CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY

THEME COMMITTEE 2

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

IN-HOUSE WORKSHOP ON SELF-DETERMINATION

The Volkstaat: An Academic Perspective

Prepared by Prof AWG Raath

THE VOLKSTAAT:
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE

A.W.G. RAATH

".....perhaps no other question of political philosophy, or international law, pregnant with such unutterable calamities, has ever been so partially and superficially examined as the right of secession" – Albert Taylor Bledsoe.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this short presentation I only have time to make a few statements and suggestions as to how the idea of an Afrikaner Volkstaat could possibly be accommodated on the basis of self-determination.

In his well-known work *Cultural Anthropology* William A. Haviland points out that throughout the world, ethnic groups continue to retain and assert their distinctive identities and traditions despite a common response of the artificially created state governments under which such people live to exert measures to maintain control over people who have never consented to that control.

It is against this background that one has to evaluate the academic merit of an Afrikaner Volkstaat as part of a multi dimensional approach to solving South Africa's complex political and constitutional problems.

Furthermore one has to point out that ethnic self-determination has become a universal phenomenon which has seriously jeopardised constitutional arrangements unsympathetic towards the political aspirations of ethnic groups. The most dramatic illustrations of this in recent years have been the break-up of the Soviet Union into several smaller, independent, states and the struggle of several Yugoslavian republics to regain their independence. It can also be seen in separatist movements, such as that of French-speaking peoples in Canada; Basque and Catalonian nationalist movements in Europe; Scottish, Irish, and Welsh nationalist movements in Britain; Tibetan nationalism in China; Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq; Sikh separatism in India; Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka; Igbo separatism in Nigeria; Eritrean and Tigrean secession movements in Ethiopia etc.

Arline and William McCord described this phenomenon rather aptly in their article "Ethnic Autonomy. A Socio-Historical Synthesis":

> This is, perhaps, the supreme paradox of the twentieth century: as the people of the globe move economically, politically, and culturally towards the creation of a more unitary world, different lines of commitment are drawn based on difference in power, religion, language, or race; and these give rise to a cry for separatism. Opposite tendencies appear to the moving together.

Perhaps this is what we should all be striving for, namely to synthesise the urge for a unitary state with the concept of ethnic and cultural self-determination in a Volkstaat.

In this context an academic discussion on the concept of a Volkstaat should, I think, focus on the international acceptability of the concept; the moral tenability of this idea and finally suggestions how such a unit could be catered for in the constitution. Therefore, you will excuse me if I venture into areas of other speakers, but please accept the sincerity of my efforts to bridle this unruly horse.

For reasons of brevity I wish to tabulate the points which I think form the basis of any academic discussion on the concept of a Volkstaat as a unit of self-determination.

2. AN ACADEMIC PARADIGM FOR THE ACCOMMODATION OF AN AFRIKANER VOLKSTAAT AS A POLITICAL UNIT IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DISPENSATION

2.1 The recognition of the principle of self-determination to the point of accepting regional autonomy is an important facet of the fair and just protection of cultural communities and ethnic groups in South Africa. Robert McCorquodale makes the following important point:

> Protection of the right of self-determination in South Africa can be a means to ensure that communities are fairly and justly protected and that groups participate peacefully in the nation-building process in 'the right way'. After all the purpose of the right of self-determination is to enable peoples (and ultimately, individuals) to be able to participate fully in the political process and to prosper and transmit their culture and not to be subject to subjugation, domination and exploitation or any other form of oppression. So the protection and lawful exercise in the 'new' South Africa of the right of self-determination can assist in the empowerment, real and perceived, of all the peoples of South Africa and strengthen and confirm democracy in South Africa.

The agreement on Afrikaner self-determination between the Freedom Front, the ANC and the South African government on 23rd April 1994 reflects some of the points mentioned by McCorquodale in so far as it made provision for negotiation as the instrument by means of which the idea of Afrikaner self-determination should be investigated, including the concept of a Volkstaat; that the possibility of local and/or regional or other forms of self-determination should be investigated and that Principle XXXIV of the Constitution should be considered.

