its willingness, firstly, to be reincorporated into South Africa at an appropriate time and also to co-operate with the South African Government on security matters.

Therefore Resolves:

1. To call on the South African Government and all other parties, to promote peace and calm to ensure a peaceful resolution of our problems in Southern Africa;
2. To condemn the violation of Transkei's territory and the violent, cruel and callous manner in which the children were killed;
3. That Minister Coetsee should be relieved of his positions in the Cabinet;
4. That the South African Government must abide by all bilateral agreements and understandings between it and the Transkei Government on these matters.
5. That the South African Government co-operates with the Transkeian officials conducting criminal investigations into the murders;
6. That the South African Government should tender a public apology on this incident.

● DRAFT RESOLUTION: NATIONAL PARTY

This Negotiating Council meeting on Friday 15 October 1993 at the World Trade Centre

Noting that the PAC is a party to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process and that it has, according to its own statements complete control and command over APLA

Noting further that the PAC adheres to a publicly pronounced policy of the killing of civilians, and the assassination of policemen in the pursuit of their political objectives and that APLA have claimed responsibility for many such dastardly acts

Mindful thereof that this Council and the Planning Committee and individual parties and persons have over a long period engaged in individual and concerted efforts to persuade the PAC to abandon these despicable policies and to commit themselves to peaceful negotiations without success

Aware thereof that a number of resolutions have been adopted by this Council and the Forum condemning violence, and in particular that on 22 June 1993 participating parties, including the PAC, by way of formal solemn declaration committed themselves to the cessation of any form of violence in pursuit of political objectives, only for the PAC to immediately thereafter renege on their commitment.

Having today debated a tragic incident which was the direct result of these PAC policies and series of APLA atrocities.

Therefore Resolves to

1. Condemn the PAC policy of political violence and the APLA atrocities;
2. Call upon the PAC to immediately stop all such acts; and
3. Call upon the PAC and the South African Government to enter into urgent discussions in this regard.

WHEN TERRORISTS BECOME INNOCENT VICTIMS

The South African public has an amazingly short memory when it comes to the victims of terror attacks. Hardly anyone recalls the cowardly and heartless killing of innocent people enjoying what should have been a great party in a hotel in King William's Town.

Few of us remember that the scattered bodies in the church in Cape Town has everything to do with today's debate.

The so called "freedom struggle" has become the catch phrase to cover up the most bloody murders of our century. Apparently everyone who has an inborn talent for crime and terrorism uses this particular phrase to cover up its trail of blood.

What makes it even worse in the case of APLA is that they lost the legitimacy of their so called struggle to the ANC and are now on a campaign of senseless killings of innocent people in order to impress radical elements who are waging a racist war in South Africa.

The time has come to be frank with those murderers and terrorists in our society who hide behind their age in an effort to make the restorers of peace and freedom look like the actual villains.

As far as we are concerned it is totally irrelevant whether these people were officially enrolled as members of APLA. When anyone makes use of the hospitality of those in society who are in a declared state of war against the peoples of that country, that person must realize that he may be the victim of punitive action against his murderous host.

It is worth taking note of the fact that the British Prime Minister declined to even speak to members of Sinn Fein as a result of their moral support to the IRA. In South Africa we went as far as accommodating our own Sinn Fein, the PAC, at the negotiating table.

It appears as if South Africans, and the Afrikaner community in particular, are mesmerized by the use of a few one liner slogans to such an extent that their sense of reality is completely lost.

No, it is not really legitimate to kill a Boer or a farmer. Neither is it a moral right to murder those you perceive as being so called settlers or to burn people to death on your way to a funeral because you have a right to be angry.

It is time to tell APLA that we will not stand this any longer.

In this regard we would also like to applaud minister Coetzee for his decisive action because we know that it took guts and leadership to stand up to the brothers David & Jonathan [alias Roelf & Cyril] to get this action approved.

Gerdus Kruger

Acting leader: AVU

Friday, 15 February 1993

*Annexum
H*

DRAFT RESOLUTION - PAC

This Negotiating Council meeting on Friday 15 October 1993 at the World Trade Centre:

Shocked:

By the senseless and brutal killing of innocent children by the S.A.D.F.;

Deeply Concerned:

By the increased possibility of violence and inter-community tension and conflict as a result of this attack;

Believing That:

Urgent measures must be taken to restore calm, restrain the S.A.D.F. and the South African Government;

Therefore Resolves:

1. To unreservedly condemn this callous killing of children;
2. Convey our sympathy and condolences to the families concerned;
3. That the South African Government should pay adequate compensation to the families;
4. To encourage all bilateral measures to resolve conflicts and disputes between the PAC and the South African Government;
5. That unilateral decisions and acts by the S.A.D.F. and the South African Government must stop forthwith, and the Planning Committee is asked to suggest measures to be taken in this regard.

DRAFT PROGRAMME FOR MEETINGS

15 OCTOBER 1993

Friday 15 October 1993	Distributed & Presented	*	Report from the Co-Chairpersons on the Delimitation/Demarcation of Regions (08h30-10h00)
	Discussion:	*	Draft Electoral Bill (10h00-12h30)
		*	Umtata Attack (12h30-14h00)
Monday 18 October 1993	Discussion:	*	Delimitation/Demarcation of Regions (14h00-20h00)
Tuesday 19 October 1993	Discussion:	*	Fundamental Rights (14h00-16h00)
		*	Constitutional Issues(16th Report on the Election of the President & 17th Report on Finances)
Wednesday 20 October 1993	Discussion:	*	Draft Electoral Bill
		*	Constitutional Issues
	Distributed:	*	Report of Commission on National Symbols
Thursday 21 October 1993	Discussion:	*	Constitutional Issues (morning)
		*	Report of the Commission on National Symbols (afternoon)
Friday 22 October 1993	Discussion:	*	Report of the Commission on National Symbols
		*	Draft Electoral Bill

REVISED PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

15 OCTOBER 1993

Negotiating Council	Friday 15 October 1993	08h30-14h00
Planning Committee	Monday 18 October 1993	11h30-14h00
Negotiating Council	Monday 18 October 1993	14h00-20h00
Planning Committee	Tuesday 19 October 1993	12h00-14h00
Negotiating Council	Tuesday 19 October 1993	14h00-20h00
Negotiating Council	Wednesday 20 October 1993	13h00-20h00
Negotiating Council	Thursday 21 October 1993	09h00-20h00
Negotiating Council	Friday 22 October 1993	08h30-14h00

Please note :

The adjournment times of the Negotiating Council meetings as stated are target times, which will only apply if the agenda has been completed, subject to the final decision of the meeting.