

D.38
IDP

Constantia Park No 8, 239 Old Pretoria Road
P O Box 4167, Halfway House, 1685, South Africa
Tel: (011)805-1796/4260
Fax: (011)805-1874

Institute for Defence Policy

FACSIMILE / FAKSIMILEE


TO/AAN COMPANY/MAATSKAPPY FAX NO/FAKS NR	MELODY EMETT MULTI-PARTY TALKS 397-2211
FROM/VAN	JAKKIE CILLIERS
DATE/DATUM: 30-JUL-93 IDPFAX.DOT	PAGES/BLADSYE: 1 REFERENCE/VERWYSING:

Dear Ms Emmet

SUBMISSIONS TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEES ON VIOLENCE AND THE TEC

Following our earlier discussion I have pleasure in enclosing the above. Only the cover pages differ for the two committees.

Kind regards



JAKKIE CILLIERS

SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON THE TEC

DEMOBILISATION AND INTEGRATION OF ARMED FORCES

*Dr Jakkie Cilliers
Director, Institute for Defence Policy*

INTRODUCTION

A range of challenges face the South African military as the country moves through a fundamental social transformation. To most people this is encapsulated by the question of integration of MK and the armies of the TBVC countries into the SADF, which is the subject of this submission.

This submission must be considered against the overriding objective as set out by the Technical Committee on Violence '*To establish impartial, accountable, effective and legitimate security forces for a democratic South Africa.*' (Report no. 4, par. 5.1)

Stability is a prerequisite for an enduring transition. Our expectation is that politically inspired violence and intimidation will increase in the run-up to elections, decrease thereafter, but that criminal and possibly even political violence will eventually increase once the inability of government to meet the extent of demands/expectations becomes apparent. This apart from the demands that could be made upon a new government to deal with elements threatening the transition such as threats of secession.

The ending of apartheid will do little to change the conditions of absolute and relative deprivation of much of our population. In this our problems reflect in many ways upon the problems of the wider region. These range from high levels of unemployment the erosion of social rules and the creation of alternative social structures such as gangs, warlords and even nascent 'revolutionary parties'. The authority and legitimacy of the state, of family and traditional authority has sharply declined.

It is imperative therefore to temper expectations about the benefits (especially the short-term benefits) that the creation of a poor, weak, and potentially an unstable democracy could produce in South Africa. The structural and predisposing factors for violence will endure for very long. As a result conflict management as opposed to conflict resolution may be a more realistic and practical approach to restructuring and legitimising the South African Security Forces.

The preceding all point to the need to maintain the organisational integrity, loyalty and enhance the legitimacy of the Security Forces whilst transforming these institutions.

SCOPE

This submission deals with four issues as regards armed forces and a potential future National Peacekeeping Force:

- ◆ ensuring supervision, transparency and accountability over the armed forces through the establishment of, amongst others, collection/assembly points;
- ◆ the timing and nature of demobilisation programmes;
- ◆ the nature and content of integration; as well as the
- ◆ interrelationship of the above.

These recommendations concur and build upon the process outlined in par. 5.2 of Report no. 4 of the Technical Committee on Violence. In that report the Technical Committee proposed the following three-phased approach:

5.2.1 The Immediate Period. *All parties/administrations/organisations with armed formations must establish proper control over these, conduct an audit of all existing weapons and personnel and establish mechanisms for bringing all weapons and personnel under the supervision of a joint multi-party agency. All parties and organisations should simultaneously take every possible step to ensure that their members and supporters do not use weapons for any unlawful purposes.*

5.2.2 Phase Two. *There should be a joint multi-party agency to formulate policy and oversee all armed formations. The agency will need to make a distinction between statutory and non-statutory armies on the one hand and police forces on the other hand. This distinction is consistent with the Committee's view that policing functions should be clearly distinguished from military functions, and with proposals made to the Committee that various armies play no role in the election process, unlike the various police forces which will be required to fulfill ongoing law and order functions. The multi-party agency must ensure effective supervision, including clear identification of personnel, weapons and locations and the circumstances and manner in which any armed formation or members of any armed formation may be deployed in peacekeeping functions. The agency should also give consideration to assisting any personnel who wish to leave an armed formation with constructive programmes for their integration into society.*

5.2.3 Phase Three. *In the third phase it will be the responsibility of an elected Government constituted on the agreed basis in terms of the Declaration of Intent adopted on 7 May 1993 to integrate, disband and rationalise the various armed formations and introduce comprehensive measures for the integration of their personnel into a democratic society, so as to achieve the objective of impartial, accountable, legitimate and effective security forces for South Africa.*

Figure 1 on page 4 attempts to illustrate the interrelationship between integration, demobilisation, (socio-economic) youth programs and the creation of a National Peacekeeping Force. It also attempts to present the nature of the process, namely the collection of the various members of the non-statutory armed forces (in particular), registration, audit, processing of combatants as well as the need to match supply (those volunteers who meet minimum standards) and the demand (force level requirement/budget capacity).

ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL/ASSEMBLY POINTS

The first concrete step, in terms of Phase Two above, is the establishment of a system of control/assembly points be established countrywide. These points should be manned by the ANC/MK and PAC/APLA but with permanent representation (in a monitoring capacity only) by the Government and the international community. The purpose of these control points should be to establish a system of control and accountability of the guerrilla armies by the respective political movements, subject to independent verification. The control points should also serve as collection points for all those members of the guerrilla armies who have no other source of regular livelihood. In this case, members who so wish should be sheltered, fed and clothed, and placed under the discipline of MK/APLA with appropriate non-partisan validation, where required.