2.2 Since World War I the principle of self-determination has been included in many international documents. The Resolutions of the UN are no exceptions in this regard. In Resolution 545 (VI) of the General Assembly of the UN, accepted on 5 February 1952, for example, under the heading "Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an article relating to the right of peoples to self-determination" it is stipulated:

> 1. (The General Assembly) (d)ecides to include in the international Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination in reaffirmation of the principle enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations. This article shall be drafted in the following terms: All peoples shall have the right to self-determination; and shall stipulate that all States, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing Territories should promote the realisation of that right in relation to the peoples of such Territories.

The inclusion of similar formulations in international instruments has led to the following conclusion by the internationally respected expert on International Law, Yoram Dinstein:

> The upshot of the matter is that the right of self-determination is accorded not only to peoples under colonial domination in Africa and Asia, but also to peoples living within independent Afro-Asian nations, as well as to those existing in Europe (for instance, in Scotland or the Ukraine) and in America. Just as people under colonial domination is entitled to create a new state where non existed before, so can a people living within the framework of an extant state secede from it and establish its own independent country. This is precisely what was achieved by the Bengalis of East Pakistan when they created the new State of Bangladesh. This, too, is what was unsuccessfully attempted by the Igbos of East Nigeria when they tried to create a new state of Biafra.

From an international perspective one may say that the principle of self-determination of ethnic groups within determinable geographical boundaries is widely accepted.

tion will not have sufficient ground to limit the right of self-determination on the basis that it impairs the state's territorial integrity

2.8 A well-known writer in the field of self-determination, Cobban, very aptly describes the interests at stake in reconciling national interest with the recognition of the principle of self-determination:

> The truth seems to be that if we take the right of sovereignty on the one hand, and the right of secession on the other, as absolute rights, no solution is possible. Further if we build only on sovereignty, we rule out any thought of self-determination, and erect a principle of tyranny without measure and without end and if we confine ourselves to self-determination in the form of secession, we introduce a principle of hopeless anarchy into the social order.

Withdrawal from a central state of part of a state.

The approach of A. Rigo Sureda in his book *Evolution of the Right of Self-determination* seems a generally acceptable one, namely that the right of self-determination should be recognised and applied in so far as international peace, harmony and stability is promoted thereby.

We may summarise this point by saying that apart from the fact that the ethnic group involved must demonstrate that it is in fact a "self", capable of independent existence, the claimant must show that acquiescence in its demand would be likely to result in a greater degree of world harmony (or less global and societal disruption) than would be the case if the existing political state of affairs was preserved and that the recognition of geographical autonomy would not lead to a unreasonable and unfair disruption of existing economic and other infrastructure etc.; the territory involved should not monopolise the economic core of the parent state or deprive it of its natural resources; rights and freedoms of noncompatriots may not be renounced; noncompatriots may not be deprived of their freedoms, may not be uprooted and may not be resettled against their will, etc.

Vernon van Dyke very aptly describes the paradox inherent in arguments denying ethnic groups the right of self-determination within autonomous geographical areas. He says:

> An obvious paradox exists in asserting, on the one hand, that peoples are entitled to equal rights, to self-determination, and to preserve their culture and on the other hand that they may not have the right to sovereignty that other peoples enjoy. In effect, the Igbos and the Bengalis revolted against this principle; and leaders of many minority peoples over the world (some leaders of the French – Canadians, for example) contemplate a similar course of action.

Quebec / French-Canadians

For purposes of this presentation I do not intend to dwell too long on the concept of "volk" and the meaning of "peoples". May I say that the use of these terms by C.J.R. Dugard in the Appeal Court decision of *Mathebe v Regering van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika* 1988 (3) SA 667 is quite useful. For purposes of my presentation I shall use the term "people" (volk) in the sense of a body of people marked off by common descent, language, culture and historical tradition. The term "Volkstaat" (national State) then means a political unit for a particular people (volk) which is characterised by a common language, culture or history.

2.7 All the proponents of the Volkstaat concept have to accept, however, that the right of self-determination is not an absolute right. Like other human rights there are limitations to the application and recognition of this right. From section 5(1) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR it is clear for example that the application of the right of self-determination may not lead to the destruction or impairment of other rights. Section 5(1) stipulates that "nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised herein...."

Furthermore the obligation upon states to honour this right must be "in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations" (Article 1(3) of the ICCPR and ICESCR) with the purpose to protect international peace and security".

In addition the *Declaration* contains a limitation on the right of self-determination in so far as nothing contained in this right "shall be construed as authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States" (Cf. also par. 6 of the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14th December 1960 and *Vienna Declaration* of 25th June 1993, chapter 1).

It is noteworthy that the *Declaration* stipulates that only "States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.... and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour" may appeal to this "general interest" in order to limit the exercise of the right to self-determination in this manner. A government, therefore, which does not represent the whole popula-

the right of a people or a nation to determine freely by themselves without any outside pressure their political and legal status as a separate entity, preferably in the form of an independent State, the form of government of their choice, and the form of their economic, social and cultural system.

Jordan Paust formulates the relationship between self-determination and human rights as follows:

> The right of self-determination is the right of all peoples to participate freely and fully in the sharing of *all* values (e.g. power, well-being, enlightenment, respect, wealth, skill, rectitude and affection). The right to political self-determination involves this broader focus but may be summarised as the collective right of people to pursue their own political demands, to share power equally, and as the correlative right of the individual to participate freely and fully in the political process. Whether or not collective and individual self-determination are viewed as human rights as such, there is no question that self-determination and human dignity are intrically interconnected with human rights as well as the only legitimate measure of authority – the 'will of the people'.

The implication is that where the rights of cultural entities are disregarded the individual rights of members of such a group are seriously jeopardised. It could, therefore, be said that ethnic self-determination could be an important precondition for the effective realisation and guarantee of human rights. It is of particular importance to note that the *Human Rights Committee* deems self-determination important "because its realisation is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights" (Cf. also the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966) (ICCPR); *International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights* (1966) (ICESCR)).

In the light of the foregoing it can safely be said that the right of self-determination is an essential condition for the empowerment of all people in the political process.

2.6 From the reaction to the political changes in this country over the last number of years it appears that a substantial segment of Afrikaner people deem their cultural identity and political independence so important that political self-determination of ethnic groups is not a phenomenon which can be wiped under the carpet. The political actors in this country in particular and the international community in general has a responsibility to work towards a feasible solution and accommodation of these aspirations.

2.3 The Vienna Declaration of 25th June 1993 continues the international commitment towards the maintenance of peace by recognising the principle of self-determination:

> *Considering* the major changes taking place on the international scene and the aspirations of all the peoples for an international order based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, including the promoting and encouraging of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, on peace, democracy, justice, equality, rule of law, pluralism, development, better standards of living and solidarity.

In part II, paragraph *bis*, the right of peoples to self-determination is expressed as follows:

> All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Read with Article 1(2) of the Charter of the United Nations this *Declaration* is an extension of the formulations of self-determination contained in other international documents.

2.4 The interpretation of the *Declaration* has to take into account the use of the term "people" in the international legal sphere. From the proceedings of UNESCO it appears that the term "people" is associated with a particular cultural identity, which Vernon van Dyke, a well-known author on self-determination and human rights, describes in terms of

> such characteristics as language, religion, and race, and more broadly by shared attitudes, customs, and traditions. To qualify as a people, those sharing a culture should think of themselves as collectively possessing an enduring separate identity, and they are likely to be predominantly of common descent.

Although views on self-determination in Afrikaner circles may vary there is general agreement as to the entity or "self" which should have a right to self-determination.

2.5 In recent years the right to self-determination has become intimately entwined with the concept of human rights. As a "right" F. Pzetacznik sees the right to self-determination as

In a new phase of constitutional development in this country we have the wonderful opportunity of addressing these paradoxes in our endeavours to harmonise and synthesise the principle of self-determination and that of territorial integrity.