These collection points would serve as temporary centers from where selection will occur for either demobilisation into civil society, or the provision of preparatory training

of volunteers for integration into a future defence force or National Peacekeeping Force.

It is proposed that the existing SADF bases serve a similar purpose, also with international and ANC or other representation.

Further, it is proposed that a similar system be used to accommodate all members of MK/APLA presently outside the country who wish to return to the country prior to elections. An approach should be made to the international community for support in the application of such a programme.

INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILISATION

Options

The integration of the guerrilla armies into a single national defence force is a political requirement. It will provide a degree of legitimacy which will not be obtainable by any other means.

The integration of the armed forces of the TBVC countries is a practical consideration which will follow the constitutional developments in this regard. The latter will also allow a degree of immediate and visible affirmative action unachievable by other means.

There are essentially two options when discussing demobilisation and integration (see Figure 1):

- ◆ **Demobilise directly from the various armed forces and integrate only what you require into a single military; or**
- ◆ **Integrate all elements into the military and then demobilise what is not required subsequently.**

Integrate First, Demobilise Later


The latter option will open the doors to the absorption into the military of the sum of all the armed formations in the country bar those who will go into a National Peacekeeping Force. This will occur irrespective of basic entry standards or the demand/requirement for armed forces in terms of threat or security requirement. Only after some stability has been achieved in the broader society, or when it becomes patently unaffordable, or once these persons have been provided with portable skills, will demobilisation occur.

This will inevitably be an extremely complicated and messy process, but also require constant special dispensations in terms of the public service regulations. Most important of all, it will be massively expensive and either require that additional funds be allocated to defence at a time that there is a concerted attempt to reduce such expenditure or, at a minimum, require the redirection of virtually all of the remaining capital expenditure component of the Defence Budget to operating or running costs. This translates into the virtual destruction of the South African defence manufacturing industry with all the effects that this would have on South Africa's ability to compete in the international manufacturing industry.


In terms of this 'integrate first, demobilise later' option, South Africa would have to be prepared to live and pay for a very large army - one far in excess of the present, declining defence budget.

The major advantage of this strategy is that it would control and neutralise any potential destabilising elements. They would all be in the military, irrespective of either the need for such a large military or of qualifications/suitability.

DEMOBILISE - INTEGRATE



INTEGRATE - DEMOBILISE



Demobilise Directly, then Integrate

We believe that South Africans should be extremely circumspect about integrating persons into the military who will inevitably have to be demobilised. The demobilisation of members of the various armed forces should occur directly from these forces, prior to any amalgamation or integration.

This would require that formal (minimum) criteria would have to be negotiated as soon as is practically possible to define the requirements for integration into a future defence force. Given the present transitional context such criteria would have to be negotiated or at least approved at a political level. It is also reasonable to assume that existing SADF recruitment criteria/civil service regulations regarding posts, etc. would have to be revised as a one off gesture of reconciliation. Some criteria would, however, have to be applied. Secondly, some upper limits and quotas would have to be determined in terms of the broad requirement for our military of the future.

Assistance could be sought from the international community, various Government departments and the private sector, both in terms of expertise and resources, to assist in the reintegration into civilian life of those present members of the armed forces not suitable for service in a future military or for whom there is no room. Such demobilisation programmes should, however, only commence once the TEC is in place/phase 2 in Report Number Four.

In this regard we differ from par 5.2.3 of that report which places the responsibility on an elected Government (i.e. much later in the process) to '*integrate, disband and rationalise the various armed formations*'. (p. 6)

Acceptance/integration into a Defence Force is, of course, not the only option. Acceptance/integration into the proposed Peacekeeping Force is another. By present indications the Peacekeeping Force would absorb 10 000 members from the various Security Forces and guerrilla armies.

Demobilisation

Demobilisation then occurs for those persons who do not want to join the military or Peacekeeping Force or do not meet the criteria, or for whom there is no place. The purpose of demobilisation is to cut costs and reduce capabilities that are not needed. In the present poor economic climate demobilisation may literally be a program to enable the former soldier to survive.

Demobilisation can or should provide access to other training, educational, counseling schemes or courses. But demobilisation is essentially a 'sausage machine' which processes persons for a fixed period across the board. Alternatively it is simply a one-off payment of a predetermined amount of money.

Ideally the demobilisation programme should link into any national development scheme or strategy. As such it should serve the national interests. According to this approach additional training should be done outside or before the demobilisation period. Assistance should be sought from the international community, various Government departments and the private sector, both in terms of expertise and resources, to assist in the reintegration into civilian life of those present members of the armed forces not suitable for service in a future military or for whom there is no room.

CONCLUSION

The approach to first demobilise and then integrate would enhance social stability and prevent frustration, reducing the propensity towards criminality. It provides the 'new' Defence Force with a clean slate, reducing the hang-over problems from the past and enabling them to recruit on the basis of requirement and qualification. It allows a future Defence Force to focus on its primary responsibility, i.e. defence of the country.

In addition to the process discussed above, agreement should be sought that:

- ◆ All further expansion of the military (SADF, TBVC armed forces and guerrilla forces) be halted upon the institution of the TEC. The normal manpower replacement cycles of the SADF and TBVC armed forces should not be affected by this agreement.
- ◆ No additional training commitments be undertaken by any of these armed forces apart from the completion of training that had physically commenced at the time of the institution of the TEC and normal force development (cyclical) training. Additional training, including foreign training, should require the agreement of the sub-council on defence of the TEC.