2.9 Cognisance should be taken of the fact that full ethnic autonomy within clear geographic boundaries is accepted in quite a few constitutions of countries where ethnic separation is a reality which could destabilise the constitutional dispensation in such countries. In the Soviet Union for example the Constitution in section 72 made provision for the fact that "each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the USSR". In the constitution of Yugoslavia a right to full autonomy and self-determination was provided for in the following terms:

> The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely expressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historical aspirations, aware that further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the common interest, have together with the nationalities with which they live, united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community of working people – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

These formulations clearly illustrate the need for the recognition of full political autonomy of ethnic groups to the point of secession under particular circumstances and conditions.

Such a right of full political autonomy and secession is also contained in the Dutch and English Common Law of our country. Hugo Grotius in his authoritative work *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* provided for such a right of secession on the basis that the right of a part of the population to protect itself is stronger than the right of the nation over the part. The part availing itself of secession, according to Grotius "employs the right which it had before entering the association". The same line of thought is also to be found in his work *Apologeticus* (translated and published under the name of *Verantwoordingh*, in 1622). On the same grounds he recognised the sovereignty of indigenous peoples on the grounds: ***suas reges, suam rempublicam; suas leges, sua jura***).

In the *Interim Report on Group and Human Rights* (August 1991) the presentation I made to the South African Law Commission on this point was accepted. Recognition was also given to my exposition on political autonomy and secession in

VS ≠ Apartheid ≠ self-determinatie

the English Common Law. According to Cobban this principle has been applied since the time of the War of Independence. He writes:

> The British Government saw no *via media* between the sovereignty of Parliament and secession, and forced the American colonies to make the choice between legislative subjection to a parliament in which they were not represented and the assertion of a right of self-determination.

Elsewhere he writes

> The history of the development of the dominions into autonomous communities, reaching theoretical completion in the peaceful secession of Eire from the British Commonwealth, is sufficient evidence of the progress of the right of self-determination in the British political mind since the time of the War of American Independence.

It should firstly be added, however, that in most instances of secession in the international sphere over the last two centuries a lot of pressure was exercised on secessionist movements to guarantee the human rights and freedoms of people of different ethnic origin.

Secondly, secession only comes into play where a group of common ethnic origin is concentrated within determinable geographical boundaries and the recognition of political autonomy of such a group will not lead to the impairment or destruction of the economy or other infrastructure of the mother country.

2.10 Quite often one hears about a "federal" right to self-determination and the question is whether such a right really exists. A.N. Wachudu identifies five levels on which self-determination operate, namely *human rights* on the *individual level*; *minority rights* on the sub-national level; *national independence* on the national level; *regional integration* on a regional level and a "global central guidance system". From Wachudu's model it appears that a federal solution could be offered on three levels, namely on the sub-national, national and regional levels. Along much the same lines Rabl identifies four facets of a peaceful process of self-determination, namely a people, the legal and factual possibility to express its will, and the realisation of its will and the willingness of the existing state authority to accept it.

From this perspective the right of self-determination has the features of a process:

> The right of peoples to self-determination is a continuing process. Once a group of people has attempted to fulfil one of the modes of implementing the right to self-determination, it continues to have the prerogative to assert the right.

Otto Kiminich sees greater autonomy for ethnic groups within federal structures of state as a valuable starting point for the realisation of the principle of self-determination

> The federal solution is closely related to autonomy. It recommends itself wherever an ethnic group lives in a territory which in size, location and resources meets the minimum requirements of a federal unit. It may also contribute to solving the problems of trapped minorities because a federal unit may provide for group autonomy by its constitution or State laws in a specific way not opened by the Constitution of the union. Flexibility and adaptability are the catchwords. Federalism is best suited to meet these requirements. There are many historical examples for the various ways in which federalism can be used to solve the problems of multi-ethnic states.

Although there is no clear federal right of self-determination, it could form an important manifestation of self-determination in the political development of an ethnic group towards full political autonomy. Kimmimich formulates it very aptly:

> Federalism is only one form of implementation of this right. And in many cases it might prove to be only a transitional stage in a long process of self-determination leading to a wider unity. But exactly for this reason it is one of those aspects of self-determination which point to the future.

In the light of the complexities of the South African political scene proponents of the Volkstaat idea will have to accept that full political autonomy cannot be realised overnight. On the other hand an open ended formulation of self-determination, starting on a federal basis may provide the stability necessary for political change in the years to come.

It should be noted, however, that providing for a federal model in a multi-ethnic society can address some of the problems that may lead to secession, but may not necessarily quell secessionist sentiments. On the other hand a State authority must accept the fact that if it is committed to accommodate the *legitimate expectations* of ethnic groups, it should not shoot itself in the foot by acting paternalistic to the extent where the *bona fides* of the government could be questioned.

2.11 Applying untried constitutional models makes it imperative to have the trust of all the major components within a political dispensation. A phenomenon which has, over the last decade or so, opened new perspectives on the question of self-determination is the possibility of the inclusion of escape clauses as means of security for political groups.

Some European heads of state, most notably former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, have expressed a reluctance to commit their countries to the political union of Europe. This may be because the nature of the union itself, and hence its consequences for the well-being of particular member states, is uncertain and most likely will only be clarified fully after the initial commitment to union has been made and efforts are already underway to implement the provisions of the agreement. Such understandable reservations might be overcome if the initial agreement itself included an explicit right to secede. By creating a satisfactory default position, a constitutional right to secede can remove the barrier to association that uncertainty raises.

Applying this to the final Constitution, a strong point could be made out for the inclusion of such a law of secession in the Constitution for a new form of political association.

2.12 The fundamental question now is how such a right to secede as an escape mechanism could be incorporated in the constitution without undermining the democracy. Addressing the conditions in which secession could be morally justified one is lead to accept that the way in which unjustified claims of secession could be intercepted would be to devise constitutional mechanisms to give some weight both to the interest in secession and the interest in preserving majority rule. The most obvious way to achieve this would be to allow secession under certain circumstances, but to minimise the danger of strategic bargaining by erecting inconvenient but surmountable constitutional barriers to secession. For example, the constitution might recognise a right to secede, but require a majority – say two-thirds – of those in the potentially seceding area to endorse secession by a referendum vote.

The purpose of allowing amendment while erecting strong majority requirements is to strike an appropriate balance between two legitimate interests: that of providing flexibility for change versus that of securing stability.

Secondly it would be important to have the necessary security that the state and/or private individuals will be compensated for their loss of property as a result of secession. A combination of these approaches could serve to balance legitimate interests in secession, on the one hand, and equally legitimate interests in political stability and territorial integrity, on the other.

With reference to the results of the break-up of the Soviet political system, Alan Buchanan says:

> Other states facing secessionist movements in the future can profit from the Soviet Union's embarrassment by thinking pro-actively about constitutional provisions for secession. Chief among these is South Africa.

Even more weight should be attached to Buchanan's remarks in view of the fact that a realistic appreciation of the racial and ideological diversity of South Africa, along with the recognition that its borders are an artefact of colonial conquest, imposed in almost total disregard for ethnic boundaries and the historical claims of various indigenous peoples, suggest that even a rather loose federal constitution may not alone suffice on the long run.

2.13 From the relevant sections and principles of the Interim Constitution it is clear that this Constitution does not accept a Volkstaat as such, but provides for the possibility that the proponents of a Volkstaat can convince the Commission on Provincial Government to accept such a concept. Constitutional Principle XXXIV, therefore, is formulated in such a manner that it does not exclude a Volkstaat but does not specifically provide for one.

One must add, however, that a Volkstaat could be accommodated in terms of Principle XXXIV read on its own in so far as it refers to "a territorial entity within the Republic or any other recognised way". This leaves the possibility for the construction and recognition of a Volkstaat wide open.

There are, however, numerous difficulties in reconciling this Principle with Constitutional Principle I providing for one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and a democratic system of government committed to achieving equality between men and women and people of all races, and section 1(1) providing for one sovereign state.

These provisions in the Interim Constitution are typical examples of the paradox mentioned previously – a paradox which needs to be clarified in the Constitution. A responsible way to do this would seem to have three major components:

Firstly, Principle XXXIV appears to be a sensible provision in so far as it contains the major segments of the principle of self-determination for ethnic groups to the point of regional autonomy. This Principle should be supported by provisions in the body of the Constitution which reflect a federal system of government as point of departure for accommodating the political aspirations of ethnic groups.

Secondly, Principle XXXIV should be formulated in such a way that the relationship thereof with other Constitutional Principles is clearer, to the extent where there can be no uncertainty of the fact that the notion of self-determination also includes geographical autonomy.

Furthermore, such a formulation should be complemented by provisions in the chapter on human rights, containing the normative framework within which full political autonomy within a geographical entity would be acceptable (e.g. prohibiting impairment of human rights; prohibiting violation of the territorial integrity of the country by monopolising the infrastructure and preventing an unreasonable fragmentation of the territory etc.).

Thirdly, an escape clause for the proponents of ethnic self-determination should be contained in the chapter dealing with human rights, providing for instances of emergency secession as well as the conditions applicable (e.g. strong majorities and compensation to the state and private individuals who will lose property as a result of secession).

3. CONCLUSIONS

One of the biggest challenges facing the drafters of the Constitution will be to solve the apparent paradox between human rights and democracy on the one hand and that of self-determination and the Volkstaat on the other. It is worth-while facing this challenge and contributing towards humanity and human aspirations in our lovely country.

Solving this paradox means crossing the bridge together into a New South Africa, to guarantee human rights, guarding democracy and ensuring that proponents of a Volkstaat could realise their dream in future (possibly as a tenth Province

if they so wish), even if this ultimately boils down to a form of evolutionary and negotiated secession.

Enclosure A: A.W.G. Raath, *Selfbeskikking en Sesessie: Die saak vir die Afrikanervolk* (1990).

Enclosure B: A.W.G. Raath, *Selfbeskikking en Sesessie: 'n moontlike toekomstige Afrikanerstaat* (1994).

Regionalisation initiatives

4.

- Complete success is problematic today. Cuts-democracy
- no clear demarcated territory for Afr.
- Does majority of Afr favour VS.

Concern: Adjudged by international stds, the secession claim for Afr community is unlikely to succeed — Afr are still leading much too comfortable a life in SA

Afr should: pursue limited autonomy within SA.

Limited autonomy. (⇒ escape clause ⇐) Volkstaat as a long term goal.

Post Vienna:

Types of SD

① Secession
② limited SD (cultural/political autonomy w/i existing state)

Singapore (late 60's)

New Wave of succession in post-communist world.

Srilanka, Burma, Indon, Chechn, Turkey.

Minority Protection

Copenhagen document 1990 adopted by Part on Stability, 20/3/1995

1992 - 'Minority' declaration (UN)

No clear guidelines vv which ~~states~~ group qualify for ①/② in Int. law.

Criteria for succession

① Mother state = undemocratic
② got = unwilling to negotiate minority LSD.
③ territory is needed.
④ Self-defined community forms a majority in the regn
⑤ Idea of cultural self-preservation. Evidence of a threat to way of life.
⑥ History of autonomy.
⑦ dedication towards HR
⑧ Evidence of potential violence
⑨ SD = prospect for conflict Resolution
eg. Slovenia.

Alt. - LSD:

1. distinct community on grounds of language, ethnic identity
2. desire cultural spol.
3. ethnic autonomy is consistent with democracy.
strengthens democracy.

Practical problems

1. migration into Alt vs. See Fr Canadians
2. Right to succession (⇒ required autonomy (escape clause)
See Ethiopia
3. International relations by regions.
federal States Belg, Canada, Switz, US, local foreign relations treaty.